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Abstract
This thesis addresses a range of interdependent themes centred on how emotions are 
picked up from the body movements of actors engaged in natural communication. There 
were 4 main aims. The first considered the importance of the social context. The second 
was to further our understanding of the mechanisms responsible for the perception of 
affect from biological motion. The third considered how the skill to read affect from body 
movements develops in children. The final aim was to further elucidate what is known 
about affect. A corpus of point-light displays were created from the body movements of 
pairs of female and male actors engaged in interlocution whilst emoting. A MacReflex 
motion analysis system was used to record their movements. Observers viewed either the 
original and/or various permutations of the original displays and made judgements about 
the portrayed emotions. The results of the first set of experiments, which tested whether 
subjects could recognise the emotions and also explored the effects of inversion, were in 
line with previous findings which showed that emotions can be recognised from 
biological motion and that inversion impairs recognition. However, this latter effect 
varied, depending on the emotion shown. Of central importance, the following two 
experiments considered the social context of the displays. For most of the emotions 
tested, it was found that seeing a natural interaction made a statistically significant 
enhancement to how well many emotions were recognised. This finding highlights the 
need for natural stimuli and the need to consider emotions at a social, as well as an 
intrapersonal, level. The mechanisms were further investigated in the next set of 
experiments. It was shown that biological motion of affect is processed differently to 
biological motion of locomotion. The final investigation focused on how children develop 
this ability: Children as young as five are able to identify some of the emotions shown 
and by age nine development is almost at adult levels. In summaiy, the findings reported 
in this thesis show that the social context is important in emotion and future studies 
should incorporate the social context in the stimuli. They also lend support for a) 
categorical theories of emotion and b) the existence of distinct modules in the mind.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1. General introduction
Humans are rai'ely completely still and, “throughout our evolutionary history, being 
an animal has been reliably —  if imperfectly —  correlated with self-generated 
motion” (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994, p 100). Therefore, animal movement or 
‘biological motion’ is a major property of the world. Humans are inherently social 
and one of the supreme achievements of evolution is that vision allows us to pick up 
exquisitely the movements made by other conspecifics in order to make sense of our 
surrounding social environment. Sure and immediate understanding about the 
meaning of others’ movements has an impact on our survival. Expressed via 
movement of the face and body and by speech and vocalisation, emotions are also a 
fundamental part of being human. Emotions shape our own existence as how we 
communicate them has implications for how others behave, which in turn affects our 
own behaviour. When communicated via movement, it is clear that emotions can be 
expressed and perceived via facial (e.g. Ekman, 2003) and bodily channels (e.g. 
Dittrich, Troscianko, Lea, and Morgan, 1996; Wallbot, 1998). Four important areas 
of enquiry with respect to the latter context, which are the focus of this thesis, are:
i) To see whether, and if so how, the social context is important for the 
perception of affect^ from biological motion.
ii) To further our understanding of the mechanisms responsible for the 
perception of biological motion.
in) To investigate how the skill to read emotion from body movements 
develops in childhood. 
tv) To further elucidate what is known about emotions.
Johansson (1973), in his seminal paper on biological motion perception described a 
method by which pictorial cues such as colour, texture, boundaries and edges could
* The terms ‘em otion’ and ‘affect’ are used interchangeably in this thesis.
be omitted from any display of an event^. Therefore, the only information left was 
about the motion of the sti'ucture. Any moving structure could be subjected to this 
treatment but naturally human movement has been the main focus of attention. 
Initially, this effect was achieved by attaching bright spots to the major joints of an 
actor and recording in darkness. Since then, Johansson’s method has been replicated 
many times and more technologically advanced procedures have been employed to 
create such displays. The term ‘point-light display’ is coined to describe this type of 
presentation as typically all that can be seen in a display is a collection of light points 
on an otherwise blank background. For example, between 11 and 13 points of 
moving light are typically used to show a point-light human. Subjects can easily 
identify correctly activities such as running, walking and jumping in these displays 
(e.g. Johansson, 1973). When such a display is shown every viewer can almost 
instantaneously pick out a human performing the action and, importantly, movement 
is critical for these types of displays to be identified as when observers view a static 
display of a point-light figure they do not recognise the figure as being human 
(Johansson, 1976). This technique has been invaluable for grasping an understanding 
of biological motion as it strips away almost all of the other pictorial cues in the optic 
anay that would still exist in normal ‘full-light’ video displays. Thus, the information 
remaining is from movement^.
This thesis addresses the perception of point-light displays and in particulai' the use 
of this technique to explore how emotions aie perceived when only cues from body 
movement are available. However, a different approach to this question is taken as a 
shift is made to consider emotions at the social rather than the more traditionally 
examined intrapersonal level. Therefore, the point-light displays used as stimuli in 
this thesis are novel because they show two people (a ‘dyad’) conversing naturally to 
explore how emotions are perceived when they are portrayed in a communicative 
context.
 ^ The term ‘event’ is used throughout this thesis as a term for occurrences that involve dynam ic m ovem ent as the key feature. 
 ^ Som e spatial structure from the relationships between the point-lights also remains.
The four empirical chapters in this thesis address a range of interdependent themes 
concerned with how affect is recognised from body movement. There is now 
considerable empirical evidence that shows emotions can be readily perceived from 
full- light bodily expressions (e.g. Dittrich et al., 1996; Wallbot 1998) and, more 
impressively, reduced cue situations (point-light displays) of the same types of 
movements (e.g. Dittrich et al., 1996; Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell, and Young, 
2004). As reviewed in detail below, point-light displays that have been used in the 
past to convey the expression of affect have been useful; however, it is important that 
there should be consideration for viewing the subject from a social angle.
The first of the empirical work is discussed in Chapter 3. The research here examines 
the nature of perception when emotions are expressed via biological motion in more 
natural communication behaviours than have been previously explored. Therefore, 
the work in this chapter first assesses the utility of the behavioural samples used as 
stimuli for the rest of the reseai'ch reported in this thesis and also allows compaiisons 
to be made between the results of this work and that from other research laboratories.
The experiments reported in Chapter 3 address the question of how readily emotions 
can be identified from interpersonal expressions of them and how manipulations of 
display orientation affect perception. To alter the orientation in biological motion 
displays is a common procedure that elucidates the processing mechanisms 
responsible for recognition of such displays in that it reveals how the images might 
be processed by the perceptual system. For example, when inverting point-light 
stimuli on the image plane, intiastimulus kinematics such as velocity of the dots and 
relative physical positioning remain constant. Therefore, the percept cannot be 
accounted for by low-level processing —  where the image is thought to be 
constructed by the visual system computing the relative motions of the dots (e.g. 
Webb and Aggai*wal, 1982).
Both qualitative and quantitative measures of analysis are discussed in Chapter 3; the 
qualitative work attempts to validate the quantitative results. The chapter also 
investigates the issue of whether males and females perceived the stimuli differently 
from each other.
Importantly, the work in Chapter 4 (Experiments 3 and 4) investigates how the 
perception of emotion is modified by the social context; an area that has so fai" been 
largely neglected in this reseaich field. The aim of the work described here was to 
take a first step at examining certain aspects of communication with regard to 
recognition of affect from biological motion. Emotions should be considered at a 
social level as emotions aie ‘intentional’, i.e. they are always ‘about’ something and 
these things are usually people or events (Manstead, 2005). Furthermore, during 
communication, emotions are frequently shared between people. Two important and 
novel issues are explored in the chapter. The first pertains to the importance of the 
interaction between the dyads in the display. In this experiment the displays are 
manipulated so that the natural dyadic exchange is removed to see if perceptability is 
an emergent property of the social interaction. The second investigates the 
communicative interaction independently of affect. It is asked whether the third 
person observer (i.e. the subject in the experiment) is able to identify the interlocutor 
from the minimal information available.
Chapter 5 follows on from the work in Chapter 3 that investigates the rotated 
displays as it contains further experiments where the visual information specified in 
each display is manipulated in order to investigate the mechanisms that might be 
responsible for the percept. The first experiment (Experiment 5) concentrates on 
whether playing the displays in reverse affects recognition. Recent evidence shows 
that point-light displays of walking dogs (Pavlova, Kiageloh-Mann, Birbaumer, and 
Sokolov, 2002) and walking humans (e.g. Vanrie, Dekeyser, and Verfaillie, 2004) 
can still be recognised when this manipulation is carried out although some 
perturbations are documented in both cases. These observations, in combination with 
the general findings regarding effects of display orientation, have led Pavlova et al. 
(2002) to make important claims about the organisation of the mechanisms 
responsible for biological motion. Experiment 5 will therefore explore whether such 
claims are transferable to abstract entities, i.e. emotions rather than concrete 
activities.
It has been demonstrated that there is considerable redundancy in a full-body point- 
light walker and findings are suggestive of a system that categorises components of 
the body (Pinto and Shiffrar, 1999). However, whether this is true for the specific 
case of affect is a question that is so far unanswered. Therefore, the second 
experiment reported in Chapter 5 (Experiment 6) is concerned with the minimal 
stimulus cues from which information is available for affect within a point-light 
display.
Despite the fact that event perception is a thriving reseaich area there have been very 
few studies that consider how such skills develop in childhood. There are some 
studies to show that the ability to perceive the information contained within point- 
light displays develops early in infancy (e.g. Arterberry and Bornstein, 2002; 
Bertenthal, Proffitt & Kramer, 1987; Fox and McDaniel, 1982). Further, there is no 
shortage of studies conducted to assess typically developing children’s ability to 
recognise emotion; for example to identify emotion from faces (e.g. Izard, 1971; 
Walden & Field, 1982), voice prosody (Stifter & Fox, 1987), music (Cunningham & 
Sterling, 1988; Boone & Cunningham, 2001) and static body postures (Tracy, 
Robins, and Lagattuta, 2005). However, these two research areas have rai'ely been 
combined in a way that sets out to study how the skill to recognise affect from body 
movement develops. This imbalance is addiessed and examined in the final empirical 
chapter (Chapter 6) where the developmental trajectory for acquisition of this skill is 
assessed by studying how well 5-, 7- and 9-year-old children can identify emotion 
from the displays. Finally, in Chapter 7 it is discussed how the work contributes to 
the topic of emotion. Reseaich methods and future experiments aie also discussed in 
this chapter.
The remainder of this chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical backgrounds to 
each of these issues beginning with a discussion on emotions.
1.2, Emotions
Emotions are complex but here follows a restricted review which is largely related to 
the studies reported in this thesis. Emotions are clearly a fundamental aspect of being 
human and have been discussed at least since the times of Aristotle. They play a 
significant part in our everyday lives and therefore, the topic of emotion cannot be 
ignored.
Damasio (2000) has defined emotions as “a collection of physiological responses 
triggered by certain brain systems when the organism represents certain objects or 
situations” (p-15). This definition is a biologically based ‘hardwired’ view and it 
stands next to the Darwinian position that emotions are adaptive. Clearly, there are 
other viewpoints but most psychologists recognise the fact that emotions serve a 
functional purpose and would not dispute the fact that there are biological 
mechanisms responsible for their production.
There has been vast attention devoted to the topic of emotion in recent years and yet 
there are only a few fundamental characteristics of affect that many theorists agree 
about. For example, most theorists agree that there are some ‘basic’ emotion 
categories which should receive higher status than the rest, although there is little 
consensus about which emotions should have a higher status and how many of them 
should be considered in this way (Ortony and Turner, 1990). For example, Watson 
(1930) considered that only the emotions of love, fear and rage were fundamental. In 
contrast, Frijda (1986) has considered that as many as 18 emotions should be 
considered as being basic. Yet a few theorists advocate the position that there are no 
basic emotions. For example, Averill (1994) has aigued that it is not profitable to 
consider a small subset of basic emotions as it means that nonbasic emotions will 
receive less attention. However, neaiiy all theorists include anger, joy, sadness and 
fear as basic emotions (Ortony and Turner, 1990). Also, there is much support for 
disgust to be included in this list of basic emotions (e.g. Izard, 1977). Although 
emotions tend to be discussed in terms of discrete categories more than one emotion
can be experienced at the same time, for example one can be angry about a friend’s 
behaviour but feel sad for the friend at the same time (Ekman, 2003).
Emotions have multiple components which include physiological, expressive and 
experiential (feeling) components which serve inter- and intra-personal functions 
(Ekman, 1994). There is substantial evidence to demonstrate that emotions have a 
physiological basis. For instance, Damasio (2000) has shown that damage to the 
prefrontal cortex is inversely associated with patients’ abilities to process emotion 
normally.
Most emotions have clear behavioural characteristics for that emotion; for instance, 
hot anger has very obvious expressive signals that are expressed via the voice, the 
face and the body. These external signals aie also observable in other primates 
(Ekman, 1994) and particular facial characteristics for specific emotions can be 
observed cross-culturally (e.g. Ekman and Friesen, 1974; Ekman, 2003). However, 
several emotions such as contempt have few external signs (Ekman, 2003).
There is some support for the view that emotions are involuntary and short-lived 
patterns of thought and behaviour which have a quick onset (e.g. Ekman, 1994). That 
they have a quick onset pertains to the adaptive value of emotions as they serve to 
enable us to act quickly in response to important events (Ekman, 1994). As such, 
emotions have developed over evolutionary time to prepare an animal to act in 
response to environmental stimuli. However, Damasio (2000) has argued that 
emotions have varied time profiles, some have a quick onset but others have a 
gradual onset and a slow decay, which can best be considered as “background 
emotions” (p-16). Ekman (1994) has aigued that any state that does not have a quick 
onset should be considered a mood. The distinction between emotions and moods, at 
the present time, appeal's to be uncleai'.
Although most authors agree that emotions serve as functional mechanisms, there is 
also the view that emotions serve no purpose. Emotions do not appear to be 
functional all of the time; for example, learned helplessness could be equated to 
apathetic soitow  (Frijda, 1994a). This author has argued that emotions may simply
be remnants of past adaptive responses but serve no present functional purpose, or 
alternatively, that they were never functional —  they may be quite simply an 
expression of a person’s awareness of an event rather than an adaptive mechanism.
Many authors argue that emotions have valenced states, that is, they appear to be 
either positive or negative (pleasant or unpleasant). Ortony and Turner (1990) have 
argued that to be affectively valenced is a necessaiy state for an emotion, otherwise it 
is simply considered as a cognitive state. Surprise does not have any particular 
valenced state (see Ortony and Turner, 1990; Ekman, 2003) and so accordingly 
should not be considered as an emotion (Ortony and Turner, 1990). However, terms 
of ‘negativity’ and ‘positivity’ might be best avoided altogether as attributes of 
emotions. For example, Ekman (2003) points out that sometimes negative emotions 
can be enjoyed —  such as having a good cry at a sad film. Further, negative 
emotions often serve us in a positive way. For example, the feeling of anger or 
jealousy may serve to protect an important interpersonal relationship if the emotion 
is directed towards an individual who is a potential threat to that relationship. 
Furthermore, Buck (1999) has argued that if positive and negative emotions are 
simply defined in terms of approach or avoidance then anger would be a positive 
emotion. However, it can be contended that sometimes anger leads to avoidance 
behaviour (Davidson, 1994).
That emotions have valenced states is a concept that pertains to the structure of 
affect. There are two main positions that relate to this issue — one of which (already 
discussed) is that there are discrete categories where each category is qualitatively 
different from the next. The other position, derived as a result of factor analyses and 
multidimensional scaling, is that affect can be described in terms of a set of (usually 
two) dimensions— of which valence is normally considered to be one and the second 
usually relates to the degree of activation (energy) of the affect (Russell, 1980, 
Russell and Bairett, 1999). These dimensions aie often thought to be inter-related so 
that all affect can be accounted for in terms of paiticular combinations of pleasure 
and activation (Russell, 1980, Russell and Baiiett, 1999). In this dimensional model, 
affect is generally represented in a two-dimensional space in which emotions fall in a 
circle (sometimes called a circumplex) where, for example, happiness falls at 0” and
disti’ess at 135° (Russell, 1980 — see Russell and Barrett, 1999 for vaiious schematic 
representations of dimensional accounts).
Clearly, it can be seen from the short discussion above that the topic of emotion is 
complicated and that authors often disagree. However, disputes regaiding the topic 
can only be solved by a continuation of scientific exploration.
Here follows a brief description for each of the emotion categories that will be 
investigated in this thesis. Romantic love is included and discussed to a greater 
extent than the other categories as it is suggested that this state should be considered 
as an important emotion.
Anger
The word anger covers numerous experiences from an annoyance that someone has 
pai'ked tightly next to your own vehicle to the rage that is felt if your teenage child is 
attacked as they walk home from a party. Ekman (1994) has postulated that the 
antecedents for anger include threats and insults and an incident that violates one’s 
own values. Thus offensive acts towards an individual, or the individual’s family and 
possessions, can be considered as the antecedent to this emotion. The action 
tendency of anger is to attack or aggress, or sometimes to withdraw (Davidson, 
1994). Anger produces increases to normal heart rate which demonstrates the 
involvement of the sympathetic nervous system (which becomes active in response 
to aversive stimuli) and is responsible for ‘fight or flight’ behaviour. (Le Doux, 
1994).
Fear
Fear has probably received the most attention of all the emotions. Fear is an aversive 
emotional state that performs the role of mediating escape in times of danger 
(Ohman, 2000) and similar expressions are observable in other animals which 
suggests they also experience feai*. There is a detectable physiological basis for this 
emotion as there are strong skin conductance responses to feai-evoking stimuli such
as spiders and snakes (e.g. Flykt, 2005), Like anger, fear produces increases to 
normal heart rate which suggests the involvement of the sympathetic nervous system 
(Le Doux, 1994). Furthermore, there is overwhelming evidence that there is a 
specific region of the brain —  the amygdala —  that is heavily involved in the 
processing of fear (LeDoux, 1994; Oilman, 2005). The amygdala is served by a fast 
subcortical processing highway that does not involve the cortex (Le Doux, 2000). 
There are vast differences in the ways that fearful experiences are dealt with which 
depend on the severity of the threat but the general action tendency is to escape, 
become still or to attack (Ohman, 2005).
Sadness
Unlike the functional accounts for fear or anger, it is harder to understand the 
motivation for the feeling of sadness. Most theorists agree that sadness is the 
resultant state that is associated with a particular loss or failure to achieve important 
goals or a failure in important social relationships (Power, 1999). Sadness may be 
seen as a cry for help although it is not necessarily manifested by crying (Clore, 
1994). Emotional disorders such as depression are related to sadness (Power, 1999). 
There is neuroscientific evidence to suggest that the amygdala is involved in the 
processing of sadness stimuli (e.g. Adolphs and Tranel, 2004).
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Romantic Love
Like sadness, love is normally focused on a particular person or an event. Love in 
general is associated with the involvement of affection. This is the most contentious 
of all the categories included for investigation here as romantic love is not regarded 
as an emotion by all psychologists. In particular, Ekman (2003) considers that 
because romantic love is an enduring state it does not fit in with the criteria that 
emotions are briefly felt. However Ekman (2003) does concede that one aspect of 
love, which he describes as extreme pleasure defined as ecstasy or bliss can be 
considered an emotion due to its fleeting presence.
Love was considered to be an important emotion by some scholars in the last 
century. For example, Watson (1930) only considered that there were thiee emotions, 
of which love was one. Further, Haiiow (1958) wrote a classic paper on the nature of 
love and considered love to be a fundamental emotion. Love is also considered as a 
basic emotion in some modern taxonomies (e.g. Shaver, Wu and Schwartz, 1992). 
Indeed, the view by a layperson is that love is an important emotion: if participants 
are asked to list what they consider to be emotions, love is one of the most common 
responses (Fehr and Russell, 1991).
Hatfield and Rapson (1993) argue that scholars di'aw a distinction between two types 
of love — ‘passionate love’ and ‘companionate love’. These authors postulate that 
passionate love is an intense emotion that is a state when an individual longs for 
another. In contrast, Hatfield and Rapson (1993) argue that companionate love is a 
fai' less intense emotion which combines feelings of attachment and commitment as 
well as intimacy. Therefore, Hatfield and Rapson’s definition of passionate love may 
be similar to Ekman’s (2003) definition of love as a state of bliss.
That love is an emotion expressed when another person is desired shows that this 
emotion relates to approach behaviour (Gonzaga, Keltner, Londahl and Smith, 2001). 
This view is substantiated by evidence that the experience of love is correlated to
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Duchenne smiles'*, head nods, nonhostile arm and hand movements and leaning 
towards the partner (Gonzaga et al., 2001). Furthermore, from the analysis of 
videotapes of couple's facial expressions, interpersonal synchrony and proximity 
were found to be important correlates of romantic love (Gada, Bernieri, Grahe, 
Zuroff and Koestner, 1997). Clearly, it can be seen that love has a strong 
interpersonal element.
Love also has a physiological basis as the expression of this emotion is linked to the 
production of oxytocin which is a neuropeptide associated with bonding behaviour 
(Caiter, 1998).
Joy
Frijda (1994a) has ai'gued that it is hard to discern the function of joy. However, as 
discussed shortly, joy may be better understood if it is considered at an inteipersonal 
rather than an intrapersonal level. Joy is an emotion that is contingent on goal 
achievement but it is most likely to be related to more than just the satisfaction in 
achieving the goal (Clore, 1994). For example, the level of feeling joyous will 
depend on a number of other factors which may be based on personality, the 
satisfaction placed on biological needs (such as sex and food) and/or relief after 
problematic or demanding activities have ended (see Frijda, 1994a; Clore, 1994). 
Ekman (1994) has ai'gued that the antecedents for joy ar e pleasure, praise, relief and 
excitement. Unlike love and sadness, joy may not necessarily be focussed on a 
particulai' person or event (Averill and More, 1993). However, it is reasonable to 
suggest that the same point could be argued for sadness.
'* A Duchenne smile is created by using the zygomatic major muscle (which pulls the lips up into a 
smile) and the orbicularis oculi muscle (which creates wrinkling around the eyes).
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Disgust
There is some dispute between theorists as to what exactly disgust relates to. Rozin 
and Fallon (1987) argued for a narrow definition of disgust in that it is a food related 
emotion: it is adaptive in that it serves to protect the body from noxious substances. 
Alternatively, Rozin, Haidt and McCauley (2000) postulated a two-factor model of 
disgust that consisted of ‘core’ disgust which is the threat of eating rotten food, for 
example. The second factor related to ‘animal reminder disgust’ which was 
postulated to be associated with death and poor hygiene. Ekman (2003) also 
concedes that disgust is related to food in terms of feelings of repulsion towards 
noxious sensory stimulation. However, Ekman also argues strongly that moral 
disgust is an important factor to consider when defining disgust. Ekman (2003) 
argues that the most intense feelings of disgust relate to physical repulsion (such as 
the Nazi atrocities that occurred in concentration camps). Anger is an emotion most 
confused with disgust and anger reactions can turn into disgust over time (Ekman,
2003). There is less involvement of the sympathetic nervous system for disgust than 
for some of the other emotions discussed here as the experiences of anger, fear or 
sadness produce a larger increase in heart rate than disgust (Levenson, 1994).
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Emotions are social
The prevalent view of emotions is that they function at the private, intrapsychic 
level. This assumption is not contended here as emotions certainly have 
physiological and cognitive components and they function to seiwe us individually. 
However, this is not the only view. Humans are social in nature and we are 
biologically adapted to living in social groups (Dunbar, 1998). Furthermore, we 
depend on each other for survival. For example, collecting resources, dealing with 
threatening situations and raising families are behaviours shared between people 
(Ainsworth, 1989).
Emotions are a significant pait of our everyday social life: people are important to 
one another and they make appraisals about each other’s emotional states. For 
example, the emotions of love, hate, anger, jealousy, envy and contempt are centred 
on interpersonal appraisals (Parkinson, 1996) and Schaver, Wu and Schwartz (1992) 
found that out of 600 written descriptions of emotions by lay people around three 
quai'ters featured interpersonal relationships as a key theme in the description.
That emotions aie communicative in nature was a position also advocated by Darwin 
(1872,1999) —  although Aristotle also discussed the social element of emotion. 
Dai'win alluded to the close coupling of emotions and communication thioughout his 
work, as the anecdotes described by him were often inherently social in nature. For 
example, when discussing anger he gave an example of a caught murderer who was 
surrounded by a mob of angry people “snaiiing with their teeth and making at him 
like wild beasts” (p-239). However, Dai'win did not relate the communicative value 
of emotions to the adaptive principles that he advocated, which Ekman (1999) 
considers to be a fundamental omission; Ekman (1999) postulated that emotions ai'e 
expressed in order to communicate to others, informing the observer that something 
important is happening to the expressor.
Emotions are adaptive in that they function to serve us at this social level, for 
example, to maintain the cohesiveness of a group or to maintain familial bonds in
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attachment (or to avoid interaction altogether, Levenson, 1994). For example, an 
emotion such as joy not only has the function of maintaining the individual’s 
behaviour but signals to others to continue their interaction with the individual 
(Emde, 1988). Furthermore, momentaiy displays of romantic love serve to promote 
and maintain long-term commitment behaviours in relationships (Gozanga et al., 
2001). The communicatory function of emotions occurs from an early age, as 
illustrated by the way that infants will look towards their caiegiver for assurance that 
a novel object can be approached. If the caregiver smiles the child will approach the 
object but if the caiegiver expresses feai', disgust or anger the child will not approach 
the object (Klinnert, Emde, Butterfield and Campos, 1987). The social exchange of 
affect is two-way, for example, toddlers have been shown to use paiticular displays 
of affect (sadness) in order to gain support from their caregivers (Buss and Kiel,
2004).
Thus, rather than thinking of emotions as states that reside only at the intrapersonal 
level, emotionality can be thought of as a dynamic relational process that occurs 
between the individual and the environment (Campos, Campos and Barrett, 1989; 
Blair, 2003). Therefore, the study of emotions at a social level must be of interest as 
emotions have interpersonal or intergroup regulatory outcomes.
Parkinson (1996) has argued that the study of emotions at a social level should 
replace cognitive and physiological approaches. Pai'kinson’s (1996) view is based on 
the ai'gument that emotions should be seen as ways to communicate between people. 
For example, Parkinson (1996) advocates that feai’ signals ‘help me’ and sadness 
signals ‘comfort me’.
Whilst the interpersonal and communicative aspects of emotions are important, a 
balanced view is required. Therefore, it is argued here that the investigation of 
emotions should include a social approach to supplement rather than replace 
enquiries made at physiological and cognitive levels.
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Mechanisms and behavioural evidence to suggest information is processed at a 
social level
This discussion now turns to the growing physiological and psychological evidence 
to support the view that emotions should be considered at a social level. First, the 
evidence to suggest that there aie neurons that function to guide social behaviour is 
reviewed.
In the neuropsychological literature it has been proposed that there is a coding 
system for action orientated behaviour at an interpersonal level (see Gallese, Keysers 
and Rizzolatti, 2004). This is based on the finding of so called ‘minor neurons’ in 
monkeys’ brains that aie activated not only when a monkey performs a task but also 
when a conspecific performs the same task (Gallese et al., 2004). This theory has 
been extended to humans as there is accumulating evidence that similar neural 
mechanisms exist in humans; in functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) 
studies the same brain aieas are involved for observing an action in another person as 
when the observed action is executed by the subject (Gallese et al., 2004). Similar 
findings have been reported that extends this theory to other sensory modalities; 
pai'ticipants have been found to show activation in pain related aieas of the brain 
when they watch others be subjected to painful stimuli (Hutchinson, Davis, Lozano, 
Tasker and Dostiovsky, 1999). Further, there may also be other shared interpersonal 
representations in humans (Thomas, Press and Haggard, 2005), These authors found 
that subjects were faster to respond to tactile stimulation to their own body when 
viewing a visual cue in a congruent (rather than an incongruent) anatomical location 
on a model’s body.
For the special case of affect, the role of the insula has recently been found to be 
fundamental in the feeling and understanding of disgust (Gallese et al., 2004). The 
same area of the insula is activated in FMRI studies when a subject experiences an 
unpleasant odour and when they are exposed to facial expressions of disgust. This 
evidence has led Gallese et al. (2004) to suggest that the same neural mechanisms 
may be responsible for first and third person experiences of emotion.
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However, Jacob and Jeannerod (2005) contend the view that there are neurons in the 
brain that exist to assist in social behaviour. These authors have argued that the 
existence of mirror neurons does not prove that these are the social mechanisms for 
intentional communication; rather they consider imitating another person’s 
movements is only likely to be sufficient for understanding his or her motor intention 
not their social aims. Furthermore, these authors argue that matching behaviour is not 
equal to social behaviour. Moreover, matching behaviour is not adaptively 
advantageous — for example, when exposed to threatening stimuli it is more useful 
to flee rather than imitate another person’s movements (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005). 
Indeed it can also be argued that single cell recordings do not give the whole story 
(Rose, 1996).
Even if, as yet, there is no concrete physiological basis for how social knowledge is 
processed, behavioural evidence does show that individuals are influenced by the 
emotions of others. Empirical evidence shows that positive emotions are facilitated 
by interpersonal interactions such as smiling, which was found to be positively 
correlated with the presence of a friend when happy films were viewed (Jakobs, 
Manstead and Fischer, 1999). Smiling was also enhanced when friends watched sad 
films together (Jakobs, Manstead and Fischer, 2001). Surprisingly then, in the latter 
case, although the stimulus was a sad film the presence of another person promoted 
smiling behaviour and inhibited the production of sad expressions. Conversely, sad 
expressions were produced when the sad movies were watched alone. Other evidence 
shows that emotions can have harmful effects on the outcomes of an event as it has 
been shown that the demands made by one person of another (the actor) alters 
depending on the perceived emotional state of the actor (van Kleef, De Dreu and 
Manstead, 2004). These researchers demonstrated, in an experiment that involved 
two-way computer-mediated negotiation, that participants conceded more to an 
angry opponent than a happy one.
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Conclusion
The topic of affect is much debated but many authors agree that there are basic 
categories of emotions which include anger, joy, sadness, fear and disgust. Love 
might also be considered a basic emotion as there are distinct (interpersonal) displays 
of love and love appears to have a physiological basis (the production of oxytocin). 
The prevalent view of emotions is that they function at the private, intrapsychic 
level. In this discussion it has been argued that emotions are also social. So far, the 
physiological evidence in support of this view is weak, however psychological 
evidence shows that the investigation of affect from a social perspective is an 
important avenue of enquiry. It is argued that physiological, cognitive and social 
approaches to the investigation of emotions are equally valuable.
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1.3. The importance of body movements and the evidence 
that body movements express affect
The human visual system has evolved to be able to extract important information 
from the environment. Movement is one such valuable property as humans and 
animals are raiely still (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994). Therefore dynamic, rather than 
static information, should be considered as a foundational feature of perception. The 
dynamics of behaviour add a substantial amount of information to that in a static 
display (McArthur and Baron, 1983). For example, when a ball is stationary its 
weight cannot be known simply by looking at it but can be instantly calculated when 
watching it roll down a hill (McArthur and Baron, 1983). The following discussion 
explains why the focus of attention in this thesis is about movement specifically 
expressed via the body.
Dynamic information conveyed by the body is undoubtedly important. For instance, 
body movement alone can be used as a form of communication, such as in gestures, 
in slumping or standing erect or moving quickly or slowly. Moreover, cross-cultural 
evidence confirms the importance of body movement as a mode of communication: 
actions directed towards objects by communication of gesture are evident in the 
cultural expressions of tribal rituals and these gestures act as substitutes for speech 
(Donald, 1991). Furthermore, body movement in combination with speech (and also 
with other bodily systems such as facial expression) is fundamental in natural human 
communication (Bachorowski, 1999; Wachsmuth, 2002; Planalp and Knie, 2002).
Body movement is likely to be a defining feature of our phylogenetic past as, in 
evolutionar y terms, movement of the body is postulated to be a precursor to language 
acquisition (Rizolatti and Arbib, 1998). These authors suggest that early hominids 
could have described an object or an event by using referential arm movements 
which, over time became accompanied by vocalisations. Rizolatti and Arbib (1998) 
argued it was unlikely for facial movement to be a precursor to language acquisition 
for two reasons: firstly, oro-facial communication is limited to a few actors, 
secondly, actions directed towards objects, that often accompany speech ar-e inherent
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in body language (Rizolatti and Arbib, 1998). Therefore, speech is likely to have 
evolved from body movement due to the flexibility and potential expansiveness of 
the brachio-manual system (arm movements).
Thus, according to Rizolatti and Arbib (1998), the use of body gestures and 
movements was fundamental as a precondition for language evolution as it allowed 
for group communication. Proximity is of course still important within the domain of 
social exchange: it is cleaiiy frustrating to be out of earshot from a speaker and at a 
distance so that their facial expressions cannot be clearly seen. For body movement 
to be a cue would mean that humans can pick up information that can be utilised 
when other communication channels are not easily available. Indeed, the perception 
of body movement is fundamental as it is likely to be the first information available 
when approaching or being approached by others.
The foregoing arguments suggest that body movement is a foundational 
characteristic of the communication system and yet the published literature shows 
that there has been a tendency to investigate expressions produced via the face rather 
than body. Almost without exception, all emotions are expressed (and can be 
perceived) via movement of the face and the body. Affect can be perceived from 
static facial expressions and from static body postures but it is far more natural to 
investigate emotion in the way in which it is naturally manifested (Atkinson et al. 
2004).
This discussion now reviews what literature there is that has dealt with the specific 
case of the perception of affect from body movement.
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Evidence to suggest that body movement specifies affect: Full-light 
observational and behavioural studies
Darwin’s (1872/1999) classic work detailed specific body movements and postures 
for many emotions. For example, his description of an angry man was as follows: 
“He canies his head erect, with his chest expanded and the feet planted firmly on the 
ground. He holds his arms in various positions with one or both elbows squaied, or 
with the arms rigidly suspended by the sides” (p.242). As well as body movements, 
Darwin also described the accompanying vocalisations for some emotions. For 
example, joy comprised “purposeless and extravagant movements of the body” 
coupled with “the utterance of various sounds” (p.80). After discussion in such 
eminent research it is surprising to find that the perception of emotion from bodily 
expression has been researched relatively infrequently in compaiison to the amount 
of work conducted on the expression of emotion in faces. In fact, research into affect 
from body movement has taken low status. Ekman (2003) emphasises the importance 
of facial expressions of affect and for instance, when describing anger he states that, 
“like all emotions, anger has a powerful signal in both face and voice” (p-125). 
However, Ekman neglects to mention the powerful, high movement activity of the 
body that also signals this emotion.
Despite the dearth of apparent interest in research that investigates body movements 
as a medium for expression, there is some evidence to suggest that specific body 
movements are associated with emotional states.
de Meijer (1989) has demonstrated that emotion attributions can be made from 
specific types of body movements. In this study, subjects were required to attribute 
affect to specific movement categories produced by actors shown in full-light 
(i.e.video) conditions. For instance, stretched, vertical movements of the whole body 
were found to correlate with joy and forceful movement was associated with anger. 
However, a problem with this study was the fact that actors were asked to produce 
body movements in spatial dimensions and with specific dynamics such as force and
21
velocity, i.e. they were not asked to express emotion. Therefore, whilst this study 
conti'ibutes to the debate, it does not tell us about the perception of emotion per se.
In a different approach, Wallbot (1998) investigated the specific link between the 
production and the perception of affect. This author employed twelve actors to 
produce expressions of affect, which were videotaped. That a large sample of actors 
were used was an important feature of the design as it has been argued that there are 
individual differences in actors’ movement styles and therefore this measure allowed 
for variation in performances (Wallbot, 1998). Fourteen emotions were produced 
including anger, joy, disgust, sadness and fear. The body movements were then 
coded from the played (silent) videotapes for the quality of movements produced 
such as ‘collapsed movement of the upper body’ and ‘arms stretched out to the 
front’ or ‘stretched out sideways’. It was found, using interrater reliability 
techniques, that 66% of the posture and movement categories distinguished different 
emotions. Therefore, these results showed that there appeared to be qualitative 
differences in movement between emotion categories. For example, a salient feature 
of anger was found to be lateralized and frontal movements with a lot of movement 
activity. In contrast, sadness was expressed with a collapsed upper body including 
forward facing shoulders and low movement dynamics (Wallbot, 1998).
In a similai' study, younger and older adults were able to recognise successfully the 
emotions of anger, sadness and happiness from videotapes (where facial information 
was blurred) which showed either one actor or two actors (together in the scene) 
depicting affect (Montepare, Koff, Zaitchik and Albert, 1999). In this study, the 
actors were given a scene in which to enact the emotion, for example, clapping ones 
hands (to depict joy). In most scenes the actors worked together, which Montepare et 
al. (1999) argued would ensure ecological validity; however, the actors were silent 
during their enactments, the scenes were scripted and it is not made clear* as to how 
the pairs of actors worked together. However, when the videotaped displays were 
rated for salient movement dimensions similar* results were documented as those 
recorded in Wallbot’s (1998) study. For* example, anger displays were rated highly 
for incorporating movements that were jerky, fast and expansive.
22
Taken together, the results of these behavioural studies suggest that there might be 
specific patterns of movement associated with paiticulai* affects, which is in line with 
Darwin’s (1872,1999) observations. However, the use of the point-light technique in 
experimental research might allow for firmer conclusions to be made about the 
importance of information from kinematics for the specification of affect.
Evidence to suggest that body movement specifies affect: Point-light studies
So far it has been shown that emotion is likely to be expressed via movement of the 
body but these observations have all been made in full-light conditions. A key 
question, however, concerns the contribution of solely kinematic information from 
the body that specifies affect. In Wallbot’s (1998) study, information from the face 
may have been available and, in the de Meijer (1989) study, although actors were 
instructed to keep neutral facial expressions this may not have always been the case: 
for instance, micro-expressions of affect cannot be concealed (Ekman, 1993) and it is 
possible that these would have been discernable in such displays. Even if facial 
expression can be discounted as a potential source of information for recognition, 
there are many other cues in the optic array that can be used as cues for perception. 
In a full-light display there aie fundamental properties of the visual world such as 
continuous surfaces, edges, shapes, background, depth cues, colour and texture, all of 
which contribute to perception (Gibson, 1950). These properties may provide cues to 
enable attiibutions about affect. For example, a red face may signify that an actor is 
angiy. Even a simple static shape such as a triangle can convey emotional meaning 
(see Pavlova, Sokolov and Sokolov, 2005). Point-light displays remove almost all of 
these elementary properties of the visual scene. In a point-light display the only 
information is that of kinematics, which includes reduced spatial information; this 
cannot be avoided as spatial information is derived from the relations between the 
point-lights.
From certain experiments there is an increasing amount of evidence to suggest that 
the information contained within a point-light display of the body is sufficient to 
specify affect. The major studies to show that affect can be recognised from displays 
of biological motion are summarised in Table 1. Walk and Homan (1984) were the
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first researchers to use the point-light method to investigate affect. By showing 
subjects point-light displays of different dances and emotions, they demonstrated 
(using a matching task as the dependent measure) that subjects could recognise fear*, 
anger, contempt, surprise, sadness and happiness. Next, Dittrich, et al. (1996) 
examined the ability of observers to recognise affect in standardised dance 
movements. Specifically they investigated surprise, fear, anger, disgust, grief and 
joy. Observers were shown full-light and point-light displays of affect and ranked 
them in order as to which emotion each display was most likely to depict. Observers’ 
rankings were recorded and converted into mean scores as a measure of emotion 
recognition accuracy. Dittrich et al. (1996) found that all of the emotions could be 
recognised above chance in the point-light condition with the exception of disgust. 
However, some emotions were recognised with more success than others. Portrayals 
of grief and joy were better identified than portrayals of feai* and anger. Portrayed 
disgust was the least well identified and it was confused with other emotions (non­
portrayals) as similar ratings as those received for disgust were given to fear and 
sadness non-portiayals. Dittrich et al, (1996) reported that the full-light displays were 
recognised more readily than the point-light displays. Disgust was also recognised 
above chance in this condition.
In another study where dance movements were used as stimuli, Brownlow, Dixon, 
Egbert and Radcliffe (1997) showed dance novices and dance experts point-light 
displays of happy and sad dances. These researchers demonstrated that perceivers 
with dance experience were able to make finer judgments about dance movements in 
which affect was portrayed over novices’ judgments of the same. This result shows 
that experience makes a difference to perception.
Atkinson et al. (2004) replicated and extended Dittrich et al.’s (1996) study by not 
only showing observers full-light and point-light displays of the same emotions 
(except for surprise which was omitted) but also by adding a condition where actors 
exaggerated their body movements by increasing the vigour of the movements. In 
Atkinson et al.’s (2004) study, actors —  rather than dancers —  portrayed the 
emotions. Subjects viewed and rated the displays by using a forced choice method. 
In both the full-light and point-light conditions, Atkinson et al. (2004) found that
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subjects could recognise affect. Similai* results were found to the Dittrich et al. 
(1996) study in that affect could be recognised from both types of displays. Atkinson 
et al. (2004) found that for disgust, fear and anger affect was more readily recognised 
in the full-light rather than the point-light displays.
Also, in a slightly different approach, Pollick, Paterson, Bruderlin and Sanford 
(2001) showed that affect could be perceived from a single body part. Actors were 
employed to produce knocking (e.g. as if knocking on a door angrily) and drinking 
arm movements. Subjects were able to recognise the affects of anger, happiness and 
sadness easily which suggests that arm movements alone enable emotional 
attribution (Pollick et al., 2001). The data from this study were also subjected to a 
multidimensional scaling technique which produced a two-dimensional model of the 
affects. One dimension was defined as ‘activation’, which accounted for 70% of the 
variance, and the other dimension was defined as ‘pleasantness’, which accounted 
for 17% of the variance. Pollick et al. (2001) ai'gued that the psychological space 
relating to this model conformed to a ciicumplex model of affect. The activation axis 
was correlated strongly with the physical dimensions of the movements which 
suggests that information from movement alone may be sufficient for the recognition 
of affect (Pollick et al., 2001).
Taken together, the results of these studies support Darwin’s (1872/1999) thesis that 
emotion can be recognised from bodily expression. Further, the view that 
information from body movement per se is paramount for recognition of affect is 
augmented. It appears that the emotions of anger, joy, sadness and fear can easily be 
recognised from biological motion, irrespective of whether the movements are 
expressed by dancers or actors. There is less evidence that this is the case for disgust. 
Affect can also be recognised from arm movements in isolation from other parts of 
the body.
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Criticisms of previously used behavioural samples for biological motion studies
Watson and Raynor (1920), in a classical conditioning experiment, showed that a 
feai* response could be induced in an infant by making a very loud noise near to the 
infant’s head. However, such studies could not be reproduced today as one of the 
great problems for psychologists studying affect are the ethical constraints imposed 
upon them. To ensure that volunteers do not incur psychological harm, ethical 
restrictions rarely allow for volunteers to experience naturally produced emotions in 
laboratory settings at the will of the experimenter. This poses a problem for 
reseai'chers as, although stimuli could be made from video footage (e.g. news clips) 
of naturally induced affect, there would be no control over the behaviour of persons 
expressing the emotion, nor would there be any control in the filming techniques 
used, e.g. the camera in relation to the emoter’s body.
Therefore, as illustrated by the studies discussed so far, to produce stimuli, 
researchers capture the emoting behaviour of actors and dancers. This procedure 
avoids ethical constraints and allows control over the actor’s behaviour (i.e. all 
behaviour, except for the emotional expressions, remains constant) and also the 
environmental variables (i.e. camera angle, surrounding lighting /noise). However, in 
terms of ecological validity, the stimuli sets produced in the past have been 
equivocal. This is despite the fact that one of the most important decisions for the 
reseai'cher involves the behaviour sampling (Ambady, Bernieri and Richeson, 2000) 
and the fact that providing unnatural contexts may produce unnatural results (Planalp 
and Knie, 2002). For instance, as can be seen in Table 1, Dittrich et al. (1996) and 
Brownlow et al. (1997) used the movements of dancers to produce their stimuli sets. 
Such procedures can be criticised as, firstly, dance is not an integral part of normal 
everyday activities (at least in western cultures) — rather it is a ‘stylized art form 
that involves cultural and aesthetic conventions’ (Van Meel, Verburgh and de 
Meijer, 1993, p-119) — and secondly, in these instances, this method disallows for 
any spontaneity in movement production.
Atkinson et al. (2004) attempted to produce stimuli with high ecological validity, 
recruiting 10 actors (5 female and 5 male) instead of dancers to develop a set of
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stimuli. That 10 actors were used meant that a wide range of idiosyncratic styles 
could be sampled and that a large corpus of stimuli material would be collected. 
Importantly, Atkinson et al. (2004) ensured that actors were free to choose how to 
express the given emotions with only minimal guidance given. However, it can be 
ai’gued that ecological validity was not achieved as i) each actor wore several pairs of 
tights over his or her head to obliterate facial features and expressions (this is a very 
unusual experience obliterating visual sensory information/feedback from the 
environment) and ii) actors were required to produce affect within a small time 
window (6 seconds) counted aloud by a researcher during filming. The foregoing 
points show that the actors employed in this study were isolated from both the 
physical and social environment during the production of the behaviour samples. 
Further, the imposed time constraints (in combination with rigid instructions about 
the finishing position) would have been an attentional constraint that might have 
interfered with the ability to produce the required emotion.
In the Pollick et al. (2001) study, when arm knocking and drinking movements were 
produced, the actors were required to read a brief story that allowed them to imagine 
the emotion to be performed. This study is far better in terms of the behaviour 
samples in that i) actors rather than dancers produced affects, ii) there appeared to be 
no time constr aints to produce the emotions, nor Hi) were they asked to wear clothing 
that restricted sensory perception. However, this work was not ideal on other 
grounds: /) it is not natural to map affect onto a physical action such as drinking, ii) 
using one par t of the body (i.e. the arm) to express affect lacks ecological validity as 
this part of the body may not correlate with the way that affects are normally 
expressed.
The preceding evidence illustrates the incumbency to develop a new approach to 
investigate the perception of affect. In order to better understand the perception of 
affect, it is important, as a starting point, to have a description of the stimulus 
information to which the person responds (McAi'thur and Baron, 1983). This cannot 
be achieved by studying the individual in a social vacuum (Tajfel, 1972). Therefore, 
it may be profitable to think about how emotions are expressed naturally in everyday 
situations.
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1.4. A naturalistic approach to event perception
Gibson (1950) described psychology as the study of the ‘perception and behaviour of 
animals and men as a function of what the environment affords’ (p-22), arguing that 
the visual world is filled with things which have meaning. Gibson (1950/1979) put 
forwai'd an ecological theoiy of direct perception that eschewed cognitive processing 
to explain perception and, instead, contended that the optic anay provided evei-ything 
required for the perceptual system to achieve its goal of vision. Gibson argued that 
the environment can specify all the information for perception in the form of 
affordances and that these will vary depending on the needs of the perceiver. For 
example, a cup of tea has the affordance of ‘drinkability’ but only if the perceiver is 
thirsty. Thus an organism will perceive an object only if it is relevant and important 
to the organism’s well being: Gibson called this ‘attunement’. Affordances, 
according to Gibson, are ecological and relational facts about the environment and 
behaviour that stay stable over time i.e. they do not vary despite changes in the 
environment and changes in the retinal image. These invariant features of the optic 
airay, according to Gibson, can be used in combination with each other and aie all 
that is needed for perception. Affordances can be physical or social properties of the 
environment. The richest affordances, according to Gibson, aie those provided by 
other people (Costall, 1995).
Thus, according to Gibson’s theory, stimulus events aie information rich; however, 
accurate knowledge about how we perceive the visual world must be sought from an 
ecological staiting point. In other words, the study of aitificial stimulus information 
is of little utility. Advocates of the ecological approach such as McArthur and Baron 
(1983) have also ai'gued that the information necessary for perception is contained 
within the stimulus. Accordingly, observers are sensitive to adaptively relevant 
information in the stimulus. For example, emotions such as feai' and anger should be 
readily perceived as they aie the most essential for survival (McArthur and Baron, 
1983). However, their account is not limited to adaptive survival processes as
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accurate social perception also means that personal achievements can be made and 
unwanted situations can be avoided (McAi'thur and Baion, 1983).
Advocates of the ecological perspective recognise that not all of social knowing can 
be explained by direct perception; cleaiiy mental processes by which the sensory 
information is transformed, stored, recovered and used by the mind are essential for a 
full understanding of perception (Neisser, 1967). In terms of how the mind might be 
structured, Fodor (1983,1985) argued that it (the mind) contained a set of distinct 
modules. According to Fodor (1985), each module, responsible for a specific 
function (such as face recognition), is ‘very fast, mandatory, superficial, 
encapsulated from ...knowledge, laigely organised from bottom to top information 
flow and largely innately specified’ (p-4). Fodor also argued that there must be 
central systems which complement modular systems and exhibit the opposite 
characteristics such as slow and flexible processing over widely distributed areas. 
There has been much interest in Fodor’s modulaiity argument to the extent that his 
claims about general systems have been largely forgotten; this is despite the fact that 
little thought has been given to the topic of how the modules might be coordinated 
(Nakayama, 2001).
The foregoing paragraph illustrates that mental processes are fundamental. However, 
Gibson’s ideas have been influential. In line with Gibson’s conceptions, the evidence 
discussed so far with respect to point-light displays shows that we are able to 
perceive dynamic properties of the social environment. For example, from displays 
of biological motion humans can pick up a range of socially relevant information 
such as a person’s sex and acquaintanceship (Cutting and Koslowski, 1977), 
discrimination of a particular walker (from other walkers) irrespective of viewpoint 
(Troje, Westhoff and Lavrov, 2005) and true behaviours despite intentions to deceive 
(Runeson and Frykholm, 1983).
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An alternative method of investigation
In studies of affect from biological motion, the verbal channel has been neglected. 
However, communication is embodied within the various sensory modalities (Streek 
and Knapp, 1992) such as facial and bodily expressions and words and voice prosody 
(see Scherer, 2003, for a discussion on the expression of affect from the vocal 
channel). These sensory modalities have not evolved independently of each other, 
which therefore means that communication should be investigated by measuring 
more than one channel at a time (Birdwhistell, 1970). More recently this point has 
been argued by other scholars: for example, Jorgensen (1998) has postulated that, by 
studying affect from only one modality (e.g. verbal), researchers are not studying 
valid communication processes and are only studying parts of the whole. 
Furthermore, expressing emotion in one modality may facilitate its release in another 
(Planalp and Knie, 2002). For instance, smiling may facilitate laughter within one 
person and inteipersonally a scream may facilitate another person’s desire to crouch 
in a position indicative of fear.
Thus, it has been ai'gued that i) emotions are inherently social, ii) body movements 
and speech are interconnected and Hi) consideration o f the natural environment is 
impoî'tant for perception. Therefore, based on the foregoing discussions, and in an 
attempt to take a more naturalistic approach in examining the exquisite ability to 
perceive biological motion, point-light displays were made that encaptured the 
behaviour of two actors interlocuting.
Interpersonal actions (where 2 actors interacted) have been used in point-light 
research once before (Dittrich, 1993). The actions studied were grouped into 3 
categories, only one of which was interpersonal; the others were locomotory (e.g. 
walking) and instrumental (e.g. hammering). Observers were required to name the 
behaviour shown in each display and for the social actions recognition rates ranged 
from 66% for threatening behaviour to 95% for boxing. This seminal study was the 
first to use interpersonal body movements in point-light displays. However, there 
were only two examples used that can be considered as naturalistic behaviours
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(greeting and threatening). Furthermore, the actors in this study mimed the 
interpersonal actions which is not how greeting and threatening behaviour normally 
occurs.
It is ai'gued that the interpersonal displays of affect used for the studies reported in 
this thesis aie more natural than those used in Dittrich’s (1993) study as mime is not 
a normal form of interpersonal behaviour. Furthermore, in the present reseaich all of 
the actions studied were produced in social contexts.
Chapter 2 describes the methods used to generate the stimuli and also details the 
experimental methods which were used to measure observers’ judgements. In 
Chapter 3, the emphasis of the research is to take some rudimentaiy first steps into 
exploring how interpersonal displays of affect aie perceived. This new approach to 
investigating the perception of affect is then fully exploited in Chapter 4 to consider 
the importance of the social interaction per se. The aim of the work described in this 
chapter is to take a first step at examining certain aspects of communication with 
regard to recognition from biological motion. In the final two chapters several 
studies are described which were conducted in order to i) gain some more insight 
into what the specific cues that specify affect might be, ii) investigate further the way 
the stimuli might be processed and Hi) consider how the skill to recognise affect from 
biological motion develops in childhood.
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1.5. Summary
Human movement is an important feature of the world and vision allows us to pick 
up the movements of other conspecifics to make sense of our social environment. 
Movement of the body is a foundational chaiacteristic of the communication system, 
yet this channel of expression is seldom investigated. The point-light method 
(Johansson, 1973) is an invaluable tool for investigating human movement in 
isolation from pictorial cues.
Emotions are also a fundamental aspect of being human. Several studies in the past 
have investigated the perception of emotion from body movements (by employing 
the point-light technique) but they have not considered the natural environment as a 
starting place for their investigations. This has potentially important consequences 
for the validity of findings in these studies. This thesis investigates a range of 
interdependent themes concerned with the perception of affect in natural 
communication behaviours from biological motion. Fundamentally, how the 
perception of emotion is affected by the social context is a primary aiea of research. 
The mechanisms responsible for perception of affect from biological motion also 
provide an avenue of enquiry. Finally, the way in which these skills develop in 
childhood is examined. It is hoped that this research will also further our 
understanding about what is known about the topic of emotion.
These questions are addressed in four empirical chapters. The work in the first 
empirical chapter (Chapter 3) investigates how well affect is recognised in point- 
light displays of communicating actors. Effects of display manipulation in the form 
of inverting and rotating (by 90°) the displays in the image plane are also 
investigated. The work in Chapter 4 addresses the importance of considering the 
social context in event perception. Specifically, it is asked how important the 
communicative context is for the perception of affect. Further, it is discussed what 
other aspects of the social exchange can be determined from biological motion 
independent of emotion, i.e. information about interlocutor identification. In Chapter
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5, the mechanisms that aie responsible for the perception of emotion (from biological 
motion) are discussed. The first study in this chapter explores the effect of reversing 
the motion in the display. The second study explores systematically the effects of 
reducing the information in the displays by removing specific elements of the body. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 ,1 discuss how the mechanisms may develop during childhood.
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Chapter 2 
Methods
2.1. Overview
In all of the studies reported in this thesis, performance for perceiving emotions was 
assessed by analysing judgements made by observers when they were shown point- 
light displays of actors expressing emotions in a communicatory context. This 
chapter describes the methods used to generate the stimuli, including the rationale for 
the script used and how actors performed it. This chapter also details the 
experimental methods, which were used to measure observers’ judgements.
2.2. Actors
Actors are able to display different emotions with variations in skill. For instance, 
one actor may be able to encode joy with a high level of accuracy but not sadness 
and for another actor the opposite might be true (Wallbot and Scherer, 1986). In 
many studies only one or a very few actors are used (e.g. Dittrich et al., 1996) and 
this limits acting styles. Thus, to ensure variation in acting styles, ten actors (5 male 
and 5 female) who were recent graduates from The Guildford School of Acting were 
employed to create the stimuli. All of the actors were aged between 20 and 30 years. 
Each actor was sent a script to learn 2 weeks before recording. Whilst it is true that 
acting variations exist at an intrapersonal level (Wallbot and Scherer, 1986) it is 
reasonable to assume that styles vary at an interpersonal level too. Therefore, to 
ensure interpersonal variations, the actors were informed that they would be acting 
together in female and male pairs and that every male actor would work with every 
female actor. They were told that their task would be to recite the script whilst 
portraying 6 different emotions: hot anger, joy, sadness, romantic love, fear and 
disgust.
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2,3, Script
A basic script was chosen for the recordings rather than a scenario approach (where 
actors are provided with a short scenario, but no script, and are instructed to envisage 
the scenario): the use of a script ensured that a standard dialogue was used for all 
recordings. Wallbot and Scherer (1986) have argued that the scenario approach 
allows actors to produce more realistic expressions of affect compared to 
monologues, which are more likely to produce a declamatory style. However, the 
use of dyadic interlocution here was a method used to overcome such shortcomings 
as declamation. Wallbot and Scherer (1986) argued that the use of scenaiios allows 
for between actor consistency in terms of emotions expressed; however, this is not 
necessarily the case as it depends on how a scenaiio is interpreted by an actor and 
also on an actor’s skill in the interpretation of it. Offering no scenario here allowed 
each actor free inspiration for the production of affect. However, actors were 
instructed not to touch their acting partner or express themselves by using overt 
symbolic gestures such as shaking the fist for anger or reaching towards each other 
with open arms for love.
Importantly, the script ensured that equal turn taking was maintained and that the 
recordings were of a similar' length. The script consisted of 8 lines (4 lines for each 
actor) with approximately 7 words on each line. The actors were asked to treat the 
script as emotionally neutral. Here follows the script:
Actor A 
Actor B 
Actor A 
Actor B 
Actor A 
Actor B 
Actor A 
Actor B
It’s a long way from Mordovia.
I didn’t expect it would be so far.
But there’s a trip to Moscow thrown in. 
No-one told me about the extra trip. 
Well the embassy arranged it all.
I thought that our comr ades ar ranged it. 
If the train could stop especially here. 
Such a thing could be arxanged.
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2.4. Movement Recording Equipment
Actors’ movements were recorded using a MacReflex motion analysis system 
(Qualisys AB). This system comprised of a high-resolution camera, sensitive only to 
infrared light. The camera was connected to video processing hardware, which 
calculated the 2-D co-ordinates of lightweight spherical markers, 50 mm in diameter, 
covered with silver reflective tape (3M Scotchlite), which were attached to the 
actors’ bodies. The equipment was connected to an Apple Macintosh computer, 
equipped with MacReflex software. The computer was connected to a 15 inch 
monitor that was able to synchronize on 60 Hz: the sampling rate of the camera (one 
‘frame’ every 16.66ms). The camera was able to distinguish the light-reflective 
markers from the background and reduce the output of the video signal to contain 
only information about the markers by using 3 mechanisms; these were: an electionic 
shutter with a very high shutter speed of 1/4000 s (0.25ms) that reduced the effect of 
ambient light; pulses of infrared light that were synchronised to the sampling rate of 
the system; and automatic gain control so that, provided there were no ‘false’ 
reflections from other objects, the markers were the only detectable infrared light 
sources in the scene. A videoprocessor connected to the camera calculated the 2-D 
coordinates of each marker within the camera’s field of view by scanning the image 
pixel by pixel and calculating the centroid of each marker location. As the markers 
used were spheres their aspect did not change with different orientations; therefore 
the centroid was a reliable indicator of the marker’s position. Several hours before 
recording, the equipment was switched on and the scene was checked via the monitor 
of the host computer to ensure there were no other light sources that would provide 
‘false’ reflections.
2.5. Marker and actor positions
The markers were attached to bands of elasticated tape that fitted securely around the 
actors’ ankles, knees, hips, shoulders, elbows and wrists, and one to the centre of the 
forehead. In particulai', the markers were placed over the iliac fossa area of hip and
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the humeral joint capsule in the shoulder. The markers were attached to the front of 
the actors’ bodies except for those on the elbows; these were positioned midway 
between frontal and lateral positions to give them the best possible chance of being 
in view of the camera at all times as the actors moved their arms.
The camera was placed at a distance of 4.5 metres from the taiget where the actors’ 
heights filled approximately 70-80% of a monitor screen. To keep the actors in view 
at all times they were instructed to work within a fixed area (1.3 m wide and 0.8m 
deep) which was marked on the floor. Each actor stood facing at approximately 90° 
to the other and at approximately 45° to the camera. No sound recording was made.
2,6. Recordings
A room measuring 5.5 metres by 8 metres was used as a temporaiy recording studio 
and another room, adjacent to the first, was used as a waiting room for the actors. 
The recording took place on a bright afternoon and so the Venetian blinds covering 
the windows in the recording room were tilted to let in a small amount of light. This 
measure ensured that no sunlight could cause ‘false’ reflections for the camera to 
pick up. No artificial light was used. The author and 2 assistants were present for the 
recording session. One assistant was responsible for fetching the appropriate actors 
for each recording (every actor was assigned a number badge and everyone had a 
copy of the schedule) and the other assistant was accountable for ensuring that the 
markers were attached in the appropriate positions on every actor. The author 
instructed the actors on which emotion was required and also operated the filming 
equipment. On each recording, the actors were requested not to rush, and to give an 
indication when they ‘felt’ the emotion. They were then immediately asked to act 
that emotion. The author who could also see the actors — (labelled experimenter in 
Figure 2.1.) was positioned to be able to see both the recordings as they appeared on 
the monitor where the point-lights were displayed as coloured crosses on a white 
background. Figure 2.1 shows a plan view of the recording layout.
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1.3 m
0.8 m
actor
4.5 m
videoprocessor
computer recording 
movement data
experimenter
Figure 2.1. Schematic diagram (not to scale) of the recording set up. The thick, solid black lines show 
connections for the recording system, the dark dashed lines show the confinement area for the actors 
and the lighter dashed lines show the distance between the actors and the camera.
Every male actor produced 4 different categories of affect with every female actor 
(time restrictions disallowed the opportunity for every category to be produced 
within each acting pair; enough samples were produced by using the method chosen 
—  see below). In every recording both actors portrayed the required emotions 
simultaneously. This arrangement meant that at least 3 clips of each emotion per 
actor were produced. This made a corpus of ~100 recordings (5 female actors x 5 
male actors x 4 emotions), with at least 16 recordings of each emotional category.
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Each pair of actors was allowed to repeat a recording if they thought that the first 
was not good enough; if this occuned then the first recording was discarded. On one 
occasion the actors were asked to repeat a recording as one actor turned too much — 
resulting in the camera picking up too few light points. No more than two recordings 
of the same stimulus were required. It took approximately 4 hours to produce the 
corpus of vignettes.
2.7. Dependent measures
For all of the experiments reported in this thesis (with the exception of the qualitative 
study reported in Chapter 3 and the child study reported in Chapter 6) all of the 
observers’ judgements for perceived emotion were measured by the method 
described in the following paragraph.
In every experiment the stimuli were presented to observers on either a 33cm x 
25.5cm Apple monitor set at a refresh rate of 60 Hz with a 1024 x 768 resolution or 
occasionally (for Experiments lb and 7) on an Apple G3 iBook laptop computer with 
a 14-inch LCD display and a 1024 x 768 resolution. A laboratory was used for all of 
the experiments using the desktop computer (as most of the experiments were 
conducted in the laboratoi7, in the empirical chapters that follow, it is only reported 
when the laptop computer was used). An Anglepoise lamp lit the laboratory which 
was fitted with a 60 watt bulb. The lamp faced away from the experimental apparatus 
towards the wall. Otherwise the room was dark. The point light displays were shown 
in green on a black background. The luminance of the dots was 44.1 cd/m^ when 
measured in the laboratory. The monitor screen subtended 9° of visual angle 
vertically and 11.7° horizontally when shown on the desktop computer. The displays 
were presented within a boxed area of this that was the same colour and luminance 
as the light points and subtended approximately 8.4° of visual angle vertically and 6° 
horizontally. When presented on the Apple iBook the monitor subtended 8,9° of 
visual angle vertically and 11.3° horizontally and the boxed area subtended 8.5° of 
visual angle vertically and 6.1° horizontally. A static frame from one of the displays 
can be seen in Figure 2.2. Subjects were seated in front of the displays at a distance
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of approximately 80 cm when shown on the larger monitor and were slightly less (70 
cm) for the iBook presentations. No headrest was used for any of the experiments 
unless stated.
Figure 2.2. Static frame of a point-light display showing the two actors where each actor is 
represented by 13 points of light. In this frame the actor on the left has his left arm occluded by the 
rest of his body.
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Subjects were asked to attend to the monitor caiefully during each trial and to judge 
how much of each emotion they thought they perceived in the stimulus. Following 
the presentation of each experimental stimulus six (sometimes less, depending on 
which experiment was being conducted) horizontal scales appeared (arranged one 
above another) on the screen— one marked for each emotion with the limits labelled 
from ‘very little’ (on the left) to ‘a lot’ (on the right). Subjects used the computer 
mouse to move a slider along each scale to provide the rating. A picture of the scale 
before being rated and an example of how observers might have rated a movie 
(showing 5 out of 6 ratings completed) can be seen in Figure 2.3 a) and b) 
respectively. The point where each subject clicked was converted to a conesponding 
number between 0-100 by the computer program. Observers were asked to use the 
full range of the scale. For each subject the order in which the emotions appeared on 
the scale for rating was altered so that the emotion appearing at the top for one 
subject was moved to the bottom for the next subject and so on. The subjects were 
obliged to work from the top scale to the bottom on each trial. After the last scale had 
been rated on one trial the next trial staited automatically.
43
sa d n e ss
love
fear
disgust
anger
joy
very little
anger
a d n e ss
d isgust
Figure 2.3. An image of the dependent measure used for most of the experiments reported in this 
thesis (a), and (b), an example of how the image might have looked after 5 out of 6 of the scales had 
been rated.
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2.8. Subjects
Almost without exception, all of the adult subjects were either postgraduate or 
undergraduate psychology students at the University of Surrey. Undergraduates 
received a course credit for their participation. Very occasionally, other adults such 
as the staff from the University’s Psychology Department took part. In the 
developmental study (Chapter 6) all of the children were recruited from one primary 
school situated in the South of England. Informed consent from the parents or 
guardians of the children was obtained for every child. The children were tested at 
school, during school hours, and were taken individually from their classrooms to a 
quiet area of the school where the children were tested.
All adults and children that took part as subjects had normal, or corTected-to-normal 
vision. They were all naïve as to the purpose of the experiment in which they took 
part and no subject had ever previously encountered the experimental stimuli.
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Chapter 3 
Effects of upright and rotated displays
3.1. Introduction
Wallbot (1998) and Montepare et al. (1999) have investigated the specific link 
between the production and the perception of affect from body movements. These 
authors have suggested that there are qualitative patterns of movement to distinguish 
between emotions. However, in these studies full-light (video) displays were used as 
stimuli and as such they contain more information than solely cues from movement. 
For instance, in a full-light display there are fundamental spatial properties of the 
visual world such as edges, shapes, colour and texture, which are all likely to 
contribute to vision (Gibson, 1950). As discussed in Chapter 1 an effective method 
to study how emotions are perceived from body movements is to use Johansson 
(1973) point-light displays as they remove most of the spatial information that would 
normally be available in a full-light display: information from motion remains. 
Although a small but informative number of studies have been conducted to 
investigate affect by using this method (e.g. Dittrich et al., 1996; Atkinson et al., 
2004), so far the social context in which emotions are usually expressed has not been 
considered as a method by which to explore perception from biological motion of 
affect.
To address this, the central question explored in this first empirical chapter was 
whether emotion could be perceived from the biological motion of two actors 
engaged in dialogue.
A supplementary enquiry was to ask how the percept was disrupted through rotating 
the displays on the image plane by 180°, so inverted; and by 90° (clockwise or 
anticlockwise), thus appearing with the main axis of the body across the width of the 
image plane. This method of image rotation is commonly used in biological motion
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research; inverted displays are most often used (e.g. Sumi, 1984; Dittrich et al., 
1996) and, less frequently, other orientations are also shown (e.g. Pavlova and 
Sokolov, 2000). The popularity of this approach is based on the logic that the pattern 
of the kinematics within the stimulus remains constant in spite of image rotation. If 
perception is disrupted by rotation then it cannot depend solely on low level 
computational processing accounts that have been put forward such as structure from 
the relative motions of the display’s elements defined by local rigidity (Webb and 
Aggarwal, 1982). Therefore, the first empirical chapter addressed the ability of 
observers to perceive emotion from biological motion expressed in the bodies of two 
people engaged in discourse but also took a rudimentary first step at considering how 
the visual system generates percepts by examining the effects of orientation 
manipulation.
In addition to the foregoing enquiries, included in the chapter are several other 
experiments that controlled for possible timing and learning artefacts that may have 
existed in the presentations shown in the first experiment and the first control 
experiment. As a measure of validation for the quantative data collection method that 
is used throughout this chapter, and indeed for most of the other experiments 
reported in this thesis, a qualitative study is also reported that allowed subjects to 
express freely what they could see in the displays. Finally, this chapter also 
investigates the issue of whether there were sex differences for the perception of 
affect.
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3.2. Experiment 1
Point-light displays contain few visual cues, however, that they are impoverished is 
not ti'ue: They aie information rich. For example, Dittrich, et al. (1996) showed that 
surprise, fear, anger, grief and joy could be identified above chance when portrayed 
by dancers in point-light displays. However, some emotions were identified with 
more success than others. Portrayals of grief and joy were better identified than 
portrayals of fear and anger. Portrayed disgust received a below chance score and it 
was confused with the non-portrayals of fear and grief. More recently, other 
movements have also been investigated, Pollick, Paterson, Bruderlin and Sanford 
(2001) used point-light displays of knocking and drinking arm movements (i.e. as if 
knocking on a door angrily), to show that subjects can perceive a range of internal 
states (e.g. fear, anger, tiredness) from these actions. Claiming a more naturalistic 
approach, Atkinson et al. (2004) used single actors to portray the bodily expressions 
of anger, joy, sadness, fear and disgust to show that observers could recognise all of 
these emotions well above chance.
Interpersonal actions have been used in point-light research once before (Dittrich, 
1993). The actions studied were grouped into 3 categories, only one of which was 
interpersonal, with four examples in each category. The groups were: locomotory 
(e.g. walking); instrumental (e.g. hammering) and, of particular relevance here, 
social actions that portrayed dancing, boxing, greeting and threatening behaviours. 
Observers were required to name the behaviour shown in each display and 
recognition rates ranged between 42% for stirring to 97% for going upstairs. For the 
social actions performances ranged Bom 66% for thieatening behaviour to 95% for 
boxing. This seminal study was the first to use interpersonal body movements in 
point-light displays. However, there were only two examples used that can be 
considered as naturalistic behaviours (greeting and threatening). It is somewhat 
surprising that no study has used interpersonal communication to capture emotional 
expressions in body motion given that the function of emotions must be, at least in
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pai't, to send information to others so that in return the observer may induce both 
appropriate cognitive attitudes and reciprocal emotion (Scherer, 1993).
Numerous studies have shown that display inversion impedes the perception of 
biological motion. Infants cannot discriminate a point-light walker from similar 
displays when displays aie inverted (Bertenthal, Proffitt and Cutting, 1984) and, for 
adults, image inversion impedes recognition of point-light walkers quite substantially 
(e.g Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000; Shipley, 2003).
Point-light walkers aside, the recognition of types of human actions and emotions is 
also disrupted by inversion although the extent to which an action or emotion is 
disrupted vaiies (Dittiich, 1993; Dittrich et al., 1996). For locomotory actions such as 
jumping, Dittiich (1993) found that recognition was reduced from 87% correct for 
upright displays to 45% correct for inverted ones. Point-light displays of social 
actions varied in the amount of disruption caused by display inversion. For example, 
for dancing and greeting couples, recognition was reduced from approximately 80% 
for uprights to 60% correct whereas for threatening behaviour recognition was 
reduced by half (Dittrich, 1993). However, the biggest disparity was for boxing 
behaviour as when upright these displays were recognised with 95% accuracy and 
yet when inverted recognition diminished to just 5%.
For the case of emotions, Dittiich et al. (1996) found that in contiast to upright point- 
light displays where, with the exception of disgust, all portrayed emotions received 
higher mean scores for recognition than the non-portrayed ones, inversions were 
more confused with other non-portrayed categories: once again portrayed disgust 
was confused for (fear and grief) non-portrayals but unlike the results for uprights, 
portrayed joy was confused with non-portrayed surprise, and portrayed fear was 
confused with non-portrayed grief. Unfortunately, Atkinson et al. (2004) did not use 
inverted displays for compaiisons to be made.
When inverting point-light stimuli on the image plane, intiastimulus kinematics such 
as velocity of the dots and relative physical positioning remain constant. Therefore, 
that image inversion causes such a problem for veridical identification of the stimuli
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is of interest as this means that simple physical information is not sufficient for 
recognition. Rather, the visual system must implement additional constraints for 
veridical perception of the stimuli. Pavlova and Sokolov (2000) have ai'gued for two 
such constraints: ecological ones derived from the invaiiants of the environment such 
as gravity, and knowledge-based constraints that consist of top-down knowledge 
about the outside world. There is accumulating evidence that ecological constraints 
are of importance as observers shown 10 second displays of either upright, oriented 
45°or 90°, or inverted point-light walkers (primes) followed by camouflaged displays 
of the same, were influenced strongly by the primes of upright walkers when 
detecting the camouflaged examples. The 90° and 180° primes had no effect on 
subsequent identification of the camouflaged examples at all. These results suggest 
that prior (top-down) knowledge of the displays was not used for recognition 
(Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000). This finding is corroborated with evidence that 
perception remains impervious to prior knowledge about inverted displays but that 
the addition of either a solid or moving line implying the existence of either a ground 
plane or some other frame of reference improves recognition of the same displays to 
above chance (Pavlova and Sokolov, 2003). Furthermore, Shipley’s (2003) novel 
experiment where a point-light walker walked on his feet in one scene and his hands 
in another showed that subjects were better able to identify the walker when shown 
in an upright orientation over an inverted one. This was despite the fact that 
observers aie not familial- with people walking on their hands and that for the 
inverted hand walker, limbs would be in their normal positions. This result suggests 
that perceivers use perceptual information about the physical world such as the force 
of gravity more than knowledge-based information and so stresses that features in the 
natural world are fundamental (Pavlova and Sokolov, 2003).
The present study draws on the design of Dittrich et al. (1996) to examine the 
perception of emotion from point-light displays and the effects of inversion. 
However, rather than the use of single dancers to express bodily affect, interpersonal 
behaviour as expressed by two actors engaged in dialogue was used (see Chapter 1). 
Based on the results of Dittrich et al. (1996) and Atkinson et al. (2004) it was 
expected that performance would be good for the upright portrayals. For inverted
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displays performance was expected to be impaired to some degree but that 
recognition would still be above chance was thought likely.
3.3. Experiment 1: Method
3.3.1. Subjects
Eight postgraduate psychology students and 2 members of the psychology 
department’s staff (7 men and 3 women; mean age 29.6 yeais; range 1 8 -4 2  years) 
volunteered to serve as subjects.
3.3.2. Apparatus.
A headrest was used, which was set at a viewing distance of 80 cm from the screen.
3.3.3. Design and procedure
Six different examples of each of the six emotions were used. The criteria for 
choosing the vignettes for Experiment 1 were to use as many combinations of 
different actors as possible and to use the vignettes that had the least number of 
occluded light points (caused by actors turning their bodies too far away from the 
camera). The examples were presented either upright or upside down which gave a 
total of 72 trials (6 emotions x 6 samples x 2 orientations). Each stimulus was shown 
for its full duration (17-30) seconds. Subjects were told that they would see some 
points of light on the screen that represented two people in a social context both 
acting out one of six possible emotions. The subjects were not informed that some 
displays would be presented upside down. All of the stimuli were presented in one 
randomised block for each subject and the experiment lasted for approximately 50 
minutes.
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3.4. Experiment 1: Results and discussion
Most displays received non-zero ratings on all scales due to the fact that clicking 
towards the far left of each scale gave a non-zero number corresponding to the 
writing shown on the monitor saying ‘very little’ (of that emotion present). Clicking 
at the very fai’ left end of the scale gave a zero rating.
3.4.1. Upright displays
For each portrayed emotion the means of the five non-portrayed emotion ratings 
were pooled so that comparisons could be made between just one ‘incorrect’ (non- 
portrayed) score and one correct (portrayed) rating. Figure 3.1.a shows that the 
portrayed emotion received the higher rating in every case. For example, when anger 
was portrayed in the display it received mean ratings in excess of 70 whereas the 
other five non-portrayed emotions received an overall mean of 19.
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Figure 3.1. Observers’ mean ratings for the a) upright and b) inverted presentations of the emotion 
response categories of the portrayed and non-portrayed emotions. The mean ratings for the non- 
portrayed emotions were derived from the mean of the combined scores from the five non-portrayals 
in each case. Error bars show standard errors.
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Table 3.1. Observers’ mean ratings for each emotion response category when a) upright and b) 
inverted point-light stimuli were presented. Figures in bold type denote the mean ratings for the 
portrayed emotions. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Stimulus Response
Anger Joy Sadness Love Fear Disgust
a)
Upright presentation 
Anger 70 (7.5) 7 (7.3) 23 (20.7) 12(11.1) 24 (18.8) 31 (16.2)
Joy 26 (13.8) 53 (17) 8 (6.1) 19(13.8) 15(11.1) 14(12.1)
Sadness 16(12.5) 6 (4.1) 59 (17.2) 20 (16.1) 17(11.2) 20 (9.3)
Love 21 (11.8) 10(5 .9 ) 24 (11.2) 47 (19.2) 20 (9.9) 15(10)
Feai' 18(18.2) 15(12.2) 18(13.6) 16(11.4) 59 (14.7) 19(9.9)
Disgust 24(11 .7) 9 (7) 37 (14.2) 14(10) 22 (11.4) 37 (11.1)
b)
Inverted presentation 
Anger 57 (7.9) 11 (5.1) 15(8.9) 14(14) 17(11.9) 23(16)
Joy 25 (16.7) 46 (23.2) 6(47) 20 (11.6) 11 (6.8) 13 (7.5)
Sadness 17(8 .3) 11 (6.1) 32 (11.3) 24 (9.5) 16(9.9) 19(7 .7)
Love 17(12.9) 13(6.6) 26 (15.9) 44 (15.8) 19(8.7) 17(9.2)
Fear 17(11.3) 24 (8.7) 16(4.5) 20 (8.1) 20 (11.7) 15(5.8)
Disgust 19(6.6) 12(7.3) 21 (5.4) 17(7.8) 19(8.4) 24 (11.6)
The complete set of ratings is shown in Table 3.1.For each portrayed emotion, a one­
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted between the ratings for that 
emotion and for the five non-portrayed emotions (i.e. along each row).' All
An important assumption for within-subjects A N O V A  is that sphericity should not be violated as, if  it is, the possibility o f  a 
type I error may be greatly inflated (for a discussion see  H ow ell, 1997, chapter 14), W here the data have failed the sphericity 
test in the present experim ents (as indicated by the sym bol *) the more conservative Greenhouse -  G eisser epsilon test has been  
used, w hich reduces the degrees o f  freedom  o f  the numerator and denominator.
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ANOVAs showed significant main effects (portî'oyed anger, F5 45 = 24,9, p < 0.001 ; 
joy, Fi.g?, 16.8*= 14.7, p < 0.001; sadness, F5 45= 22.2, p < 0.001; love, F5 45= 12.03, p 
< 0.01;/ear, ^’2.6,23.7*= 18.8, p < 0.001] disgust, ^’1.9,17.9*= 10.12, p = 0.001). Tukey’s 
post hoc tests confirmed that for each stimulus the portrayed emotion was rated 
higher (p < 0.001) than each of the 5 non-portrayed emotions considered individually 
with the exception of portrayed disgust. Ratings for this portrayed emotion did not 
differ from those for (non-portrayed) sadness, anger and fear although they were 
significantly larger than the ratings for (non-portrayed) joy and love (p < 0.001).
These results show cleaiiy that the emotions of anger, fear, joy, sadness and love can 
be identified in normally oriented point-light displays. This suggests that the spatio- 
temporal information inherent in human movement is sufficient to specify certain 
emotions. The exception was for the display of disgust, which was confused with 
sadness, anger and fear. That some emotions were better identified than others 
corroborates findings in the literature (e.g. Dittrich et al., 1996; Atkinson et al., 2004) 
although the order in which emotions were most easily identified differs between 
studies.
3.4.2.Inverted displays
Figure 3.1.b shows the mean ratings of the portrayed emotions as well as the 
combined mean scores for the non-portrayed emotions when the displays were 
presented upside down; Table 3.1b presents the complete set of ratings.
A two-way ANOVA between display type and emotion with two levels of display 
type (the bold figures in Tables 3.1a and 3.1b) showed that ratings for inversion were 
significantly reduced (F,, 9 = 32.2, p < 0.001) relative to the upright stimuli. A 
significant interaction between emotion and orientation (Fgj, 20.6 * = 5.5, p < 0.01) 
showed that inversion affected the ratings of some portrayed emotions more than 
others. Post hoc Tukey’s tests following the ANOVA revealed that the ratings for
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anger (p < 0.005), sadness (p < 0.005), feai' (p < 0.001) and disgust (p < 0.05) were 
significantly reduced by inversion. Joy and love were unaffected by inversion 
although these results may have been due to a lack of power given the small number 
of subjects (n=10) that took part in the experiment.
For the inverted stimuli one-way ANOVAs that compared the ratings for the 
portrayed and all of the five non-portrayed emotions showed that there was a 
significant main effect for portrayed anger, sadness, love and joy but not for fear or 
disgust {portrayed anger, 45 = 27,74, p < 0.001; yoy, ,4 ? * = 11.13, p = 0.002; 
sadness, F5 45= 6.49, p < 0.05; love, F g 19.1 ♦= 8.87, p = 0.002', fear F5 45= 1.71, n/s 
and disgust Fg^  ^22 ♦ = 3.02, n/s). Post hoc Tukey’s tests confirmed that for portrayals 
of anger, joy or love, the portrayed emotion was rated significantly higher than each 
of the 5 non-portrayed emotions individually (p < 0.01). This was also true for 
ratings of portrayed sadness (except that the rated degree of sadness did not differ 
significantly from that of love, although this result may also have been due to a lack 
of power). Ratings for disgust were confused with each of the 5 non-portrayed 
emotions except for joy. Fear was indistinguishable from all other (non-portrayed) 
emotions when inverted.
Inversion reduced the salience of the displayed emotions to varying extents although 
overall performance was still good for most emotions. This result is in line with 
previous findings for inverted biological motion displays of dancers emoting 
(Dittiich et al., 1996). However, that the identification of fear was completely 
destioyed when displays were inverted was an unexpected result.
3.5. Experiment la
The stimuli for both upright and inverted presentations used in Experiment 1 were 
shown in one randomised block. This meant that there was no control over the 
orientation order of the stimuli, which gave rise to the possibility that if subjects saw 
an upright display before seeing an inverted version of the same display, they may 
have been able to remember the features from the first showing for subsequent
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identification. Furthermore, in Experiment 1 each movie varied in presentation time 
based on the amount of time actors used for the production of each vignette; there 
were also differences in mean presentation times for each emotion category. The 
fastest mean time was for the anger vignettes (17.6 seconds), followed by joy (17.9), 
fear (19.4), disgust (21.6), then love (22.7) and the slowest time was for sadness 
(24.8). Therefore, a second experiment was devised that had two main aims: the first 
was to control for any leaining that might occur on presentation of the upright 
stimuli, the second was to control for the possibility that subjects were discriminating 
the stimuli by stimulus length. Importantly, this experiment also tested the 
replicability of the results found in Experiment 1.
3.6. Experiment la: Method
3.6.1. Subjects
Fifteen undergraduates and 3 postgraduates participated in the experiment and 
undergraduates received course credits for their participation (3 males and 17 
females; mean age = 21.5 years; age range 19-33 years).
3.6.2. Apparatus, design, stimuli and procedure
The experiment employed a mixed factorial design. As in Experiment 1, there were 
six different examples of six emotions used. These were presented both upright and 
upside down which gave a total of 72 trials (6 emotions x 6 samples x 2 
orientations). There were 2 blocks of trials containing either the upright or inverted 
stimuli. The order in which they were completed was counterbalanced so that half of 
the observers saw the upright stimuli first and half saw the inverted ones. This was a 
between-subjects factor. Within each block, trials were randomly ordered. Each 
block lasted for approximately 25 minutes.
The same stimuli were used as in Experiment 1 except that each movie was 
shortened so that only the first 10 seconds (600 frames) were shown.
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3.7 Experiment la: Results and discussion
3.7.1. Results
The ratings were recorded and the non-porhayed scores were pooled, in the same 
way as in Experiment 1. Thus, comparisons were made with just one correct 
(portrayed) and one ‘incorrect’ (non-portrayed) rating. Figure 3.2 shows these 
results. Figure 3.2.a shows that the portiayed emotion for the upright presentations 
received the higher mean ratings in every case. Figure 3.2.b shows that ratings for 
the inverted portrayals received the higher ratings in each case except for feai*, which 
received similar ratings for inconect and correct judgements irrespective of which 
blocked viewing condition was shown first.
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Figure 3.2. Observers’ mean ratings as a function of viewing block order for the a) upright and b) 
inverted presentations of the emotion response categories of the portrayed and non-portrayed 
emotions. The mean ratings for the non-portrayed emotions were derived from the mean of the 
combined scores from the five non-portrayals in each case. Portrayed UF and portrayed IF denote 
whether upright (UF) or inverted (IF) stimuli were shown first to observers. Error bars show standard 
errors.
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Table 3.2. Observers’ mean ratings for each emotion response category when stimuli were blocked 
and counterbalanced by orientation. The ratings have been collapsed by presentation order and show 
a) uprights and b) inversions. Figures in bold type denote the mean ratings for the portrayed emotions. 
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Stimulus; Response 
Anger Joy Sadness Love Fear Disgust
a)
Upright stimuli
Anger 70 (14) 7 (6.9) 24 (25) 7 (7 .1 ) 19 (15.4) 39 (25.6)
Joy 28 (19.6) . 37 (16.5) 14 (11.9) 18(15.6) 14 (8.5) 22 (20)
Sadness 15 (13.6) 9 (8.3) 49 (20.8) 17(12.6) 19 (12.1) 20 (15.5)
Love 16 (11.8) 13(14.6) 19 (12.4) 41 (14.3) 14 (11.1) 17 (15)
Feai' 18 (15.3) 12(9) 24 (14.4) 13(10.9) 44 (19.3) 20 (16.1)
Disgust 21 (15.9) 10 (6.9) 36 (19.9) 14(10) 17 (16.7) 32 (15.5)
b)
Inverted stimuli
Anger 61 (16.6) 9 (7.3) 25 (21) 8 (6.4) 18(14.4) 38 (22.2)
Joy 30(19 .9) 36 (18.1) 14(13.4) 19(14 .5) 13(7.4) 19(16.2)
Sadness 16(15.7) 9 (6.3) 38 (18.9) 19(10.5) 22 (17.4) 22 (17.7)
Love 13(14.8) 13(12.1) 22 (17.4) 36 (15.2) 13(8.8) 16(17.5)
Fear 20 (17.6) 17(10.4) 26 (18.9) 20 (14.1) 24 (14.4) 22 (18)
Disgust 21 (16.9) 13(7 .6 ) 33 (19.6) 16(11.5) 19(13.3) 31 (21.4)
A mixed design ANOVA (the bars for the portrayed emotions only in Figure 3.2. a) 
and b) with 2 within-subjects factors: emotion (6 levels) and orientation (2 levels), 
and one between-subject’s factor (blocked condition order of either uprights or 
inversions first), confirmed that inverted ratings were significantly reduced compared 
to upright stimuli (F, ;g= 9.9, p < 0.001). A significant interaction between emotion 
and orientation showed that some emotions were more affected by inversion than 
others (Fg gg = 4.6, p = 0.001). However, there was no significant main effect for 
blocked orientation presentation order (F  ^ 15= 0.95, p > 0.05). This confirmed that it
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made no difference whether observers viewed the upright or inverted blocks of 
stimuli first. Therefore, the results for orientation viewing order are considered no 
further here. To find out how recognition was affected by inverting the stimuli 
overall, the corresponding ratings from both blocking conditions (inverts first and 
uprights first) were collapsed together and a two-way within-subjects ANOVA was 
performed. This showed main effects for emotion (fg = 23.8, p < 0.001) and 
orientation (F^ ^  = 9.4, p < 0.01), which was qualified by an interaction between 
them (Fg, los* = 4.2, p < 0.05). Post hoc tests showed that fear was the only emotion 
with ratings significantly reduced by inversion (p < 0.005).
For each portrayed emotion, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted between the ratings for that emotion and for the five non-portrayed 
emotions (i.e. along each row in Table 3.2). For all of the upright displays all 
ANOVAs showed significant main effects {portrayed anger, F2.34,39.54 *= 58.8, p < 
0.001; joy. Fa.,».37.14*= 7.3, p < 0.005; sadness, 27.4, p < 0.001; love,
45.48*= 16.2, p < 0.001;/ear, F,.92,32.66*= 15.66, p < 0.001; disgust, F.3.33.50.6?* = 15, p < 
0.001). Tukey’s post hoc tests confirmed that for each stimulus the portrayed 
emotion was rated higher (p < 0.005) than each of the 5 non-portrayed emotions 
considered individually with the exception of portrayed joy and portrayed disgust. 
Joy portrayals were distinguished from the non-portrayals of sadness, love, fear and 
disgust (p < 0.05) but did not differ from the non-portrayals of anger. Disgust 
portrayals were rated differently to all non-portrayals (p < 0.005) except for sadness.
For the inverted stimuli ANOVAs that compared the ratings for the portrayed and all 
of the five non-portrayed emotions showed there was a significant main effect for all 
of the portrayed emotions except fear {portrayed anger, F 2.72,46.19 »= 54.1, p < 0.001; 
Joy, F 2 59 32,22 * = ^"2, p “  0.001; sadness, Fg gg = 12.4, p ^ 0.001; love, Fg gg = 9, p 
0.001; jèm- F2.77,47 » = 1.07, n/s and disgust F2.g9_ 49.1g* = 7.7, p < 0.001). Post hoc 
Tukey’s tests confirmed that for portrayals of anger, sadness or love, the portrayed 
emotion was rated significantly higher than each of the 5 non-portrayed emotions 
individually (p < 0.05). Portrayals of joy were rated significantly higher than for 
(non-portrayals) of sadness, love, fear and disgust (p < 0.05), but they did not differ 
significantly from non-portrayals of anger. Ratings for portiayed disgust were higher
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than the non-portrayals of anger, joy, love and fear (p < 0. 05) but were confused 
with sadness. As in Experiment 1, fear was indistinguishable from all other (non- 
portrayed) emotions when inverted.
3.7.2.Comparison between Experiments 1 and la
The ratings for the portrayed emotions in Experiment la, when presentations lasted 
for 10 seconds, were combined together irrespective of block order so that they could 
be compared with the results from Experiment 1 when presentations lasted for the 
full length of the vignette. Figures 3.3.a and 3.3.b present the ratings from both 
experiments for the portrayed emotions and the 5 combined non-portrayed emotions 
for the upright a) and inverted b) presentations.
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Figure 3.3. Observers’ mean ratings as a function of experiment for a) upright and b) inverted 
presentations of the emotion response categories of the portrayed and non-portrayed emotions. The 
mean ratings for the non-portrayed emotions were derived from the mean of the combined scores 
from the five non-portrayals in each case.
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For the upright presentations in Experiment 1, when the full-length vignettes were 
shown, ratings for most of the portrayed emotions appeared higher than for the 10- 
second presentations (Experiment la). For the portiayed, inverted presentations from 
both experiments some ratings were higher for Experiment 1, e.g. joy and love, and 
some were higher when the shorter movies were shown (Experiment la). The non- 
portrayed emotion ratings varied by a maximum of 3 between the two experiments in 
every case for each orientation except for the case of inverted displays of non- 
portrayed anger, where ratings were slightly lower in the first experiment. An 
omnibus ANOVA with 3 within-subject vaiiables (emotion x error x orientation) and 
a between-subject variable (experiment) that compared the ratings made in 
Experiments 1 and la  for only the non-portiayals showed significant main effects for 
both emotion Fg. ,30 = 7.9, p < 0.001 and the non-portrayed ratings F4 ,04 = 13.8, p < 
0.001.However, there was no effect for orientation F, 26 = 1, p > 0.05 and 
importantly, no effect for experiment Fj  ^26 = 0.3, p > 0.05. This suggests that there 
were no differences between the experiments for the incorrect ratings made.
A mixed design ANOVA with 2 within-subjects factors (emotion (6 levels) and 
orientation (2 levels)), and one between-subject’s factor (experiment) —  (the bold 
figures in Tables 3.1 and 3.2) was caii'ied out on the data. There was a main effect 
for emotion (Fg ,30 = 26.3, p < 0.001) and orientation (Fj. 26 = 42.8, p < 0.001), 
qualified by a significant interaction (Fg_ ,30= 8.5, p < 0.001). However, no significant 
between-subject difference between Experiments 1 and la  was found (F, 26= 2.3, p > 
0.05).
3.7.3. Discussion
As in Experiment 1, perception of some emotions was affected by inversion. 
Portrayals of joy (when uprights were shown first) and love (when uprights were 
shown second) were confused with one or more non-portrayals here whereas in 
Experiment 1 these emotions were not affected by inversion. Once again, inversions 
of portiayed sadness were confused with love (only when uprights were shown first)
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and portrayed disgust, inespective of order of showing, was confused with at least 
two other non-portrayals. The most interesting finding for inversion displays, as in 
Experiment 1, was that portrayed feai* was indistinguishable from all other emotions 
(except joy when inverts were shown fii*st).
That there was no significant between-subjects difference between the shown order 
of orientations suggests that subjects did not learn to categorise the emotions by 
seeing examples of upright stimuli first. Furthermore, that there was no significant 
between-experiments’ difference between Experiments 1 and la  shows that there 
were no differences between seeing full-length vignettes or shortened, 10-second 
examples of them. Therefore, there was sufficient information in a 10 second clip for 
recognition of the emotions (with the exception of disgust).
3,8. Experiment lb
Experiment la  has shown clearly that the overall results from Experiment 1 were 
reliable in that emotion can be perceived from displays of interpersonal 
communication and that the perception of fear, and to some extent other emotions 
too, is impaired by inversion. Furthermore, Experiment la  shows that there were no 
leaining effects transferred from upright to inverted versions of the same displays. It 
has also revealed that discrimination of the stimuli was not based on duration of the 
presentations as all the vignettes in Experiment la  were cut to show only the first 10 
seconds and there were no differences in ratings between these and the full length 
stimuli (Experiment 1). However, the consequence of this action meant that, 
although each film clip was the same absolute length as all the other clips, the fact 
remained that, due to some emotion types taking longer to act out, there may have 
been more information (due to more turn-taking behaviour being included) contained 
in the 10 second presentations for some emotion categories relative to the others. For 
example, anger presentations lasted for an average of 17.6 seconds when they were 
shown in full. Therefore, by reducing them to 10 seconds removed less material than 
for sadness presentations, which were on average 24.8 seconds long. Therefore, 
Experiment lb  was designed to eliminate this possible artefact. To achieve this, 
subjects were required to rate examples from each emotion category where the
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vignettes shown took the actors similar amounts of time to act out. Figure 3.4.a) 
gives the ratings for each vignette shown in Experiment 1 and the amount of time 
that each vignette lasted. Figure 3.4,b) shows the 12 vignettes that were chosen for 
the present experiment. As the full vignette (with all 8 turn-takes) was shown the 
ratings given for these examples could then be compared with those from 
Experiment 1. Therefore, the amount of time that the vignettes were played for, and 
the amount of turn- taking contained within each one was constant. Therefore, if no 
between-subject differences were found, it could be confirmed that subjects were not 
using information based on, or as a consequence of, display duration for recognition 
of emotions.
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Figure 3.4. a) Observers’ mean ratings for each of the upright stimuli used in Experiment 1 as a 
function of total showing time; b) the subset of portrayals used for Experiment lb.
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3.9. Experiment lb: Method
3.9.1. Subjects
Fifteen subjects participated in the experiment (3 males and 12 females; mean age = 
36.7 yeai's; age range 21-58 yeais).
3.9.2. Apparatus, design, stimuli and procedure
Two full-length examples from each of the six emotion categories were used from 
the Experiment 1 corpus. The examples chosen were those that were the most similar 
in length. The mean duration (in seconds) for each emotion category was: anger 19.5, 
joy 20,9, sadness 22.4, love 19.2, feai* 20.65 and disgust 19.3 — a difference of only 
3.2 seconds in mean duration between the slowest (sadness) and the fastest (love). 
Three emotions, anger, love and disgust differed by less than or equal to 3/lOths of 
one second.
Subjects were seated in front of a table where the displays were shown on the 14- 
inch G3 Apple Macintosh (laptop computer - described in Chapter 2). They were 
required to watch each display and rate them in the same way as described in 
Experiment 1. The stimuli were shown in random order and the experiment lasted for 
approximately 12 minutes. The ratings were recorded, and the non-portrayed scores 
were pooled, in the same way as in Experiment 1.
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3.10. Results and discussion
Figure 3.5. shows the portrayed and non-portrayed mean ratings for each emotion 
category for this experiment along with the mean ratings for all the examples shown 
in Experiment 1. The non-portrayed results (as they are similar between both 
experiments, (Fj 23 = 0.8, p > 0.05) are considered no further here. A between- 
subjects ANOVA for the portrayed ratings only revealed no significant between- 
experiment effect (F, 23 = 2.35, p > 0.05). Post hoc tests for each target emotion 
further confirmed that there were no significant differences between experiments (p 
> 0.05). Thus, these results establish that neither the varying duration of the vignettes 
nor the amount of turn-taking communication shown within each display affected 
observers ability to discriminate between emotions.
an ger j o y  sa d n ess  lo v e  fear
E m o tio n  portrayed  b y  th e  actors
■  P ortrayed  1
■  Portrayed  lb
G1 N on -p ortrayed  1 
□  N on -p ortrayed  lb
d isg u st
Figure 3.5. Observers’ mean ratings for the upright presentations of the emotion response categories 
of the portrayed and non-portrayed emotions shown in Experiments 1 and lb. The mean ratings for 
the non-portrayed emotions were derived from the mean of the combined scores from the five non­
portrayals in each case. Error bars show standard errors.
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3.11. Qualitative analysis
The sliding scales dependent measure that is used in most of the experiments 
reported in this thesis allows for the possibility that observers might have been able 
to discriminate between emotions by a process of elimination. Therefore, by 
allowing observers to express freely what emotion(s) they perceived in the stimuli 
would validate the quantitative scales if the portrayed emotions were spontaneously 
recognised by observers.
3.12. Qualitative analysis: Method
3.12.1, Subjects
The subjects were 5 postgraduates and 7 undergraduates from the Psychology 
department at the University of Surrey (5 male and 7 female; age range 19 to 57 
yeai's; mean age 25.75 years).
3.12.2. Apparatus, design, stimuli and procedure
The laboratory and computer set up was the same as that used in the previous 
experiments reported in this chapter except that a chin rest was not used. Two 
different examples of each of the six emotions were used from the Experiment 1 
corpus and were shown to subjects in random order. Therefore, there were 24 
responses for each emotion (one response for portrayed disgust was missing due to 
experimenter error). The criteria for the stimuli selection were 1) to use stimuli that 
received medium ratings (for example the anger stimuli chosen were those that 
received the second and the fourth highest ratings out of six in Experiments 1 and la) 
and 2) to include at least one example from each of the 10 actors. Displays that 
received the very highest ratings were not included as the high ratings may have been 
indicative of actors over-exaggerating the body movements made in their 
performances of the vignettes (see Chapter 5 for a discussion on exaggerated 
movements). The stimuli were presented in upright form and each stimulus was
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shown for its full duration. The observers were seated in front of the monitor and 
were told that they would be viewing some point-light displays where people 
expressed emotions. They were informed that they were required to try to describe 
the displays in terms of any emotional content that could be discerned. The 
experimenter sat next to the observer and noted the emotion being shown along with 
descriptions given. The subjects were unable to see the experimenter’s notes as they 
were asked to watch the monitor constantly and the room was dimly lit. As a back up 
measure all descriptions were also recorded on audiotape. The experimenter 
contiolled the computer to show each trial once the observer indicated that they were 
ready. The process for showing all 12 displays and obtaining the relevant 
descriptions of them lasted approximately 15 minutes.
3.13. Qualitative analysis: Results
The observers’ main responses can be seen in Table 3.3. All of the words used as 
attempts to describe emotions are included. Words used to describe physical 
movements are only included when they are salient to the observers’ dialogues or 
when an observer said little else.
On every occasion apart from 3,when observers expressed that they could not 
identify emotion, each observer made insightful comments about the displays being 
watched, although they did not always specifically describe emotions. For example, 
“intense in something, something quite deep” (HM) was used to describe a love 
portrayal and “turning away, in a huff with each other” (DN) was used to describe an 
anger portiayal.
Each of the emotion categories is considered in turn below.
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3.13.1. Anger
This was the emotion category most easily identified by observers as on fifteen 
occasions observers mentioned the word anger in their descriptions of the anger 
displays. On the 9 occasions that anger was not mentioned, that an argument was 
taking place was claimed 5 times, usually backed up with descriptions such as ‘not 
happy’ (MJ), ‘enraged’ (KF) or ‘confrontational’ (AB). The remainder of the time 
observers made comments such as “in a huff with each other” (DN), “pissed off with 
each other” (MP) or “aggressive” (JS). On no occasion was there a comment made 
that could be attiibuted to the perception of positive affect.
3.13.2. Joy
On 9 occasions out of 24, observers described the stimuli as ‘happy’ and on one 
occasion ‘joy’ was mentioned. On 7 other occasions ‘excitement’ was used as a 
descriptive. Observers were ambivalent over their judgements in 8 instances where 
they made comments about the displays showing both anger and happiness. 
However, within this category, it was apparent that observers’ were sometimes 
changing their minds about what emotion they were seeing as the displays unfolded. 
For example, “angry... happy... jumping around indicates happier” (MJ), or, 
“aggressive, excited, excited actually” (MJ). Other descriptions included phrases 
such as ‘ friendly aggression’ (PH). On only 3 occasions, and therefore for only 
12.5% of descriptions, were the joy portrayals described as negative affect per se.
3.13.3.Sadness
For almost 50% of the time, the word ‘sadness’ was mentioned as either the only, or 
one of a few similar (e.g. miserable or depressed) feelings. On two occasions, 
observers described the figures as looking upset and on one occasion each, the words 
“solemn” (AB) and “depressed” (HP) were used. For the rest of the time the stimuli 
were described as looking bored (twice), insecure, confused, angry and curious 
(once each). On two occasions subjects expressed either no knowledge of what was
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being displayed (‘don’t know’) or that there was little emotional interaction to be 
perceived.
3.13.4. Love
The word ‘love’ was used twice to describe the love portrayals. Other words and 
phrases were used that may be considered as subordinate categories of love (see Fehr 
and Russell, 1991) such as “embrace” (MJ), “kind” (CJ), “care” (CJ), “intense” 
(HB), “friendly” (CJ), “flirting” (MP), “gentle” (PH) and “lust” (MJ). On 10 
occasions the descriptions had no relation to the concept of love, for example, 
“confrontational” (DN), “don’t know” (AM), or “rowing” (HP).
3.13.5. Fear
The word ‘fear’ was used on two occasions. Words that can be associated with this 
emotion such as “anxiety” (CJ), “afraid”, “scared”, “apprehension — flight or fight” 
(MJ) were used on another 10 occasions. On another occasion, a scenario approach 
was used by a subject when they said “like 2 kids waiting for a third to smash a 
window” (MJ). This response could be interpreted as the subject’s perception of a 
fearful event about to take place. On 6 occasions the subjects did not get an 
impression of fear; for example, they perceived dancing or being cross with each 
other. Twice, the observers were either not sure of the emotion, e.g., “not sure if it’s 
positive or negative” (PH), or, “building up to something but can’t think of the 
emotion” (HP).
3.13.6. Disgust
Not once did any of the observers use the word ‘disgust’ or any word that could be 
associated with this emotion (e.g. ‘revulsion’ or ‘repugnance’). Instead, a wide 
vaiiety of adjectives were used to describe the stimuli such as “depressed”, “bored”, 
“happy”, “angry’ or “sad”. On some occasions, observers made several discordant 
descriptions of the stimuli at once, for example, one observer described for one 
stimulus, “sadness, boredom, annoyance and empathy”. There were 3 instances
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where observers said that the stimulus made “no sense, “was odd” or that they were 
“confused” by it.
3.14. Qualitative analysis: Discussion
This analysis was designed as a measure of validation for the quantitative, sliding 
scales dependent measure that has been used in most of the experiments reported in 
this thesis. When the sliding scales were used, it was possible that observers might 
have been able to use a process of elimination to identify the emotions. Here it has 
been demonstrated that in many instances observers are freely able to name either the 
emotions directly or use descriptions of the stimuli which are broadly indicative of 
the emotions shown for most of the categories. As in the quantitative results, the 
degree to which observers were successful in freely identifying affect varied 
depending on emotion category and this variation largely coheres with the 
quantitative ratings given in experiments 1, la  and lb. For example, both the 
quantitative and qualitative results show that anger was an easily identified emotion 
as it received ratings of around 70% or more in the former and, in 15 out of 24 
showings, the word ‘anger’ was attributed to the displays, which is also high (62.5% 
correct). The rest of the time observers gave descriptions that implicitly implied an 
angry scene. The success rate was also good (42%) for the free identification of joy. 
That this emotion was also sometimes confused with anger, was consistent with the 
quantitative results. Interestingly, anger was never confused with joy here and nor 
was it in the quantitative data (except in one case in Experiment la). Sadness was 
identified freely for about 50% of the time. It was suiprising that the observers only 
identified love explicitly on two occasions. This may be due to the fact that love is an 
emotion rarely talked about in a scientific context and therefore observers, who were 
all psychology students, were not expecting love to be the correct answer. In support 
of this view, when observers were debriefed after the test many expressed surprise 
and amusement that love was the coixect emotion term required and acknowledged 
that the relevant point-light displays were indicative of love. Despite the few times 
that the word ‘love’ was used as a descriptor, many terms were used that are 
considered as subordinate categories of this emotion (Fehr and Russell, 1991). As in
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the case of love, fear was identified explicitly only twice. However, that fear was 
identified frequently with words, or on one occasion with a scenario, associated with 
fear shows that fear was implicitly recognised for more than 50% of the vignettes 
shown.
Of particular interest was the finding that on no occasion here was disgust identified 
explicitly, nor could any description of these stimuli be associated with anything that 
might be interpreted as disgust. Instead, a range of descriptions were given such as 
‘happy’, ‘angry’, ‘boredom’ and ‘lethargic’. It was, in some cases, as if the observers 
were guessing at what the stimuli might be and, in other cases observers admitted to 
being confused by the displays. These findings concur with the quantitative data, 
which shows that disgust was very confused with other emotion categories.
Overall, the qualitative findings corroborate and validate the quantitative method 
used throughout this thesis. Therefore, the rating scale procedure was used with 
confidence as it was measuring observers’ perceptions of the specific emotion 
categories portrayed and the ability to recognise emotions is not an artefact of the 
sliding scales method.
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3.15, Experiment 2
Experiments 1 and la  have shown that for some emotions inverting the stimuli on the 
image plane severely impedes perception. This replicates findings by others for both 
non-emotive, point-light walkers (e.g. Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000) and emotive 
stimuli alike (Dittrich et al., 1996). Few studies have looked at how rotated stimuli 
(other than 180° inversions) affect perception. One exception was the study by 
Pavlova and Sokolov (2000) who found that, with orientations of 90° -  
180°,spontaneous recognition of a point-light walker was seriously impaired 
compared to upright displays. There have been no studies where emotive stimuli 
have been rotated by 90°.
From studies where either actors or dancers express emotions for observers to 
classify into specific movement categories (Wallbot, 1998) or, where specific 
movements are made for observers to decide which emotion they indicate (de Meijer, 
1989; Sawada, Suda and Ishii, 2003), there is evidence to suggest that specific 
movements and postures indicate certain emotions. For example, lateralised 
movements of the hands have been found to specify anger but not joy (Wallbot,
1998). In contrast, vertical movements, where dancers stood on their toes, stretched 
the trunk of the body and lifted their heads upwards were indicative of joy but not 
anger (de Meijer, 1989). When stimuli aie turned on the image plane by 90° lateral 
movements will appear vertical and vertical movements will look horizontal 
(although they do not change in terms of the actor’s egocentric co-ordinates). 
Therefore, by rotating anger and joy porti’ayals on to their sides veridical perception 
of the stimuli may be impaired: anger portrayals may be confused for joy and vice 
versa (if these directional cues aie critical for perception). The main purpose of this 
experiment was to show observers rotated presentations to see how important 
vertical and horizontal movements were for the recognition of joy and anger 
respectively.
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It was found that portrayed fear was severely degraded when the stimuli were 
inverted (Experiments 1 and la). Therefore, a secondaiy enquhy was made to see 
how feai' was affected when the stimuli were turned on their sides. Although the 
interest here was in only 3 out of the original 6 emotion categories, all of the stimuli 
were shown to observers in both upright and rotated displays. This was done partly 
so that observers would not have too few categories to discriminate between and 
partly to generate more data for upright portrayals so that the data (for upright 
portrayals) from Experiments 1, la  and 2 could be combined in order to look at sex 
differences.
There are many studies that examine sex differences for emotions but given that the 
literature is divided between both expressivity and experience of emotion, and that 
the methods by which assessments aie made vary greatly, actually there are few 
studies that measure sex differences in recognition of emotion from movement of the 
body. Although women are suggested to be the more ‘emotional’ sex (Kring and 
Gordon, 1998) the evidence for this is fai' from conclusive. Indeed, Dittrich et al. 
(1996) found no sex differences in the recognition of affect from body movement. 
Therefore, the examination of sex differences here will shed some more light on this 
issue.
3.16. Experiment 2; Method
3.16.1. Subjects
A total of 20 observers (10 males, and 10 females; age range 1 8 - 4 1  years; mean 
age: 21.4 yeais) paiticipated in the study. Eighteen were undergraduates and 2 were 
postgraduates and the undergraduates received a course credit for their paiticipation,
3.16.2. Apparatus, stimuli, design and procedure
The experimental set up and the stimuli used were the same as in Experiment 1. The 
stimuli were presented in the normal upright orientation and horizontally; half of the
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horizontal presentations were rotated clockwise (and half anticlockwise), thus the 
light-point heads would appear* on either the far left or the far right side of a boxed 
area of the monitor. The boxed area subtended approximately 8.9° of visual angle 
vertically and 9.9° horizontally. There were 72 trials in all (6 emotions x 6 samples x 
2 orientations) and stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment la. Each 
stimulus was shown for its first 10 seconds only. They were shown in one 
randomised block.
Observers were told that they would see some points of light on the screen that 
represented two people in a social context, both of which would be acting out only 
one of six possible emotions. The subjects were informed that in some trials the 
orientation of the stimuli would be altered. As in Experiment 1, a chin rest was used 
and subjects were instructed not to tilt their heads (in the preparation of the stimuli 
the experimenter had noticed that there was a natural tendency to turn the head to 
one side in order to make out the stimuli and so this was an important instr uction that 
was not necessary for Experiments 1 and la). The experiment lasted for 50 minutes.
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3.17. Experiment 2: Results
For each portrayed emotion the means were pooled so that comparisons could be 
made between one incorrect (non-portrayed) score and one correct (portrayed) score. 
Figure 3.6. shows the mean ratings of the portrayed emotions as well as the 
combined mean scores for the non-portrayed emotions when the displays were 
presented at 90° from vertical. Table 3.4. presents the complete set of ratings for both 
upright and rotated stimuli.
80
70
50
40
30
20
I ■  portrayed 
[ □ non-portrayed
anger joy sadness love
Portrayed emotions
fear disgust
Figure 3.6. Observers’ mean ratings for the 90° rotated presentations of the emotion response 
categories of the portrayed and non-portrayed emotions. The mean ratings for the non-portrayed 
emotions were derived from the mean of the combined scores from the five non-portrayals in each 
case. Error bars show standard errors.
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Table 3.4. Observers mean ratings for each emotion response category when stimuli were a) upright 
and b) rotated 90°. Figures in bold type denote the mean ratings for the portrayed emotions. Standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses.
Stimulus Response
Anger Joy Sadness Love Fear Disgust
a)
Upright presentation 72 (16.4) 4(4.1) 8 (6.5) 3 (2.5) 13(3.2) 27 (22.1)
Anger 23 (16.9) 47 (17) 6 (4a) 12(9.1) 12(10.2) 9(9)
Joy 7 (5.7) 4 (4a) 59 (13.7) 10(7.5) 18(14.9) 12(11.9)
Sadness 10(8.7) 8(14.5) 15(12.7) 41 (29.5) 12(16.6) 12(11.6)
Love 11 (10.1) 11 (10.5) 21 (13) 6 (8.8) 48 (22.7) 15(16.4)
Fear 13(11.2) 9(10.2) 37 (25.1) 5 (6.2) 19(20.1) 25 (18.8)
Disgust
b)
Rotated presentation
Anger 72 (13.1) 6 (6.5) 10(11) 7 (6.4) 14(14.6) 24 (17.6)
Joy 30 (20.8) 39 (24.5) 9 (9.6) 8 (7.5) 11 (8.7) 12(14.8)
Sadness 9(9.9) 9(10.7) 40 (18.5) 19(15.7) 14(12.5) 16(13.7)
Love 9 (10.8) 8(11.3) 18(15.4) 41 (25.8) 15(16.2) 9 (9.3)
Fear 16(12.9) 15(12.3) 18(13.4) 9 (7.8) 29 (18.5) 20 (15.4)
Disgust 17(12.7) 9(15.7) 29 (16.7) 10(9) 15(12.2) 25 (13.5)
An ANOVA with 2 variables: display type (2 levels, vertical and horizontal) and 
emotion (6 levels), revealed a significant main effect for emotion (Fj yg, 52.39* = 20.8, p 
< 0.001) and for rotation (F^ ,9 = 49.1, p < 0.001) showing that ratings for rotation 
were significantly reduced relative to the upright stimuli. A significant interaction 
between emotion and orientation (Fg_ 95 = 5.52, p < 0.001) showed that rotation 
affected the ratings of some portrayed emotions more than others. Post hoc Tukey’s
83
tests following the ANOVA revealed that the ratings for joy (p < 0.05), sadness (p < 
0.001) and feai' (p < 0.001) were significantly reduced by rotation while anger, love 
and disgust were unaffected. There was no significant difference found for the way 
that subjects rated the 90° left and 90° right stimuli (F5 95= 1.52, p > 0.05).
One-way ANOVAs that compared the ratings for the portrayed and all of the five 
non-portiayed emotions when the stimuli were rotated showed that there were 
significant main effects for all of the portrayed emotions {portrayed anger, F3 3 59,54*= 
93.74, p < 0.001;yoy, Fj ,, 33,74* = 13.12, p < = 0.001; sadness, F2M,54.23* = 16.33, p < 
0.001; love, F2_69,su 9* = 12.99, p < O.QOV, fear  Fg,95= 4.79, p = 0.001 and disgust F 2_^  ^
53,83* = 8.13, p < 0.001). Post hoc Tukey’s tests showed that for portiayals of anger, 
sadness or love, the portiayed emotion was rated significantly higher than each of the 
5 non-portrayed emotions individually (p < 0.01). This was not true for ratings of 
portrayed fear as although ratings for portrayed feai' were higher than anger, joy and 
love (p < 0.05), they were no higher than ratings for (non-portrayed) sadness and 
disgust (p > 0.05). Ratings for (portrayed) disgust were confused with (non- 
portiayed) sadness (p > 0.05) but were lai'ger than anger, joy, love and feai' (p < 
0.001). Of particulai' interest was the result that portrayed joy was confused with 
(non-portrayed) anger (p > 0.05) but was not confused with any other emotions (p < 
0.005).
3.18. Experiment 2: Discussion
The main finding of this experiment was that the portrayals of joy and fear were 
severely impeded by showing the displays at 90° orientations. In comparison to 
Experiments 1 and la, rotated presentations of feai' portrayals were not as degraded 
as when inversions were shown when, almost without exception, feai' was confused 
with all of the non- portiayals. In Experiment 2 fear was confused with only two 
emotions: sadness and disgust. However, that this is so shows that bodily expressions 
of fear appear to be particularly sensitive to effects of showing non-veridical 
orientations per se. It may prove interesting to investigate the showing of fear
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stimuli at orientations of less than 90° to see how close to upright positioning the 
stimulus needs to be before veridical perception is reinstated.
It was expected that recognition of anger would be impahed to some degree as it has 
been proposed that lateralised body movements aie indicative of this affect (Wallbot,
1998). However, that perception of this emotion remained good shows that either 
horizontal movement is still easily recognised despite rotation or that it is not a 
critical cue. Bodily expressions of anger do consist of other movements and 
positioning as well (e.g. arms stretched out frontal, Wallbot, 1998). Moreover, 
Pollick et al. (2001) found that affect (including anger) could be identified better than 
chance from point-light displays (of arm knocking movements) when displays were 
both inverted and phase scrambled; therefore detail of specific form is lost. This 
suggests that some low-level aspects of the displays such as velocity of the dots are 
useful for recognition of affect, and so quality of movement may not be an essential 
cue.
Whilst horizontal movement is not necessary to specify anger, it appeal's that vertical 
movement is important for veridical recognition of joy as the data for joy here are 
impaired when the stimuli are turned by 90°. Furthermore, portiayed joy is confused 
with (non-portrayed) anger in this condition. This result suggests that vertical 
movement is an important cue for the recognition of joy and thus corroborates with 
observations in the literature (e.g. de Meijer, 1989) that joy is specified by vertical 
movement and posture. This observation is also reflected in lay knowledge of this 
emotion — e.g. in the expression ‘jumping for joy’. That perception of joy remained 
good when inverted images were shown bolsters this claim (except for one 
anomalous result in Experiment la) as it shows perception is dependent on the 
vertical direction of movement irrespective of veridical positioning. That portrayed 
joy was confused with non-portrayed anger suggests that, whilst horizontal 
movement is not critical for perception of anger portrayals, it is an inti'insic feature of 
anger.
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3.19. Sex differences
The literature is replete with studies investigating sex differences in the 
expressiveness and response of emotions. Numerous studies have been conducted on 
how men and women express and experience emotions both psychologically (e.g. 
self reports) and physiologically (e.g. skin conductance responses). The majority of 
studies suggest that women are more emotional than men (e.g. Wagner, McDonald 
and Manstead, 1986; Zuckerman, Lipets, Koivumaki and Rosenthal, 1975) although 
the findings are not always clear and are often inconsistent. Whether the cause of sex 
differences is environmental or genetic for emotions is complicated as it is likely that 
the cause of at least some differences is because of the way men and women are 
socialized (Grossman and Wood, 1993). Furthermore, men hide their feelings more 
than women (Gross and John, 1998). To complicate the issue further, the sociality of 
the experimental situation influences how emotions are expressed, i.e., the 
experimenter will act as an additional eliciting stimulus (Buck, Losow, Muiphy, and 
Costanzo, 1992). In a solitary context (i.e. viewing a film alone) there is less 
likelihood that such display rules will be operative (as there is no social stimulus 
present to activate or inhibit them).
For the particulai' case of the perception of emotions from full-light showings of 
body movements (where the actor’s back was faced towards the camera so no facial 
information could be seen) females identified feai' portrayals with more accuracy 
than men but no other sex differences were found out of the emotions tested, which 
included joy, surprise, fear, sadness anger and disgust (Sogon and Izard, 1987). 
However, Dittrich et al. (1996) found no sex differences for emotion recognition in 
full-light and point-light displays.
Here, the data for the veridical (upright) portrayed emotions were combined from 
Experiments 1, la  and 2. This meant that there were 48 subjects included in the 
analysis (20 male: 28 female, age range 18-41 years). It was possible to combine data 
from these 3 experiments as the stimuli and experimental design in each were the 
same and the only differences were that each stimulus in Experiment 1 was played
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for its full duration whereas in Experiments la  and 2 the stimuli were clipped to 10 
seconds in length.
It is evident from Figure 3.7. that there were differences in ratings between the sexes 
for portrayals of anger, joy, sadness, and fear: men gave higher ratings to the stimuli 
than women. The target emotions for the upright portrayals only were entered into a 
2 (sex: female, male) x 6 (emotion: anger, joy, sadness, love, fear and disgust) 
ANOVA. This revealed a significant main effect for emotion (F5 230 = 31.35, p < 
0.001) and was followed by a non-significant interaction between sex and emotion 
(F5 280* = 1.59, p > 0.05). There was a significant between-subjects effect for sex {F^  
46 = 4.18, p < 0,05). Six, two-way ANOVAs with one between-subject factor (sex) 
and one within-subjects factor— the ratings for the portrayed and the five non­
portrayed emotions given for each category —  showed no significant differences 
between ratings for males and females except for portr ayed fear (anger, F3 2, , 47 .9* = 
0.88, p > 0.05, joy, F234, 107,5+ = 1, p > 0.05, sadness, 157.1* = 0.73, p > 0.05, love 
^ 2.85,131* = 0.85, p > 0.05, fear  F3 i_ 142* = 4.05, p < 0.01, disgust F3 2,149.6+ = 0.86, p > 
0.05). Follow up tests for fear* indicated that men gave higher ratings for portrayed 
feai" than women (p < 0.001). No other differences were found. The full set of ratings 
for males and females can be seen in Table 3.5.
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Figure 3.7. Observers’ mean ratings for the upright presentations of the ‘correct’ response category 
for the portrayed emotions as a function of sex. Error bars show standard errors.
Table 3.5. Observers mean ratings for the upright portrayals shown in Experiments 1, la  and 2. The 
ratings for males and females are shown separately. Figures in bold type denote the mean ratings for 
the portrayed emotions. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Stimulus Anger Joy Sadness Love Fear Disgust
Females
Anger 69 (13.7) 5 (3.5) 20 (20.9) 6 (6.2) 16(15.8) 33 (25.8)
Joy 23(17.4) 41 (16.1) 10(10.4) 15(12) 14 (9.4) 14(15.1)
Sadness 12(12.4) 6 (5.2) 53 (18) 14(12.8) 18(12.6) 18(14.9)
Love 14(11.8) 11 (13.6) 20(14.4) 42 (23.4) 13(12) 11 (9.9)
Fear 18(14) 12(9.7) 22 (14.2) 10(9.9) 42 (20.5) 17(15.5)
Disgust 20(15.2) 8 (7) 33(19.4) 10(9.3) 20(18.7) 30 (15.4)
Males
Anger 73 (14.2) 7 (8.3) 14(17.7) 8 (8.9) 20(15.3) 32(18)
Joy 29 (16.8) 50 (18.8) 8 (5.9) 17(14.6) 13(10.4) 17(16.4)
Sadness 11 (9.6) 7 (7.8) 58 (17.2) 16(11.5) 18(13.8) 15(10.6)
Love 15(10.9) 10(13) 17(9.4) 42 (21.4) 16(15.5) 19(14.8)
Fear 11 (8.6) 13(11) 20(12.8) 11 (12.2) 58 (16.7) 19(14.6)
Disgust 17(11.9) 11 (9.7) 41(22.6) 10(10) 18(14.9) 30 (18.5)
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Men gave higher ratings than women for four of the emotion categories tested. That 
men judged portrayals more intensely than women was a surprise given that women 
are generally reported as the more emotional sex and that the opposite effect was 
found by Sogon and Izai'd (1987). However, men have been found to display higher 
skin conductance reactivity when watching (full-light) fear-eliciting films (Kiing and 
Gordon, 1998), Therefore, it appears that men give higher ratings to bodily 
expressions of fear and produce more physiological activity to fear-eliciting stimuli 
than women.
3.20. General Discussion
The present experiments were designed to investigate whether emotion can be 
recognised from the non-verbal cues displayed in point-light displays produced by 
pairs of actors engaged in dialogue. The prime motivation behind this was the fact 
that natural social situations have not yet been considered in the perception of affect 
from biological motion. This is considered a major omission given that emotions are 
communicative in nature. The first experiment clearly showed that the emotions of 
anger, fear, joy, sadness and love could be identified in such displays, which 
suggests that the spatio-temporal information inherent in natural human movement is 
sufficient to specify certain emotions. The exception in these results was for 
portrayed disgust, which was often confused with sadness, anger and fear. 
Qualitative data made the quantitative results more cogent by showing that the 
psychological process involved was recognition, rather than discrimination, between 
6 response alternatives. Inversion reduced the salience of the displayed emotions to 
varying extents although overall performance was still good for most emotions 
except fear. In Experiment 2 the effect of 90° rotation was investigated. Results for 
the rotated displays showed that portrayed joy was confused with non-portrayed 
anger but the opposite was not true as portiayed anger was identified veridically. 
This suggests that directional cues are important for some emotions over others. It
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was found that men gave higher ratings to portiayals of fear than women did but no 
other sex differences were found.
That a range of emotions can be recognised in biological motion displays of actors 
engaged in a dialogue is in line with previous research, which has generally used 
more stylised movements such as dance (e.g. Dittrich et al., 1996). However, the 
results reported here do not mirror some other results in the literature. For example, 
portrayed anger was the most easily perceived emotion out of the six shown here, 
which is not consistent with the findings of Dittrich et al. (1996) or Atkinson et al. 
(2004), In both of these experiments portrayals of grief and joy received higher 
ratings than portrayals of anger, and in the case of Atkinson et al,’s results fear did 
too. In fact, Atkinson et al. found that all of the emotions, even disgust, received very 
high scores when presented as point-light displays. In the results presented here only 
portrayed anger consistently received ratings this high. Such vaiiation in findings 
may be accounted for by a number of differences in the methods used between 
studies. One important difference was that Atkinson et al. (2004) did not use point- 
light displays in the strict sense of the concept. Rather, strips of reflective tape were 
used, which changes the cues normally available in a point-light display in that the 
orientation of the limbs and wrists is more apparent, and furthermore, a sense of 
depth is given, especially to the shoulder joints. Therefore, more information is 
available to the perceiver than in a true point-light display. Other reasons for such 
high identification in the Atkinson et al, study may have been due to half of the 
observers having watched full-light displays (videos) one week before seeing the 
same displays in point-light. Furthermore, a 5-alternative forced choice dependent 
measme was used, which meant that observers were forced to make yes/no decisions 
about the stimuli shown.
The fact that fear was well identified here is consistent with Walk and Homan’s 
(1984) results in point-light displays of an actor engaged in mime, and an actor 
expressing stereotypical movements (Atkinson et al., 2004) but contrasts with the 
poor identification of fear with other types of movement (e.g. musicians’ movements 
presented in full-light: Dahl and Friberg, 2004; dancers’ movements presented in
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point-light: Dittrich et al., 1996). Based on their findings for poor recognition of fear, 
Dittrich et al. aigued that to detect the presence of feai* quickly a system would use 
only spatial information as this is instantaneous (dynamic information is not 
instantaneous as time has to elapse for it to occur). However, that fear was easily 
identified here suggests that a system for the perception of fear could be based on 
dynamic form information. Furthermore, For survival purposes, this emotion must be 
detected wherever it occurs in the visual field, irrespective of where attention is 
presently directed (Ohman, 2000).
Movement is detected easily regardless of attention, for example, whilst picnicking 
in a quiet park on a sunny day visual attention can be quickly diverted from a good 
book to focus on an animal running across a distant open field. However, the 
literature is replete with studies showing us that with minor disturbances in the visual 
array large changes in static scenes are easily overlooked — a phenomenon known 
as change blindness (e.g. Henderson and Hollingsworth, 1999; Rensinck, O’Regan 
and Clark, 1997; Simons, 1996). That spatial information is not used is not the point 
argued here; rather the point is that dynamic information is used and is most 
effective.
It is fundamental that any effective system is efficient, and so to use information that 
is veridical even if it takes an instant longer (dynamic information) to process is 
better than to be momentarily quicker (spatial information) but be incoixect. Ohman 
(2000) has argued that false negatives (i.e. failing to detect fear and elicit a response 
when it is present) aie more costly than false positives (eliciting a response when 
there is no threat). Whilst this is true, a good system for detecting threatening 
situations should not make false positives because there are carry over effects for the 
next tlireatening encounter.
Interestingly, Bassili (1978) found that fear and anger were not easily identified in 
point-light displays of facial emotion but disgust was. However, in the present study 
disgust was poorly perceived. This is in agreement with Dittrich et al.’s (1996)
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finding that disgust was not only poorly discriminated in point-light presentations of 
dancers’ movements but was also the least well identified in the corresponding full- 
light presentations of the same. Disgust was better discriminated in Atkinson et al.’s 
(2004) study but their actors were explicitly guided to avoid interpreting disgust as 
contempt or moral disgust, which was a measure not undertaken here (it is not 
known how the dancers interpreted disgust in Dittrich et al.’s, 1996 study). Moral 
disgust is likely to be mixed with feelings of anger, which may explain why disgust 
was confused with anger here but not in Atkinson et al’s. research. However, disgust 
did receive the lowest percent correct out of the emotions tested across all (full-light 
and point-light, moving and still) conditions in Atkinson et al.’s (2004) study. This 
finding combined with the present results and those of others (e.g. Dittrich et al., 
1996) suggests that neither the body nor indeed other channels such as the voice (see 
Johnstone and Scherer, 2000) may be good channels to communicate this emotion 
regardless of whether representations of it are presented in full-light or abstracted 
body movements. To corroborate with this view, Coulson (2004) has demonstrated 
that disgust can not be recognised from static pictures of the body (whereas other 
emotions can). Although this emotion is associated with contempt (Darwin, 
1872/1999) and morally objectionable behaviour (Ekman, 2003), it is also food 
related (Daiwin, 1872/1999; Ekman, 2003). Indeed Rozin and Fallon (1987) argued 
for a narrow definition of disgust in that it is only related to food. That the face is a 
better channel of expression for disgust makes sense and in fact its distinctive facial 
expression has been well documented historically (e.g. Darwin, 1872/1999; Ekman 
and Friesen, 1974). Overall it appears that the face is a good channel for perception 
of some emotions, and the body for others.
A motivation in the present work has been to fulfil the need for ecological, rather 
than paradigm driven research. Clearly the differences in results between Dittrich et 
al.’s findings and those reported here might be at least in part due to the fact that 
dance movements were recorded in the former. Although Atkinson et al. (2004) did 
not use dancers in the making of then stimuli, that actors made their performances in 
isolation of others, and indeed in isolation from their surrounding environment
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(given that tights were worn over their heads during recordings) may account for at 
least some of the reported differences between studies.
Evidence to suggest that the recognition of biological motion from point-light 
displays is impaired when inverted (Bertenthal and Pinto, 1994; Pavlova and 
Sokolov, 2000; Dittrich et al., 1996; Shipley, 2003) was supported by our findings as 
in general lower ratings were given to the inverted stimuli compaied to the upright 
ones. This effect was particularly pronounced for fear. Similarly, Dittrich at al. 
(1996) found that inverted displays of fear were given higher ratings for non­
portrayed grief than for fear. However, the effects for inversion were far more 
pronounced in this study, which may reflect the differences in types of portrayals 
used between studies.
The foregoing evidence suggests that there may be special processing constraints that 
relate to fear and not to other emotions. Further, there is evidence in the literature 
from brain imaging and experimental studies to suggest that there may be a special 
module for the processing of fear. For example, recent brain imaging research has 
revealed that stimuli showing bodily expressions of fear and stimuli showing bodily 
expressions of happiness activate different brain regions (de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, 
Gerard and Hadjikhani, 2004; see also Dolan and Moms, 2000). Their findings have 
shown that fearful expressions depicted in full body videos yielded high activity in 
areas known to process emotional information (such as the amygdala) whereas this 
was not the case in similar compaiisons of either happy or neutral but meaningful 
body expressions (e.g. putting on trousers or opening a door). Furthermore, it is also 
known that the amygdala is active in the processing of biological motion (Bonda, 
Petrides, Ostry and Evans, 1996; Pavlova, Birbaumer and Sokolov, 2005). In 
addition to activation for emotion specific areas, de Gelder et al. (2004) found that 
feai- stimuli increased activation in areas responsible for action representation and 
motor cortex. Thus, the combined activity in these areas could amount to a fast track 
mechanism for fear contagion designed for preparation of action. Therefore, it 
appears that bodily expressions of feai- could be processed differently in the brain to 
other emotions. This result is substantiated by a study of NM, a patient with damage 
to the amygdala, who was unable to recognise fear from photographs of body
93
posture, although able to perceive anger, joy and sadness as well as controls could 
(Sprengelmeyer, Young, Schroeder, Grossenbacher, Federlein, Büttner and Przuntek,
1999).
The existence of a special system for fear recognition could explain why observers 
were unable to see fear when presented in unnatural orientations (both inverted and 
rotated): Whereas for the other emotions enough high level processing could be 
cairied out for veridical perception from the altered orientations this would not be the 
case for a fast-acting system where non-veridical portrayals of fear would be 
meaningless as they aie ecologically invalid. Consistent with this hypothesis, it has 
been postulated that a special low level route for the processing of feai- exists in the 
brain whereby the detection of feai- stimuli can be picked up almost instantaneously 
without awareness and with minimal cortical processing (LeDoux, 2000; and see 
Ohman, 2005 for a recent review). It is plausible that the existence of a fast-acting 
system for the perception of fear could explain why such a strong inversion effect 
was found for boxing behaviour (Dittrich, 1993) if this was inteipreted as fear by the 
visual system —  both types of behaviour are likely to be similar in quality of 
movement style, i.e. crouching and jerking backwards (and sometimes forwards) 
movements.
In conclusion, these studies cleaily demonstrate that emotions, with the exception of 
disgust, can be perceived from point-light displays of interpersonal behaviour. These 
findings cohere largely with those of similar studies although some differences are 
apparent. That men gave portrayals of fear higher ratings than women did was of 
interest given that the percept of fear appears to hold special status in the visual 
system; supported by the finding that feai- recognition was completely diminished for 
its non-veridical portrayals. This was an arresting result but one that could be 
explained if a special system exists for fear identification.
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Chapter 4 
Effects of social interaction
4.1. Introduction
Of centi'al importance in this thesis is the understanding of how perception of 
emotion is modified by the social context within the display. The aim of the work 
described in this chapter was to take a first step at examining certain aspects of 
communication with regard to recognition of affect from biological motion. Two 
important issues relating to the perception of a social event were explored. The first 
pertained to the importance of the natural dyad in the perception of affect by a third 
person observer. Specifically, the aim of this experiment (Experiment 3) was to 
determine whether performance of the observer differed when the original social 
context of the display was manipulated. As well as the original stimuli with two 
actors, observers were shown two other variations: the fnst was a single actor (the 
other was occluded) and the second was a simulated dyad without the rhythmic 
timing of interlocution. This was constructed by mirror-imaging a single actor on one 
side of the midline (so that each point-light person made the same movements at the 
same time). Therefore, by studying the natural dyadic interaction as well as situations 
where this was artificially removed, the importance of the social context will be 
investigated.
The second experiment reported in this chapter (Experiment 4) pertained to the 
communicative interaction independently of affect. It is clear that animate motion is 
an important source of information for an observer and that socially relevant states 
such as affect can be recognised. In the past, the use of point-light displays has 
demonstrated that other important intraindividual characteristics such as sex 
(e.g.Barclay, Cutting and Kozlowski, 1978) and identity (e.g.Troje, Westhoff and 
Lavrov, 2005) of an actor can be recognised. It is essential to establish what other 
chai’acteristics can be picked up from biological motion in order to understand the 
parameters of the social information available from movement cues. Without
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communication, humans would not be social. This experiment investigates a primary 
aspect of communication, i.e. speech. It takes an important first step to understand 
something about the interpersonal characteristics that are conveyed via the 
kinematics of the display, independent of affect. The question asked was whether the 
speaker can be identified.
4.2. Experiment 3
The social importance of emotions was implied over a century ago in the writings of 
Daiwin (1872; 1999) but it is only now that the social dimension of emotionality is 
becoming considered as fundamental in some of the current literature (e.g. Campos, 
Campos and BaiTett, 1989; Parkinson, 1996; Ekman, 1999; Blair, 2003; Manstead, 
2005) (see Chapter 1). However, there is still a dearth of empirical studies that 
consider emotion at this level.
Primarily, emotions should be considered at a social level as emotions are always 
about something and these things are normally people or events (Manstead, 2005). 
Further, during communication, emotions are frequently shared between people and 
an emotion expressed by the first person (the actor) informs the second person about 
the actor’s current state and also gives feedback to the actor about how the actor is 
perceived. Importantly, the behaviour of the second person will be based on their 
appraisal of the actor’s behaviour. Therefore, rather than thinking of emotions as 
states that reside only at the intrapersonal level, emotionality can be thought of as a 
dynamic relational process that occurs between the individual and the environment 
(Campos, Campos and Bairett, 1989; Blair, 2003). According to this view the study 
of emotions at a social level must be of interest as emotions have interpersonal or 
intergroup regulatory outcomes.
These social appraisals of others’ emotional states aie observable from an early age. 
For example, an infant will crawl across a solid table top and then onto and across a
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piece of transparent glass (which creates an illusory drop for the infant) only when 
the infant’s mother encourages the child to do so by smiling: when the mother 
appears to be fearful the baby remains on the perceived safe-side of the table (Sorce, 
Emde, Campos and Klinnert, 1985). The social exchange of affect in mother/child 
interactions is two-way, for example, toddlers have been shown to use particular 
displays of affect (sadness) in order to gain support from their social environment 
(Buss and Kiel, 2004).
Typically, positive emotions (e.g. joy and love) occur in social contexts (Shiota, 
Campos, Keltner and Hertenstein, 2004). These authors have argued that positive 
emotions aie paiticularly important at a social level because they serve functional 
purposes to help with bonding within families, romantic partnerships, friendships and 
also groups. For example, momentary displays of romantic love serve to promote and 
maintain long-term commitment behaviours in relationships (Gozanga et al., 2001).
Empirical evidence shows that positive emotions are facilitated by interpersonal 
interactions such as smiling, which was found to be positively correlated with the 
presence of a friend when happy films were viewed (Jakobs, Manstead and Fischer,
1999). Smiling was also enhanced when friends watched sad films together (Jakobs, 
Manstead and Fischer, 2001). Surprisingly then, in the latter case, although the 
stimulus was a sad film the presence of another person promoted smiling behaviour 
and inhibited the production of sad expressions. Conversely, sad expressions were 
produced when the sad movies were watched alone. Here it is important to draw a 
distinction between the expression and perception of emotions as, although this 
research provides evidence that the social context is important for the production of 
positive emotions, little is known about whether this is equally tiue for the perception 
of positive affect.
What do we know of the social interactions that serve to communicate affect? 
Humans are equipped to be able to both send and receive sensory information via 
multiple modalities simultaneously (Birdwhistell, 1970; de Gelder and Vroomen,
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2000) and theories of communication differ on what information is important for the 
exchange (see Chapter 1). However, in everyday interactions turn-taking is an 
observed phenomenon that serves to function as an important aspect of 
communication (Argyle, 1967). Turn-taking develops eaily and is evident in mother- 
infant interactions (Trevarthen, 1993; Bernieri, Reznick and Rosenthal, 1988; Baron 
and Boudreau, 1987; Field, Healy, Goldstein and Guthertz, 1990). Furthermore, 
imitation within a dyadic exchange by each partner of the other partner’s actions 
serves to facilitate similai* behaviour (Hess, Philippot and Blairy, 1999). For instance, 
smiles appeal" to be initiated by one partner and then imitated by the other (Cappella, 
1993). In general, mimicry is postulated to serve important social functions such as 
to communicate empathy, to enhance similarity between partners and to increase 
liking of the interacting partners (Hess et al., 1999). Furthermore, social synchrony 
and patterns of entrainment can be readily perceived by third parties not involved in 
the exchange (McClave, 1994). Moreover, relating to the same, film clips of natural 
mother-infant interactions which aie edited and reconstructed so that the behaviour 
of one interactant in one time period (e.g. the first minute) is paired with the 
behaviour of the other interactant in another time period (e.g. the third minute) 
(pseudointeractions) can be discriminated from real interactions (Bernieri et al., 
1988). Listeners involved in the exchange move their bodies but not always in a way 
that signifies that they want to take a turn to speak: this effect is known as back- 
channelling and it augments the first person’s speech (Duncan, 1972). Back- 
channelling is auditor-initiated and related movements have a powerful effect on the 
speaker as, without them, a speaker may start repeating an utterance or become quiet 
(Weiner, DeVoe, Rubinow and Geller, 1972). Head nods aie a prototypical example 
of back-channelling but speakers make head nods too. Speaker head nods have been 
found to have an interactive function in that they trigger back-channels; listeners are 
very sensitive to such head nods, resulting in almost immediate responses (McClave,
2000).
The aim of the present study was to take a preliminaiy step at examining how the 
perception of emotion by third parties was affected by the social interaction seen in 
the vignettes. With the foregoing evidence in mind, the following predictions were
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made: fkst, it was anticipated that the natural social interaction would augment the 
perception of emotion; second, it was expected that this effect would be stronger for 
positive emotions. In order to test these predictions the natural synchrony of the dyad 
was disrupted in two ways. Three viewing conditions were employed which varied 
the communicative element of the displays. The ability of subjects to recognise the 
emotions in the normal dyad condition was compared, firstly with a situation when 
only one actor was present (i.e. the other was occluded — ‘monads’) and, secondly, 
with a condition without the rhythmic timing of interlocution, i.e. by showing a 
single actor on one side of the midline with his or her point-lights reflected about the 
midline (i.e. the mirror image of the same actor making the same movements at the 
same time —  ‘reflected dyads’). This last measure was necessaiy for two reasons: 
first, it provided a control for the natural dyads —  the total amount of dynamic 
information (i.e. number of point-lights) displayed in both of these conditions was 
the same; second, it introduced a pseudointeraction, in that there were two moving 
point-light figures facing each other in every display but no natural social interaction 
was present. The dependent measure was the same as that employed for the 
experiments reported in Chapter 3.
4.3. Experiment 3;Method
4.3.1. Subjects
Seven postgraduates and 11 undergraduates (11 women and 7 men; mean age 21.5 
yeai's; range 18-33 years) volunteered to serve as subjects in the experiment.
4.3.2. Design and procedure
There were three experimental conditions: dyads, monads and reflected dyads (see 
section 4.2). Owing to the findings in the previous experiments reported in this thesis 
(see Chapter 3) the stimuli which portrayed disgust were not included. Therefore, in 
this experiment only five emotions were used. Although six examples of each
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emotion were used in the experiments reported in Chapter 3 only four examples of 
each emotion were used for each conditions in the present experiment. This measure 
was necessary in order to keep the experiment within a manageable time scale for the 
participants. The stimuli were chosen from the original corpus used in experiments 
1,1a and 2; the discarded portrayals were the ones that received the 2 lowest mean 
ratings for each emotion in Experiment 1 (Chapter 3) — for anger and sadness these 
were stimuli with means < 50, for joy and fear < 30, and love < 40. There were twice 
as many trials in the monad condition as each actor was shown in a sepaiate trial. 
This gave a total of 80 trials, with an even number of dyads (albeit that some were 
reflected dyads) and monads. The first 10 seconds of each film were shown. The 
subjects were told that either one or two people would be seen where both were 
acting out one of five emotions. The ratings procedure was the same as in Chapter 3 
except here there were only 5 emotions shown on the rating scales. The stimuli were 
shown in one block, in random order for each subject. The experiment was 
approximately 40 minutes long.
4.4, Experiment 3; Results and discussion
Figure 4.1. shows the mean ratings for each portrayed emotion in each viewing 
condition and Table 4.1. shows the complete matrix of means from Experiment 3.
A two-way ANOVA between display type and emotion with 3 levels of display type 
(dyad vs. monad vs. reflection) and 5 levels of emotion was conducted on the ratings 
given to the portrayed emotions (the bold figures in Table 4.1). ’ Significant main 
effects were found for display type (F^ 34 = 8.2, p = 0.001) and for emotion g, =
16.6, p < 0.001). There was also a significant interaction between display type and 
emotion (F4.4 75.4. = 5.65, p < 0.001).
* An important assumption for w ithin-subjects A N O V A  is that spliericity should not be violated as, i f  it is, the possibility o f  a
type I error may be greatly inflated (for a d iscussion  see  H ow ell, 1997, chapter 14). W here the data have failed the sphericity  
test in the present experim ents (as indicated by the sym bol *) the more conservative Greenhouse -  G eisser epsilon test has been  
used, which reduces the degrees o f  freedom  o f  the numerator and denominator.
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Table 4.1. Observers’ mean ratings for each emotion response category when dyads, monads and 
reflected stimuli were presented. Figures in bold type denote the mean ratings for the portrayed 
emotions. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Stimulus Response
Anger Joy Sadness Love Fear
Dyads
Anger 72 (16.1) 5 (3.6) 18 (17.2) 11(13.9) 15 (7.9)
Joy 22(18.9) 56 (23.5) 7 (5.6) 18 (20.4) 7 (5.2)
Sadness 8(5.40 7 (5.6) 45 (23.9) 28 (21.5) 14(13.5)
Love 15 (13.9) 13(11.1) 12 (8.8) 43 (26.7) 9 (8.6)
Fear 23 (19.6) 16 (13.4) 14 (12.6) 16(13.7) 40 (19)
Monads
Anger 69 (25.4) 5 (7.3) 14(12.3 7 (6.2) 14 (17.7)
Joy 24(15) 46 (19.7) 7 (4.5) 11(9) 11 (6)
Sadness 8 (6.4) 5 (3.7) 52 (23.5) 9 (7.8) 17(11.9)
Love 14(19.5) 8 (4.9) 26 (16.5) 17 (19.3) 19 (23.3)
Fear 15(13.8) 12 (9.3) 16(11.6) 8(5) 46 (21.6)
Reflections
Anger 68 (20.8) 6 (6.5) 22(23.2) 10 (12.6) 10 (9,4)
Joy 27 (18.7) 42 (22.2) 8 (7.1) 13 (15.6) 8 (8)
Sadness 5 (3 JO 8(9ri) 35 (25) 27 (27) 19(18)
Love 19 (22.16) 13(11) 10 (7) 36 (21.4) 16(18.6)
Fear 16 (14.9) 13 (10.4) 19(17) 21 (21.8) 30 (18.9)
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Post hoc Tukey’s tests revealed that portrayed joy received higher ratings when 
displayed as natural dyads (p < 0.02) than as monads or reflections. Portrayed love 
received significantly higher ratings when seen as natural or reflected dyads relative 
to monads (p < 0.001). Interestingly, Tukey’s tests also showed that the monad 
presentations of sadness and fear portrayals received higher ratings than the reflected 
ones (p < 0.05). No other significant differences were found.
Dyad
□ Monad
□ Reflection
80
70
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50
40
30
20
10
0
sadness love fearanger joy
Emotion portrayed by the actors
Figure 4.1. Observers’ mean ratings for the emotion response category portrayed by the actors when 
displayed as natural dyads, monads and reflections. Error bars show standard errors.
One-way ANOVAs and post hoc Tukey’s tests were carried out on all of the results 
across each row in Table 2 and all of the portrayed ratings were found to be 
statistically higher than the corresponding non-portrayals (p < 0.05) except for 3
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cases. Fkst, after the one-way ANOVA for the 5 ratings of monad portrayals of love 
( F 2 . 2 , 3 7 . 4  * = 3.5, p < 0.05) Tukey’s tests revealed that love was confused with all of 
the non-portrayed emotions (p > 0.05), Second, following the one-way ANOVA for 
the 5 ratings of reflection portrayals of sadness * -  9.54, p = 0.001) Tukey’s
tests showed that ratings for portrayed sadness were no different to ratings of non- 
portrayed love and non-portrayed fear. Third, for the reflected images of fear (F’2.61, 
44.45 ♦ = 3.07, p < 0.05), fear ratings were not significantly different from those for any 
of the non-portrayed emotions except joy.
These findings show that performance was markedly altered by the absence of the 
second actor in either veridical or non-veridical (mirror image) formats, or both, for 
all the emotions except anger. Recognition of the emotions displayed by natural 
dyads was in some cases better than with only one actor (the monad condition) or 
without rhythmic synchronisation between two actors engaged in conversation (as in 
the reflected dyads). In paiticular the removal of one actor affected the perception of 
joy and romantic love, in that successful identification of these emotions was 
significantly impaired when the second actor was not present.
4.5, Experiment 4
Experiment 3 showed that the social context makes a difference to how affect is 
perceived. However, very little is known of the hidden structures and regularities that 
exist in social interactions per se. The issue is complex as verbal and nonverbal 
behaviour varies greatly in terms of importance and distribution within the 
interaction. Furthermore, the grammar (i.e. the hidden regulaiities) within the 
exchange may also contain a parallel stream of behaviour from each person that 
occurs independently of the interaction (Magnusson, 1996). For instance, movements 
that serve the needs of the body have been termed ‘adaptors’ (e.g. head scratching or 
squeezing a part of the body) and these occur with little intentionality or awareness 
(Ekman and Friesen, 1972), Adaptors can be observed within an exchange but are 
not used as a deliberate method of communication (Ekman and Friesen, 1972),
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Adaptors are obvious examples of parallel behaviour that occur alongside the 
interaction without being related to it. Other far less salient non-communicative 
behaviours are likely to exist and therefore it is not difficult to see why an 
understanding of the patterns and structure within a social exchange remain elusive.
We know that body movement and speech are both fundamental in natural human 
communication (Bachorowski, 1999; Wachsmuth, 2002) and it has been argued that 
speech and body movements are closely connected in terms of evolutionary 
processes (Rizolatti and Arbib, 1998). In everyday conversations verbal 
communication occurs with nonverbal behaviour. For example, when a person 
speaks, their arms, fingers and head move in a temporally structured way that co­
ordinates with what is spoken (Ekman and Friesen, 1972; Condon, 1986). Thus, 
speech and body movement can be considered as two pai'ts of the same process 
(Birdwhistell, 1970). As communication naturally occurs this way —  indeed it is 
almost impossible to suppress body movements whilst speaking (Dobrogaev, 1932, 
cited in McClave, 2000) —  it means that ideally speech should be empirically 
investigated in situations when it is accompanied by nonverbal communication.
There is also evidence to show that speech and body movements are connected. For 
example, from microanalysis of videotaped speech, it was found that during speech 
the head raiely stopped moving and these movements became more rapid with verbal 
amplitude (Hadar, Steiner, Grant and Clifford Rose, 1983). Further, discrete speaker 
initiated head movements appear to carry distinct meanings: for example, side-to- 
side shakes were found to coixelate with verbal expressions of intensification (such 
as ‘vei7*, ‘a lot’ and ‘great’) of the speech (McClave, 2000).
For the case of emotion recognition, links have been reported between speech and 
other modalities. For example, performances on the identification of specific 
emotions such as happiness, sadness, fear and anger have been shown to correlate 
across facial, prosodic and lexical channels (Borod, Pick, Hall, Sliwinski, Madigan, 
Obler, Welkowitz, Canino, Erhan, Goral, Morrison and Tabart, 2000). In another
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study, the task allowed subjects to process emotional information visually by 
studying facial expressions, whilst simultaneously listening to emotion expressed in 
voice prosody (de Gelder and Vroomen, 2000). These researchers found that the 
perception of emotion from the face was influenced by the vocalisations that subjects 
heard; this occuned (although to a lesser extent) even when observers were asked to 
ignore the facial displays. For example, when the task was to judge a facial 
expression as happy or sad the subjects were more likely to judge a face as happy 
when they heard a simultaneously presented happy utterance and this happened even 
when participants were asked to ignore the utterance. Furthermore, the converse 
effect was observed, i.e. auditory perception of emotion was influenced by visual 
information (de Gelder and Vroomen, 2000). These authors suggest that observers’ 
judgements were influenced by the unattended modality (the one ignored). 
Therefore, evidence exists for the mandatory cross-modal integration of information 
processing.
That cross-modal processing exists should not be a surprise as emotions aie most 
often expressed through more than one modality at a time. For example, a person 
may express hot anger whilst shouting, punching the air with a tightly clenched fist 
whilst also tightly gritting his teeth, his eyes fixed and with his eyebrows raised — 
thus combining vocal, bodily and facial expressions. Furthermore, there is evidence 
to show that the neural structures involved with the processing of affect are shared by 
different modalities of expression (Hadjikhani and de Gelder, 2003).
Although links have been found between facial and vocal expressions of affect, there 
appears to have been no research conducted to explore directly the bimodal 
connection between body movement and vocal expressions of emotion. Therefore, 
the aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship between the visual 
detection of a speaker and (full body) biological motion when actors were expressing 
affect.
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If speech and nonverbal behaviour aie related then it might be expected that an 
emoting articulator can be distinguished from an emoting non-articulator from 
biological motion alone. Here it is investigated whether the body movement of the 
emoting actor that opens the conversation in each point-light movie is sufficient for 
specification of the aiticulator and if so whether success in identification is constant 
for each of the emotion categories. Subjects were shown the same movies as those 
used in previous experiments (Experiments 1, la  and 2) reported in this thesis 
(without the inverted or rotated displays) but this time they were asked to decide 
which person talked first. As the aim of this experiment was to investigate the 
relationship between speech and biological motion rather than emotion per se, 
disgust portrayals were reincorporated into the experimental design.
4,6. Experiment 4: Method
4.6.1. Subjects
Five postgraduates and 12 undergraduates (4 men and 13 women; mean age 25.7 
years; range 19 - 46 years) volunteered to serve as subjects.
4.6.2. Design and procedure
A total of 36 trials were used (6 emotions x 6 samples) in all. For every original 
recording it was always the actor on the left that initiated the conversation, therefore, 
to show an equal number of trials where the person on the left and the right talked 
first half of the stimuli (3 for each emotion) were transformed in Matlab so that the 
original positions for each actor were reversed (the actor on the left appeared on the 
right and vice versa). Each stimulus was shown for the first 10 seconds and all were 
shown in one randomised block. Subjects were told that they would see some points 
of light on the screen that represented two people in a social context. They were 
asked to judge which person talked first in each presentation and that therefore it 
would be important for them to be particularly attentive at the beginning of each clip. 
Throughout each presentation the trial number was displayed in the bottom right 
hand corner of the monitor. At the end of each trial the subject recorded this number
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as well as the identity of the person (the one on the left or the right) that they thought 
initiated the conversation. A sheet of paper was provided for this. Once the subject 
had recorded their answer they pressed a key to be shown the next trial. The 
experiment lasted for approximately 20 minutes.
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4.7. Experiment 4: Results and discussion
For each individual, an accuracy score for correct identification of the first speaker 
was calculated where a score of 1 was given for each correct choice, therefore a 
range from 0 to 36 was created, with a mean score of 18 expected by chance. The 
average accuracy score was 22.3, which was shown to be significantly above chance 
when a one-sample f test was used, t (16) = 7.25, p  < 0.001. Generally then, 
observers were able to extract from biological motion information about who was 
talking.
To enquire whether this ability was similai* for each of tlie six emotions portrayed the 
separate scores for each emotion categoiy were calculated for each participant. This 
amounted to six separate scores for each observer with a range of six and a mean 
score of three to be expected by chance. Figure 4.2. shows the accuracy of speaker 
identity for each emotion category. One-sample t tests were used to compare actual 
performance with that expected by chance. For anger, joy, sadness and love, these 
tests showed that speaker recognition was above chance (anger,  ^(16) = 11.14, /?<
0.001; joy, t (16) = 6.13, < 0.001; sadness, t (16) = 2.52, p  < 0.05; love, t (16) =
2.28, p < 0.05) but for fear and disgust portrayals this was not the case (fear, t (16) =
2.04, p  > 0.05; disgust, t (16) = 0.20, p > 0.05). Thus, speaker recognition from 
biological motion appears to depend on which emotion category is portrayed.
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Emotion portrayed by the actors
disgust
Figure 4.2. Accuracy of first speaker identification as a function of emotion. Error bars show standard 
errors. Solid line denotes chance score.
A one-way ANOVA was conducted between the emotion categories which revealed 
a highly significant result, go = 15.46, p < 0.001. In order to understand where the 
differences lay, post hoc Tukey’s tests were carried out that revealed for anger 
portrayals, performance of identifying who was talking first was better than for all 
the other groups individually (p < 0.001). For joy portrayals, speaker identification 
was better than for portrayals of love, fear and disgust (p < 0.05) but for portrayals of 
sadness, speaker identification was only better than for portrayals of fear {p < 0.001).
Generally, these results show that observers were able to tell who was talking at the 
beginning of each interaction although the ability to identify the speaker varied 
depending on which emotion was being portrayed and, when anger was being 
portrayed, recognition was the best. This is a considerable achievement given that 
discrimination was based purely on movement information specified in point-light 
displays where facial information was not included. The fact that the interlocutor was 
not identified correctly when fear was expressed is of interest as this shows that in 
not all cases can the interlocutor be identified even when the emotion can be
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recognised. This was not the case for disgust, as although the articulator was not 
identified nor was the emotion (see Chapter 3).
4.8. General discussion
The experiments reported here were designed to investigate two independent yet 
interrelated phenomena relating to the social interaction. The first enquiry asked how 
the social context affected the perception of emotions. The second question asked 
whether a speaker could be identified in the point-light displays. In Experiment 3 it 
was found that the social context affected perception of the emotions in most cases. 
Joy and love were better recognised when natural dyads were observed and the 
perception of love was particularly impaired when monads were shown. 
Furthermore, reflected displays impaired recognition for all of the emotions except 
for portrayals of anger and love.
Joy and love are positive emotions that are particularly expressive socially and, in 
Experiment 3, they were recognised better when displayed in a two-actor context 
which was in line with predictions. Joy is typically expressed more in social contexts 
(Jakobs, et al., 1999; Jakobs, et al., 2001; Schaver, Schwaitz, Kirson and O'Connor, 
2001) and romantic love is important for the attachment process and plays an 
informative role in indicating to each paitner that the other is trustworthy and can be 
depended on (Shiota, et al., 2004). Importantly then, not only are positive emotions 
(love and joy) expressed more strongly in social contexts, the results reported here 
show that the third party perception of them is more powerful in social contexts too. 
It is noteworthy that fear, joy and sadness were less easily perceived in the reflected 
dyads and joy and love less so in the monads. In general, these results show that 
subjects process details about the social context of a scene and not just the intrinsic 
movements of an individual actor.
The best example of an observers’ sensitivity to context cues was the fact that 
portrayals of romantic love were unrecognisable without the presence of a second
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actor despite the fact that the stimulus properties for each actor were no different 
between monad and dyad conditions.
Context cues have been shown to be important in other research. Shipley and Cohen 
(2000) showed observers point-light displays of sportsmen playing a variety of sports 
(e.g.basketball, tennis and football). These were made from video footage of real 
games where the information was reduced to point-lights that conesponded to the 
sportsmen’s hands, feet and head, A typical interaction showed, for example, one 
person dribbling the ball whilst another was competing for possession of it. These 
authors found that when the ball was specified in the display (as a single point of 
light) observers made accurate judgements regarding the coordinated action shown in 
the displays. However, when the ball was missing, performances were qualitatively 
impaired as subjects could not make sense of the coordinated relationship between 
the sportsmen.
Further, if an implied ground plane (in the form of a single or moving horizontal 
background line) is added to the top of a display when inverted point-light walkers 
and moving dogs are shown, observers were able to explicitly identify (above 
chance) the otherwise unrecognised walkers and dogs (Pavlova and Sokolov, 2003). 
Thus, it appeal's that when contextual information is available specifying physical or 
social information beyond the relations that exist within a single point-light human, 
emergent properties of the display unfold.
Shipley and Cohen (2000) have argued that their results might be better understood if 
they ai'e considered in an affordance based framework. This suggestion means that 
properties of the environment surrounding the point-light human in the displays 
supply information for the third person observer to take appropriate action. This 
argument could be extended to include the social enviionment. For example, in the 
case of Experiment 3, observers might have picked up information that allows them 
to avoid or meet other individuals or couples. Recent evidence has shown that the 
way observers perceive human walking varies from when the observer is still
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compared to when the observer canies out the same actions as the display (Jacobs 
and Shiffrar, 2005), These authors asked subjects to view 2 simultaneously presented 
point-light walkers where gait speeds differed between the displays. The subjects 
were required to compare the gait speeds of the walkers. This task was completed 
whilst the observers stood still, walked, or bicycled. More accurate discriminations 
were made when observers were either still or when they cycled. In other words the 
production of walking movement interfered with walking perception. Further 
differences were demonstrated depending on the observer’s position relative to the 
stimuli (Jacobs and Shiffrar, 2005). This shows that, by providing more realistic 
environmental conditions than those used traditionally in a laboratory, the results are 
altered markedly —  observer movement interferes with visual perception. The 
challenge is now to incorporate variations to the third person’s social behaviour 
within the experimental design rather than or as well as variations of the visual 
stimuli in order to comprehend whether an affordance based framework is 
appropriate for further understanding of these results.
Experiment 3 strongly demonstrated that emergent properties unfold within 
interpersonal interactions; these transmit socially relevant information that may 
provide affordances for the third person to take action. Experiment 4 also showed 
that there are qualities inherent within the social exchange that advise the third 
person observer of important communicative characteristics. Here it was 
demonstrated that a speaker can be identified even if the only information available 
is a point-light display of two people engaged in conversation where, importantly, 
facial information is not available. Therefore, speech and body movement are 
related. In this experiment articulator recognition varied depending on which 
emotion was presented and for anger displays speaker identification was at its best.
What aspects of bodily expression could have been informative for speaker 
recognition here? At this time only speculative answers can be offered as 
identification could be linked to qualitative or quantitative aspects of the movements 
and it is unknown what contributions spatial information had per se. However, 
whatever dimensions were used for speaker identification some useful clues have
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been revealed. Speaker identification was significantly above chance for most 
emotions and so some general feature that is common to all displays is likely to be 
operative. This may be information from amount of movement as anger and joy 
typically feature a lot of movement and these were the emotions where best 
articulator recognition occurred. The speaker was not identified for displays of fear 
and disgust and, in contrast to the possible explanation for portrayals of joy and 
anger, it is unlikely that these non-significant results were due to little movement 
activity as low amounts of movement also existed for portrayals of love and sadness 
and yet the speaker was identified when these emotions were acted out. Indeed, in 
some of the disgust portrayals movement activity was reminiscent of portrayed 
anger, with lai'ge and expansive, fast-moving arm movements. Therefore, some other 
cues must be responsible for interfering with identification — quite possibly these 
were nonverbal back-channel effects from the interacting paitner. In other words the 
movements made by the listener competed with, or were related to, those made by 
the speaker.
In summaiy, the experiments reported here are the first to demonstrate that the social 
context within a biological motion display affects how emotions are perceived. These 
findings provide clear evidence that perception of emotion is altered for some 
emotions when two actors are displayed or when non-veridical contexts aie shown. 
In addition these data show that speaker recognition is possible from the minimal 
cues provided in (full-body) point-light displays depicting interlocution. This is quite 
a remarkable achievement, given the fact that there was no facial information present 
in these minimal cue stimuli. If an ecological framework is employed these effects 
may be better understood.
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Chapter 5 
Further analysis of the mechanisms
5.1. Introduction
The main experimental method of investigating how biological motion is processed 
by the perceptual system is by observing how subjects respond to displays where the 
images aie distorted. For example, in the first empirical chapter it was shown that by 
rotating point-light displays by 90° and 180° perception was impeded thus 
demonstrating the existence of orientation based processing constraints for biological 
motion. Other reseai'ch has demonstrated similar effects for inversion (e.g. Dittrich et 
al., 1996). However, in general there is a paucity of data in biological motion 
reseaich that investigates emotion. This is suiprising given that the number of studies 
exploring biological movements for action is so high.
In this chapter the stimuli are manipulated in several ways in order to give some 
insight into what the specific cues for affect might be and to investigate further the 
way they might be processed. The first experiment (Experiment 5) explores the 
processing constraints of the perceptual system when the stimulus is a complete (13 
point) display. However, in the second experiment (Experiment 6) the stimuli are 
altered so that fewer points are shown. This last manipulation provides a way of 
investigating whether there are paiticulai* chai'acteristics within a display that specify 
affect.
Specifically, Experiment 5 investigates whether affect can be recognised in displays 
where the information is distorted by reversing the motion (playing the displays 
backward). This is a relatively neglected procedure but an important one to consider 
as although the information in forwaid-played and backwaid-played displays is equal 
in terms of its physical properties, it may be different from an ecological point of 
view (Pavlova, Krageloh-Mann, Birbaumer and Sokolov, 2002). Therefore, 
observers aie shown displays where the stimuli aie played backwaid and the results
114
of this experiment are compaied with the same stimuli being played normally 
(Experiment 3).
Experiment 6 pertains to the attributes of the stimulus in a way that questions 
whether information from the whole stimulus is necessary for the perception of 
affect. A theme that runs through all of the results reported in the thesis so fai' is that 
categories of affect appeal' to be processed differently. For example, the perception 
of affect was augmented by the presence of a natural dyad (Experiment 3) but only 
for pai'ticular emotions (love and joy); and the recognition of fear (Experiment 1) 
was at chance when the stimuli were turned upside down but this was not observed 
for other emotions. As the evidence shows that particular emotions are processed 
differently to others then might there be distinctive characteristics that specify each 
of them? Authors such as Darwin (1872,1999) Wallbot (1998), and Atkinson et al. 
(2004) have argued that there are distinctive movements and postures associated with 
specific emotions. For example, Wallbot (1998) has postulated that lateral hand and 
arm movements are indicative of anger and forwaid facing shoulders indicate fear. 
However, all of these researchers made their observations based on movement 
patterns of the full body. Therefore, in order to investigate the possibility that more 
information is present in a full-body stimulus than required, and to specify what 
configurations are fundamental for perception of affect, the stimuli aie broken down 
in order to explore some of their specific components.
5.2. Experiment 5
The perception of reversed motion displays of walking point-light dogs was 
investigated by Pavlova et al. (2002), The dogs walked as if they were on a treadmill,
i.e. there was no net tianslation. When the displays were played backwards it was 
found that observers, in a free verbal response task, were able to recognise some 
form of biological motion (e.g. 2 walkers or a cat in motion). Interestingly, in 
reversed motion displays subjects perceived the motion as forwaid facing rather than 
backward facing (Pavlova et al. 2002). For instance, one intei'pretation was ‘a giraffe 
moving to the right’ (in the foi'ward-played condition) and, for the same display, as 
‘a cat with a tail lifted’ (in the backward-played condition). Therefore, observers
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appeared to be able to identify some form of biological motion in both conditions but 
interpretations altered depending on the direction of movement. Performance was 
impaired compared to normal (forward-played) displays as Pavlova et al. (2002) 
documented that, for the reversals, there was a slower response time, a greater 
number of interpretations as to what the displays may have been and a number of 
inteipretations of the displays being more than one object, for example, ‘two workers 
cariying a tube’ (in the forwards played displays they were always interpreted as a 
single entity). The correct responses were given more often when the displays were 
played normally.
Performance tends to also be impaired in the recognition of human gaits played in 
reverse. For instance, in a task where observers were required to judge a non­
translating point-light walker’s direction of motion (in comparison to a vertical 
counterphase grating backdrop) it took longer to identify the motion of backward- 
played walkers than those that were forward-played (Fujimoto, 2003). However, 
observers were able to correctly identify the direction of motion despite the increased 
reaction times. In another study, where (non-translating) walking motion was 
reversed, Vanrie, Dekeyser and Verfaillie (2004) documented a similar effect to 
Pavlova et al. (2002) in that observers who were asked the orientation of the figure 
perceived the walker as facing the observer. However, in this study observers had 
been informed of the backward-play manipulation prior to viewing the displays 
(observers were not informed of the manipulation in the Pavlova et al. (2002) study 
nor the Fujimoto, 2003 study). Therefore, the forward-facing interpretation was 
incongruous with what would be perceived normally as it implied that the walker 
was seen as moving away but also facing the observer (the most logical 
interpretation when knowing of the backward-play manipulation would be to 
perceive the walker as facing away from the observer). This effect is of interest as it 
suggests that observers may be using high-level top-down processes to interpret the 
image (Vanrie et al., 2004). This phenomenon might be thought of as analogous to 
the hollow mask illusion (Gregory, 1973) where a concave mask of the human face 
appears to be convex as it appears that the visual system attempts to make some 
ecological sense of the mismatched information. However, whereas the hollow mask 
illusion may be accounted for in terms of effects of experience (faces are never really
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hollow), Vanrie et al. (2004) have argued that familiarity cannot account for the 
forward-facing effect as people are often seen facing away from the viewer. 
However, it is reasonable to argue that observers are more familial* with seeing a 
facing view of a conspecific over a backward view of the same. Therefore, 
experience could account for the forwaid-facing phenomenon.
Clearly, compared to normal displays, perception is altered when observers view 
reversed motion displays of quadrupeds and walkers. However, the percept is not so 
degraded that observers cannot make some sense of the images. The present study 
examines whether observers can recognise affect from backward-played point-light 
displays. Affect and human (or animal) locomotion are qualitatively different. One 
salient dissimilarity is that there is a stiuctured, pendulum like, pattern of movement 
when humans walk which is different to that exhibited when displaying affect. For 
purposes of efficiency, moving from one place to the other involves moving the 
limbs in a régulai*, predictable way but emotions appear not to be expressed by such 
régulai* movement of the limbs.
An important function of perception must be to detect in which direction the animal 
is moving or facing (to avoid collision). In contrast, when a human detects affect, 
direction of movement is not an essential feature. Therefore, the perceptual system is 
likely to operate in qualitatively different ways to perceive affect and to perceive 
objects. However, to know which way an emoting actor is facing is fundamental. 
Therefore, the goal of Experiment 5 was to establish whether and if so how 
backward-played displays would affect recognition of emotion.
117
5.3. Experiment 5; Method
5.3.1. Subjects
The participants were 13 volunteers: three postgraduates and 10 undergraduates (1 
male and 12 females; mean age 27 yeai’s; range 19-47  yeais).
5.3.2. Design and procedure
The same stimuli were chosen as those used in Experiment 3: this amounted to 4 
examples for each of the 5 emotions (owing to the findings in Experiments 1,1a, lb 
and 2 the stimuli which portrayed disgust were not included). The movies were 
transformed so that they could be played in reverse by the computer program. The 
first 10 seconds of each film were shown in reverse. Subjects were told that they 
would see some points of light on the screen that represented two people in a social 
context both acting out one of five possible emotions. However, they were not 
informed of the reverse nature of the stimuli. All of the stimuli were presented in one 
randomised block for each subject and the experiment lasted for approximately 20 
minutes. The ratings procedure was the same as in Experiment 3.
5.4. Experiment 5; Results and discussion
For each portrayed emotion the means of the five non-portrayed emotion ratings 
were pooled so that compaiisons could be made between just one ‘incorrect’ (non­
portrayed) score and one correct (portrayed) rating (Figure 5.1). The (correct) rating 
for the portrayed emotion was higher in every case than for the (incorrect) non- 
portiayals. Table 5.1 shows all of the values individually as well as the values for the 
same stimuli when they were played forwaids (Experiment 3). The correct ratings for 
backward-played anger and backward-played sadness were higher than the 
equivalent ratings for the forwaid-played displays. It is not clear why this should be 
so although the backward motions, unlike the normal displays, did not start from a 
neutral posture which may have made recognition of the backward-played stimuli
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more easy. However, if this is the case then it is unclear why only some emotions 
were more easily recognised. For each portrayed emotion, an ANOVA was 
conducted between the ratings for that emotion and for the four non-portrayed 
emotions (i.e. along each row for the backward-played displays in Table 5.1) '. All 
ANOVAs showed significant main effects (porti'ayed anger, F 2.50,30.04 *= 94.21, p < 
0.001; joy, Fi.41, 16.95+= 10.98, p < 0.005; sadness, Fi_%, 23.51+ = 24.98, p < 0.001; love, 
■^2.4,28.66*= 15.06, p < 0.001; jem*, Fi.g,2i.67 + = 13.84, p < 0.001). Tukey’s post hoc tests 
confirmed that for each stimulus the portrayed emotion was rated higher (p < 0.05) 
than each of the 4 non-portiayed emotions considered individually.
Table 5.1. Observers’ mean ratings for each emotion response category when forward played 
(Experiment 3) and backward played point-light stimuli were presented. Figures in bold type denote 
the mean ratings for the portrayed emotions. Standard deviations aie shown in parentheses.
Stimulus Response
Anger Joy Sadness Love Fear
Forward played
Anger 72 (16.1) 5 (3.6) 18 (17.2) 11(13.9) 15 (7.9)
Joy 22 (18.9) 56 (23.5) 7 (5.6) 18 (20.4) 7(5.20
Sadness 8(5.40 7(5.6) 45 (23.9) 28 (21.5) 14(13.5)
Love 15 (13.9) 13(11.1) 12 (8.8) 43 (26.7) 9 (8.6)
Fear 23 (19.6) 16 (13,4) 14 (12.6) 16 (13.7) 40 (19)
Backward played
Anger 82 (15.3) 5 (3.7) 22 (16.7) 8 (6.8) 22 (16.6)
Joy 33 (25.9) 54 (23) 8 (10.2) 19(14.8) 13 (20.4)
Sadness 8 (5.2) 9 (7.4) 63 (27.1) 24 (16.7) 16(20.8)
Love 9 (7.2) 11 11.4) 28 (17.3) 46 (22.8) 17(18.4)
Fear 13(12.3) 9 (8.4) 18(17.7) 12(10.7) 45 (21.2)
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Reverse transformation ■  portrayed 
□  non-portrayed
anger joy sad
Portrayed emotion
F igure 5.1. Observers’ mean ratings for the backwards presentations of the emotion response 
categories of the portrayed and non-portrayed emotions. The mean ratings for the non-portrayed 
emotions were derived from the mean of the combined scores from the four non-portrayals in each 
case. Error bars show standard errors.
To compare the backward-played portrayals with the forward-played ones a two-way 
ANOVA with 5 levels of emotion and 2 levels of display type was conducted on the 
ratings given to the portrayed emotions. A significant main effect was found for 
emotion 16.34, p < 0.001) but no significant main effect was found for the
direction of motion (F , ,2 = 1.95, p > 0.05). Further, there was no significant 
interaction between display type and emotion (F^ = 1.07, p > 0.05). Therefore, no
further analyses were carried out.
An important assumption for w ithin-subjects A N O V A  is that sphericity should not be violated as, if  it is, the possibility o f  a
type 1 error may be greatly inflated (for a d iscussion  see H ow ell, 1997, chapter 14). Where the data have failed the sphericity 
test in the present experim ents (as indicated by the sym bol *) the more conservative Greenhouse -  G eisser epsilon test has been  
used, which reduces the degrees o f  freedom o f  the numerator and denominator.
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The results reported here show that observers are able to extract the cues available in 
point-light displays that enable them to recognise affect irrespective of the fact that 
the displays were played backwards. This shows that the visual system uses 
information independent of direction and therefore does not rely on the dynamic of 
the pattern of movement. Further, these results suggest that walking movements are 
qualitatively different to those that express affect.
5.5. Experiment 6
Experiment 5 has shown certain aspects of the temporospatial dynamic are not 
crucial for the perception of affect. In Experiment 6 the point-light displays are 
manipulated in another way in order to explore the mechanisms that underlie the 
perception of affect.
Evidence has been provided to show that as few as 4 or 5 moving points that relating 
to the knees and the ankles (Ahlstrom, Blake, and Ahlstrom, 1997) or knees, ankles 
and hips (Johannson, 1978) supply the observer with a vivid percept of a human 
walker. This suggests that there is considerable redundancy in a full-body point-light 
walker. In another study where the configurations of a point-light walker were 
manipulated so that either the extremities (wrists and ankles), mid-limb elements 
(elbows and knees) or central components (shoulders and hips) were removed the 
detection of a point-light walker (presented in a mask of visual noise) varied 
depending on which elements were missing (Pinto and Shiffrai*, 1999). For example, 
although there was no difference between normal viewing and the condition where 
the extremities were missing, task performance maikedly deteriorated when the 
elbows and knees and the shoulders and hips were removed. These findings are 
suggestive of a system that categorises components of the body (Pinto and Shiffrar, 
1999). Moreover, that performance was significantly impaired when the mid-limb 
elements were missing suggests that the dynamic symmetry (i.e. the equal and 
opposite movement of the limbs) was important for discrimination. Further, that 
removal of the central limb components impaired discrimination suggests that the
1 2 1
principle axis of organisation (the torso) (see Marr, 1982) is also a fundamental 
feature.
As already mentioned (see 5.2) walkers move in a predictable way in that as one 
limb moves forwards the neighbouring limbs move backwards, in anti-phase to the 
first limb (Pinto and Shiffrar, 1999). Emotions are not expressed like this although 
there are specific movements that indicate affect. For example, lateral and fast- 
moving arm movements are associated with anger (Wallbot, 1998). Therefore, it may 
be expected that particular elements of the human body will specify affect but it is 
likely that these will be different to the ones that the visual system exploits to 
recognise a human walker.
Roether and Giese (2005) have taken a first step to explore the components of the 
body that are fundamental for specifying affect. These researchers produced 
biological motion stimuli of emotional gaits for anger, joy and sadness, which were 
split into upper body (arms, shoulder and head) and lower body (hip and legs) 
components. Subjects were asked to distinguish between emotional and neutral 
walks and to provide expressiveness ratings. Results showed that the lower and 
upper body appealed to contiibute independent information about affect. The upper 
body was more informative than the lower body for expressions of anger and sadness 
but not for feai*; this was identified more equally from both upper and lower body 
components. This evidence supports the view that all of the information contained in 
a full point-light display may not be necessaiy for recognition of affect. However, 
Roether and Giese (2005) only manipulated 2 body components (upper body and 
lower body). Moreover, they used simulated rather than naturally produced stimuli.
The aim of the present experiment was to examine whether the visual system 
exploits paiticulai* information from the human body. Vai*ying exemptais of point- 
light displays that omitted paiticulai* points were created. Thus the displays appealed 
to have missing features of the body. Specifically, the questions asked were whether 
some information was redundant in a full point-light figure. If so, then the next 
enquiry was to see which subconfigurations were characteristic of human emotion 
and whether these were different for the various emotions. It was expected that there
1 2 2
would be some redundancy in the full 13 point-light figure. However, it was not 
known what chai'acteristics of the human form would be important for recognition.
Five subconfigurations were employed in the design. The number of point-lights 
shown for each of the manipulations ranged between 3 and 8. Whilst these 5 
combinations of elements are by no means exhaustive, they are designed to 
incorporate major features of the body that may be particularly important for the 
specification of affect. It was reasonable to assume that the head and shoulders may 
convey important information about affect as the face and voice are fundamental 
channels for emotional expression (e.g. face, Ekman, 2003; voice, Scherer, 2003). 
Therefore, showing only the head and shoulders made up the first configuration. 
Most objects have a principle axis which is important for recognition (Marr, 1982) 
and the principle axis by which the human body is recognised is the torso. Following 
Pinto and Shiffrar (1999) removal of the elements that define the torso, i.e. the 
shoulders and hips, was the second configuration produced. Although it was not 
expected to be critical for perception of affect the third condition was the removal of 
the interlimb joints, that is the elbows and knees. The latter condition eliminated 
pair-wise rigidity of the major joints and has been found to be important for accurate 
recognition of biomechanical motion (Pinto and Shiffrai', 1999). Movement of the 
aims may be an important feature for anger (e.g. Wallbot, 1998) and arm movements 
have been ai'gued to be a fundamental human feature in terms of evolution (Rizolatti 
and Arbib, 1998). Therefore, the last 2 subconfigurations were a) where all of the 
elements remained except for the aims and b) where only the arms were shown.
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5.6. Experiment 6: Method
5.6.1. Subjects
Twelve females and eight males (mean age 21.3 years; range 18- 30 years) 
volunteered to serve as subjects. The majority (17) were undergraduates.
5.6.2. Design and procedure
All of the stimulus displays were modified examples of the stimuli used throughout 
this thesis. As the design of this experiment was to establish what would be the 
minimum information required to perceive emotion, monads rather than dyads were 
used. Owing to the fact that monads were presented, portrayed love was excluded 
from the design as this emotion was not recognised in this format (Experiment 3). 
Four monads, for each of the remaining 4 emotions (anger, joy, sadness and fear) 
that had been used in Experiment 3 were used.
The stimuli were shown in the original (13 point-lights) format as well as in 5 other 
subconfigural combinations, which can be seen in Figure 5.2:
Figure only head and shoulders. (Fig. 5.2.a). All of the points apait from the head 
and shoulders were removed. Thus the least information in terms of light points was 
made available (3 points).
All o f figure except torso, (Fig. 5.2b). The points that corresponded to the hips and 
shoulders were removed. This eliminated information from the centre of the body (8 
points).
All o f figure except mid-limb elements. (Fig. 5.2c). The knee and elbow points were 
removed. This eliminated the pair-wise rigid relations among the limb joints (8 
points).
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All o f figure except arms. (Fig. 5.2d). The aims, specifically the wrists and elbows, 
were removed (8 points).
Figure only arms. (Fig. 5.2e). This figure contained only information from the wrists 
and elbows (4 points).
For all of the above subconfigurations except for 'figure only head and shoulders' 
the point-light that conesponded to the position of the head was also removed.
There were 96 trials in all (4 emotions x 4 samples x 6 configurations). Each 
stimulus was shown for 10 seconds. The experiment was conducted in two blocks. 
The first block comprised 80 trials (the subconfigurations) and the second block 
comprised 16 trials (the full body condition). The fact that the full point-light 
displays were played second eliminated any possible learning effects although this 
was unlikely (see Experiment la). The same rating scale procedure that has been 
used in the other studies of this thesis so far was employed as the dependent measure.
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Figure 5.2. Illustrations of the presentations shown where a single frame of an anger monad is 
displayed in each of the 5 subconfiguration formats, a) Only the head and shoulders remained, b) All 
elements were shown except the torso, c) All elements remained except the interlimb joints, d) All 
elements remained except the arms.e) Only the arms were shown.
126
5.7. Experiment 6; Results and discussion
The means for each subject were calculated for every stimulus configuration shown. 
All of the results (with the exception of portrayed joy) for the full body condition 
were rated higher than the same (monad) condition in Experiment 3. There is no 
clear reason why this should be so although it is most likely due to individual 
differences within each group of subjects. Figure 5.3 summarises the ratings given 
for each (correct) portrayed emotion and it illustrates that observers’ performances 
varied as a function of the missing element combinations. It also shows that the 
pattern of recognition for each combination was not uniform across emotion 
categories.
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F igure 5.3. Summary of results for each of the (correct) portrayed emotions for every stimulus 
configuration. Error bars show standard errors.
To ascertain whether observers’ performances varied depending on the element 
combinations shown, a two-way repeated measures analysis of variance with 4 levels 
of emotion and 6 levels of display type was conducted on the ratings given to the 
portrayed emotions. Significant main effects were found for display type (F^ <,5 =
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23.97, p < 0.001) and for emotion (F 3  5 7  = 12.23, p < 0.001). There was also a 
significant interaction between display type and emotion (F15 255= 9.04, p < 0.001). 
Planned comparisons confirmed that there was a decrement in performance 
compared to the whole body (13 point) condition for some of the reduced 
configurations but this effect varied according to emotion category. For portrayed 
anger recognition was impaired when only the head and shoulders remained (f (19) =
7.04, p < 0.001) and when all of the elements remained except for the arms (r (19) = 
11.16, p < 0.001). For portrayed joy recognition was also impaired when all of the 
elements remained except for the arms (f (19) = 2.32, p < 0.05). The most disruption 
in performance was observed for portrayed sadness as for every subconfiguration, 
recognition was significantly impaired (head and shoulders remaining: r (19) = 5.16, 
p < 0.001, all parts remained except torso: f (19) = 5.07, p < 0.001, all parts remained 
except knees and elbows: f (19) = 3.07, p < 0.01, all parts remained except arms: t  
(19) = 4.24, p < 0.01, arms only remained: t  (19) = 4.15, p < 0.001. Like sadness, 
recognition of portrayed fear was impaired for all of the missing element 
combinations except for when only the arms were removed: head and shoulders 
remained: t  (19) = 2.24, p < 0.05, all parts remained except torso: t  (19) = 3.28, p < 
0.005, all parts remained except knees and elbows: f (19) = 2.62, p < 0.05, only arms 
remained: f (19) = 6.52, p < 0.001. No other differences were found.
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Figure 5.4. Observers mean ratings for presentations of the emotion response categories (a) anger, b) 
joy, c) sadness and d) fear) of the portrayed and non-portrayed emotions organised by stimulus 
configurations. Error bars show standard errors.
Figure 5.4 (a-d) illustrates the full set of (correct) portrayed and (incorrect) non- 
portrayed results for each portrayed emotion in every condition. For each emotion 
category one-way ANOVAs and post hoc Tukey’s tests were carried out for the 5 
subconfigurations and emotions separately. All of the portrayed emotions were found 
to be statistically higher than the corresponding non-portrayals except for 7 cases (2 
for each emotion category except only 1 for anger). Therefore the disturbances in 
recognition appeared to vary fairly evenly across emotion categories but there were 
differences in the type of information that were important for each emotion. The 
head and shoulders combination caused confusions to be made for 3 of the emotion 
types: after the ANOVA for the 4 ratings of portrayed anger (F , 79 34. = 16.04, p < 
0.001) Tukey’s tests revealed that anger was confused with fear (p > 0.05), after the 
ANOVA for joy (F 3 57 = 5.97, p = 0.001) joy was mistaken for anger and after the 
same for sadness portrayals ( F , gj, 34.56 • = 12.26, p < 0.001) sadness was found to be 
confused with fear (all p> 0.05). Following the one-way ANOVA for the 4 ratings of 
portrayed joy in the condition when only the arms were shown, (F , 55 29.41 * = 20.06,
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p < 0.001) ratings for joy were found not to differ from non-portiayed anger. After 
the ANOVA for fear portrayals in the same (only aims) condition (Fa_ 57 = 5.97, p = 
0.001) fear was confused with sadness (both p > 0.05). In contrast, after the 
ANOVA for sadness when all of the elements remained except for the arms (F 2.08,39.6 
* = 10.03, p < 0.001), sadness was mistaken for fear (p > 0.05). Finally, after the 
ANOVA for the 4 ratings of feai' when the torso elements were left out (F 3 57 =8.52, 
p < 0.001) fear was confused with sadness (p > 0.05),
The aim of the current study was to determine how systematic removal of 
components in the displays affected the recognition of anger, joy, sadness and feai*. 
The experiment showed that as few as 3 or 4 points were sufficient for correct 
recognition of some emotions. However, an uneven pattern of results was revealed in 
that in some conditions recognition was impaired for some emotions whereas 
perception of others, in the same condition, remained unaffected. Furthermore, for 
sadness portrayals performance was impaired compared to the full point-light 
condition regardless of which subconfiguration was displayed. For portrayed feai* a 
similar result was found (except for when only the arms were missing where 
recognition remained equivalent to the full stimulus condition). Taken together, these 
results suggest that the contribution of different components of the body varied 
depending on which emotion was displayed; for sadness and fear perceptibility was 
significantly better when the full 13 point-light display was available. However, 
performance for full-figure displays of anger and joy was seldom enhanced 
compared to the corresponding subconfigurations. Having said this, in many 
instances even when perception was impaired to some extent emotions were still 
perceived veridically. Therefore, it seems that the visual system is adaptable in its 
ability to extract information about affect from body movement. Some of the 
information in a full point-light figure is redundant for the perception of affect.
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5.8. General discussion
The present experiments were designed to investigate further the mechanisms that 
underlie the perception of affect and the stimulus information required by the mind 
for veridical processing. Experiment 5 investigated what happened when the motion 
was reversed. The results showed that observers were able to recognise affect despite 
the disruption of reversing the movements. Further, when the results were compaied 
to those of Experiment 3 (in the condition when the same displays were played 
normally) it was demonstrated that there was no difference between backward- 
played and forwai'd-played movement.
Observers have shown some sensitivity to reverse transformations of walking 
movements for humans (Fujimoto, 2003; Vanrie et al., 2004) and quadrupeds 
(Pavlova et al., 2002). However, perception was not severely impeded in these cases 
even though it seems important for a perceiver to know about the direction of a 
walker’s movements. The results of this experiment suggest that for the case of affect 
direction of movement is not an important cue.
Pavlova et al. (2002) have argued that limitations in the processing of biological 
motion are hierarchically nested. For example, these authors have argued that 
limitations connected to inversions are likely to be more powerful than those for 
position cues. Certainly, the results from Experiments 1 (and la , lb) and 2 in 
combination with the results for this experiment support Pavlova et al’s. (2002) 
claim. However, processing constraints may also vary depending on the type of 
motion, i.e. inanimate or animate objects or movements that specify social 
information.
Experiment 5 examined whether the visual system was sensitive to the emotions 
when they were played in reverse. But what information in the stimulus does the 
perceptual system extract to achieve veridical perception of emotions? The aim of 
Experiment 6 was to answer this question by determining whether the whole body or 
specific elements of the body were important for perceiving affect. In line with
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expectations, the general finding was that there were characteristic features of the 
body that specify affect from biological motion. Interestingly, recognition varied as a 
function of the different configurations shown. Further, only a few point-lights were 
necessary for perception of most emotions.
The findings of Experiment 6 are partly consistent with those of Pinto and Shiffrar
(1999) in that specific elements of the human body are important for event 
perception. Pinto and Shiffrai' (1999, p.315) argued that the limbs are a ‘fundamental 
building block’ for veridical perception of human walking movement. However, this 
is not the case for the perception of affect as the removal of the interlimb joints 
(specifying dynamic limb symmetry), which were important features for walker 
recognition (Pinto and Shiffrar, 1999), made no difference to the recognition of 
affect. This is not surprising given that walking is regularly structured around 
momentum of the limbs and the expression of affect does not have this quality. 
Evidently, the perceptual system is sensitive to these qualitative differences of 
movement energy between physical actions and psychological states.
A fundamental feature of hot anger was movement specified by the arms: although 
anger could be perceived without the arms displayed, recognition was greatly 
impaired in this condition. In contrast, when only the 4 points that specify arm 
movement were displayed performance was equal to the full body condition. This 
feature was unique to anger (at least for the emotions tested) as for all of the other 
emotions when the arms were the only elements available, performance was either 
par tially impaired as in the case of portrayed sadness, or it diminished completely. 
However, it cannot be the case that positioning of the arms relative to veridical 
positioning of the body is essential as anger was still easily perceived when the 
displays were inverted or rotated (see Chapter 1). The fact that there is very little 
structural information of the human form in the ar-ms —  they appear as 2 moving 
sticks — suggests that kinematic information is likely to be an important cue for 
anger.
In support of this claim, information from kinematics has been found to be 
fundamental in the processing of biological motion. For example, Hill and Pollick
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(2000) found that observers were better at discriminating identities of actors from the 
actors’ arm movements when time based information was exaggerated (i.e. the 
movements were segregated into individual pai'ts and then the separate movement 
durations were increased by 50% and 100%). Importantly, spatial information 
remained constant in all of the conditions. Furthermore, in a manipulation where 
temporal information was negatively exaggerated (i.e. by -50%) discrimination of 
the actor was poorer (Hill and Pollick, 2000). For the specific case of affect, Pollick 
et al. (2001) asked observers to categorise arm-knocking movements of different 
affects (as if knocking on a door angrily, for example). A two dimensional model of 
affect was created from the results by using a multidimensional scaling procedure. 
Pollick et al. (2001) found that information from the physical movement of the arm 
correlated highly with the so-called ‘activation’ dimension of the model. This 
remained true even when form information was disrupted by scrambling the spatial 
information in the displays. Thus it appealed that observers’ responses were largely 
based on the kinematics of the actors’ movements.
There is further evidence to suggest that kinematics aie important as (for point-light 
displays produced from actors’ more exaggerated portrayals of affect rather than 
normal portrayals of the same) there was a general trend for enhancement in 
recognition for the exaggerated expressions (Atkinson et al., 2004). However, results 
varied, as this was not true at all for the categories of sadness and joy. A caveat of 
this approach is that spatial information was not held constant in the exaggerated 
movement conditions. However, when the best exemplars of exaggerated movement 
were presented in a static full-light condition it was found that the exaggerations 
made little difference to perception. This result suggested that movement information 
was the underlying cue (Atkinson et al., 2004).
It may be that for slower (less movement activity) emotions such as sadness spatial 
cues could have more status than kinematic cues. For example, it was demonstr ated 
that for sadness, recognition was impaired for all of the subconfiguration categories 
compared to the normal (13 point-light) displays. It is of interest that in Atkinson et 
al.’s (2004) study sadness was the only emotion that received significantly lower 
ratings when movements were exaggerated (by the actors). The most likely
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explanation for this effect is that increases in movement are inconsistent with the 
perception of sadness. Taken together, it appears that sadness may be recognised 
with the most accuracy when the visual system uses form cues of the whole figure. 
Certainly, sadness can be easily recognised in static body positions —  although, 
interestingly feai’ cannot (Coulson, 2004). In another study that illustrates the utility 
of spatial information, Bientema and Lappe (2002) have demonstrated that observers 
can recognise a human point-light figure without local image motion. This was 
achieved by moving every point-light individually to a randomly allocated position 
of the limb in the display (therefore no point caiTied the valid motion signal from one 
frame to the next frame). However, in this study a single frame was not enough for 
recognition, rather a sequence of frames was required. This effect was robust even 
when residual motion was controlled for by reducing the presentations to 4 frames a 
second. Therefore, it may be that spatial information from posture is important for 
recognition of some emotions but only when the spatial information evolves over 
time.
Recognition of biological motion could be accomplished by combining spatial and 
kinematic information. Specialised pathways have been postulated to exist in the 
visual system that process information from form and information from movement in 
quasi-independent streams (Milner and Goodale, 1995): the ventral stream, arises 
from primary visual cortex and projects to the inferotemporal cortex, and the dorsal 
stream, also arises from primary visual cortex but projecting to the superior parietal 
cortex (Ungerieider and Mishkin, 1982). It has been proposed that the ventral stream 
processes spatial information and the dorsal stream processes movement information. 
Giese and Poggio (2003) have argued that the visual system could encode patterns of 
body shapes via ‘snapshot’ neurons in the ventral processing stream and movement 
information could be processed in the sequences of complex optic flow patterns in 
the dorsal processing stream (see also Casile and Giese, 2005). Therefore, evidence 
of biological mechanisms in combination with recent computational models supports 
the utility of both form and movement information for the processing of biological 
motion and this is consistent with the findings here. Notwithstanding, a number of 
open questions remain, such as how the spatial and motion information and their 
relative weighting in the different emotions might be combined.
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Portrayed joy was confused with anger when the fewest number of points were 
shown, i.e. i) when only the head and shoulders were displayed, and ii) when only 
the arms were displayed. Sadness and fear were confused with each other in some 
conditions. Yet these anger/joy and sadness/ fear confusions remained mutually 
exclusive (except for one occasion when anger was confused for feai) and similar 
confusions have been documented elsewhere in this thesis and by other authors 
(Dittiich et al. 1996). Anger and joy are expressed by faster movements than are 
sadness and fear. For example, Pollick et al. (2001), who have documented the 
velocities for various emotions when specified in actors’ arm movements, recorded 
average velocities of approximately 450 mm/sec for joy and 550mm/sec for anger 
whereas fear and sadness had lower velocities — approximately 300mm/sec each.
That these confusions occur in certain reduced cue situations could be explained by 
postulating a processing framework for the biological motion recognition. Massaro 
and Egan (1996) have proposed a model for bimodal processing of emotion called 
the ‘Fuzzy Logical Model of Perception’ where information is processed in three 
stages: evaluation, integration and decision making. Information is evaluated based 
on a prototype of a particular emotional expression. Secondly, information is 
integrated across the modalities. Finally a decision is made based on the amount of 
support for each alternative. A similar framework could explain unimodal processing 
where information from various cues (e.g. from form and optic flow) is first 
evaluated, and then integrated. Finally, a decision is made at a higher level of the 
processing hierarchy. As demonstrated by the results here, when cues are degraded to 
make recognition difficult (as shown in the confusions) incorrect decisions are often 
made by the visual system as it is operating with insufficient information. For 
example, in the case of portrayed joy when only the arms were shown, the visual 
system may have been able only to detect that the emotion was high in activation 
(i.e. anger or joy) at the evaluation stage with this limited information. However, the 
percept of joy can only be recognised as ‘joy’ when more information is available to 
be combined at the integration stage, after which a correct decision can be made.
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The results of Experiment 6 show that the visual system does not use the same 
constituent parts of the stimulus in all emotions. The visual system appears to be 
specifically attuned to particular body configurations for veridical perception of 
specific emotions.
There are limitations to this study in that only 4 emotions were examined here. 
Likewise, the number and type of body component combinations considered were by 
no means exhaustive. For example, there were no manipulations that examined 
movement from only the lower body — it might prove interesting to see if lower 
body movements, i.e. of the hips, are indicative of fear. For instance, Roether and 
Giese (2005) have shown that point-light displays of the lower half of the body can 
specify fear.
In summary, the experiments reported in this chapter demonstrate that backward- 
played displays do not disrupt perception of affect. Furthermore, the whole body is 
not necessary for veridical perception of affect, showing that there is some 
redundancy in biological motion displays. This is not surprising given that in the 
natural environment people are often partially occluded by other things (Pinto and 
Shiffrar, 1999). Of interest is the observation that there is considerable variation in 
the features needed for recognition, depending on emotion type. Form cues appear to 
dominate for some emotions and movement cues appear to dominate for others. 
Certainly the experiments reported in this chapter show that the visual processing of 
biological motion is complex but both robust and flexible.
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Chapter 6 
Children’s perception of emotion from biological motion
6.1. Introduction
So fai* it has been established that perception of emotion from biological movement 
portrayed in the context of interpersonal dialogue can be perceived by adults, is 
affected by the social context of the displays and, with only minor exceptions, is 
robust despite systematic degradation of the stimulus. This chapter explores how 
children recognise emotion from biological motion as veridical perception of socially 
relevant information is fundamental to the development of interpersonal 
communication.
The ability to perceive point-light displays develops early in infancy. For example, 
Fox and McDaniel (1982) used a preferential looking task to demonstrate that 4- 
month-old infants preferred to look at a point-light walker to dynamic noise. Infants 
can discriminate non-human movement too as in a habituation task 6-month-olds 
could categorize vehicles and animals (Arterberry and Born stein, 2002). 
Furthermore, 5-month-old infants can discriminate a walker from similar stimuli and 
yet cannot discriminate the same stimuli when they are turned upside-down 
(Bertenthal, Proffitt and Kramer, 1987). This finding is important as both images had 
the same low-level visual properties such as velocity of the dots in the display, and 
so the preference was not for some primitive aspect of the images.
Clearly infant reseaich has some limitations as it cannot be known what the infant 
perceives in the displays but children as young as 3 are able to attribute motion verbs 
such as ‘walking’ and ‘dancing’ to point-light displays of walkers and dancers 
respectively (Golinkoff, Chung, Hirsh- Pasek, Liu, Bertenthal, Brand, Maguire and 
Hennon, 2002) and can recognise and name point-light displays of a walking man, 
walking and running dogs, and a flying bird (Pavlova, Krageloh-Mann, Sokolov and 
Birbaumer, 2001), Static versions of the same displays revealed poor performances 
by the children and therefore showed that movement information was vital for
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recognition and by the age of 5 the children were almost at ceiling levels of 
performance (Pavlova et al., 2001). Interestingly, these researchers found that 3 and 
4 year-olds were able to identify a walking point-light dog better than similar 
displays of a human walker (although this effect was not appaient for a running dog). 
This result is surprising given that it is more biologically relevant to perceive human 
biological motion than canine motion. In another developmental study Berry (1991) 
demonstrated that 5-year-olds could discriminate sex correctly from point-light 
displays of actors’ faces but only when the actors were engaged in conversation with 
another (unseen) person. In contiast, in another condition where there was no social 
interaction and the actors simply recited the alphabet the children’s judgements were 
at chance performance. This implies that children are sensitive to information in 
quotidian conversation but are not sensitive to information that has no social 
relevance.
Our knowledge of what children can perceive in point-light displays has been laigely 
confined to the identification of physical objects and activities and there has been 
very little reseaich into whether children can identify internal states such as emotion 
from these unusual displays. In one rare study, Moore, Hobson and Lee (1997) 
presented 7-yeai-olds with point-light displays of a single actor engaged in actions to 
represent emotions (surprise, sadness, fear, anger or joy), for example, jumping and 
skipping ai'ound to depict joy. In 21 out of the 65 verbal responses made, the children 
were able to identify the emotions. However, the developmental trajectory for 
acquiring such skills and whether all the emotions were recognised equally well were 
not examined. The correct responses were made for less than half of the stimuli 
shown which suggests that the skill to identify affect was not fully developed at this 
age; although this result may have been due to task difficulty as the children were 
required to describe verbally what they saw in each display. Therefore, the children 
might have recognised affect in some displays but may not have been able to 
verbalise their answers correctly.
There is indeed some evidence that children aie sensitive to the emotion conveyed 
within such stimuli as pictures of faces (e.g. Izard, 1971; Walden and Field, 1982), 
voice prosody (Stifter and Fox, 1987), music (Cunningham and Sterling, 1988;
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Boone and Cunningham, 2001) and static body postures (Tracy, Robins, and 
Lagattuta, 2005). In a study that investigated the particular case of body movements, 
Van Meel et al, (1993) tested whether 5-, 8-, 10-, and 12-year-olds could recognise 
affect (anger, joy, sadness and fear) when it was portrayed in dance movements 
(facial information was not occluded). These authors argued that, irrespective of 
whether the dependent measure was a free response or a multiple choice response 
format, children under 8-years were not able to recognise emotion. However, even 
the 8-year-olds appeared to perform quite poorly (the authors did not compare the 
accuracy scores to chance) although their performances were better than those of the 
5-yeai-olds. Differences between individual affects were not examined.
Boone and Cunningham (1998) also investigated the developmental trajectory for the 
acquisition of this skill when portrayed in dancers’ body movements (facial 
information was blurred). In contrast to the results of Van Meel et al. (1993) Boone 
and Cunningham (1998) found that children as young as 4 were able to identify 
sadness from full-light displays of expressive body movements in dance (even 
though the facial information was bluiTed and faded and therefore could not be used 
as a cue). By 5 years of age, fear and happiness could also be identified. The 
dispaiity between the results of the Boone and Cunningham (1998) study and the 
Van Meel et al. (1993) study is puzzling and cannot be accounted for in terms of 
cues from facial affect given that the study where performance was particularly poor 
was also the study where facial information remained. It is possible that differences 
in the dance samples between the studies could account for the differences in results.
In adults anger was found to be the most easily identified emotion (see Chapter 3) 
and young childien can perceive anger when full-light information from the face and 
body is available as 4- and 5 year-olds do recognise anger from nonverbal and 
nonstylized adult portrayals (Cummings, Vogel, Cummings and El-Sheikh, 1989). 
Furthermore, children as young as 3 can identify anger both from faces and voice 
prosody (Stifter and Fox, 1987). Therefore, it was of particulai* interest as to whether 
young children would identify this emotion when expressed in naturalistic portrayals 
of social interaction rather than stylized dance movements, of which they aie likely 
to have little experience.
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How might such skills develop? One hypothesised mechanism is a link between 
motoric production and perception. According to this view it is necessary for a child 
to be able to produce the specific motor actions involved in a cue in order to perceive 
it (Lockman, 1990; Bushnell and Boudreau, 1993). Boone and Cunningham (1998) 
argued that young children were unable to perceive anger because they were unable 
to produce the complex dhectional changes in the face and torso that are claimed to 
be associated with this emotion (e.g. de Meijer, 1989). However, this hypothesis was 
not directly tested.
The aim of the present study was to assess whether children could identify emotion 
from more natural communication behaviours than dance (Boone and Cunningham, 
1998) and more natural types of movement than that expressed by single actors 
behaving stereotypically (Moore et al., 1997). Another aim of this research was to 
track the developmental trajectory for the acquisition of this skill. From an ecological 
perspective and taken with Berry’s (1991) finding that children detected information 
about the sex of an actor only from natural patterns of movement chaiacterised in 
interacting faces, the stimuli used in the displays developed here should give children 
the best possible chance of successful identification of their emotional content.
In this study the youngest group were 5-year-olds — the youngest age that most of 
the emotion categories expressed in videos of dance movements could be identified 
(Boone and Cunningham, 1998), and it was reasoned that with more impoverished 
stimuli younger children than this would be unlikely to perform well here. Seven - 
and 9-year-olds were included to understand the development of this skill through 
mid-childhood. Anger, happiness, sadness and fear were the emotion categories 
selected on the basis of their being successfully identified in previous studies 
(e.g.Boone and Cunningham, 1998).
Specifically, the aim of this study was to enquire (i) whether children can perceive 
emotion from point-light displays, (ii) whether this ability improves with age, and 
(iii) whether the ability to identify emotion develops at different rates for the
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different emotions. A control group of adults was also tested to establish the 
maximum level of performance that could be expected in the task.
6.2. Method
It was clear that the method employed in the experimental design for recording the 
adult subject’s responses was likely to be too complex for young children to 
understand; therefore a design was needed that would be appropriate for the children 
to use. Smiley and Huttenlocher (1989) found that young children gave the best 
performance when using a binary choice technique over open-ended verbal responses 
or choosing from among verbal alternatives when given an emotion identification 
task. Other researchers (e.g. Boone and Cunningham, 1998) have also used this 
method with success. Therefore, a non-verbal binaiy choice task was implemented in 
the present experiment. This method involves showing two displays simultaneously 
and asking the subject to pick the correct one. To show the dyadic displays used for 
the other studies reported in this thesis was deemed as being too complicated and 
therefore the displays were altered so that single actors were shown expressing an 
emotion whilst engaged in discourse with another (unseen) actor. A group of adults 
was tested prior to the children for two reasons: first, to ensure that the method 
worked successfully and second, to use as a control group for the children.
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6.2.1. Subjects
A total of 68 observers from four age groups were recruited. There were 14 adults (8 
women, 6 men, mean age: 25 years 1 month, range: 19 -  36 years); 18 five-yeai- 
olds (8 boys, 10 girls, mean age: 5 years 6 months, range: 5 years 5 months -  5 
years 11 months); 18 seven-year-olds (9 boys, 9 girls, mean age: 7 years exactly, 
range: 6 years 10 months -  7years 2 months); and 18 nine-year-olds (10 boys, 8 
girls, mean age: 9 years exactly, range: 8 years 8 months -  9 years 3 months).
6.2.2. Stimulus materials and apparatus.
The stimuli selected for the experiments contained 3 different recordings for each of 
the 4 emotion categories •— anger, joy, sadness and fear. The stimuli used here were 
chosen as they were found to be good exemplars (i.e. they received high ratings) in 
the previous studies on adults reported in this thesis. As before, they also comprised 
as many different actor combinations as possible and at least one performance from 
each of the 10 actors was used.
Each of the recordings was split into separate stimuli containing just one of the two 
actors. These individual stimuli were then presented in mixed pairs, with, as an 
example, one actor portraying anger and the other portraying fear. When viewing 
such a mixed pair, a child could be asked to identify “who’s angry” or “who’s 
scared”. To make it clear that the two actors were not directly interacting with each 
other in a mixed pair a solid vertical line was shown between them as if they were in 
different rooms. The first 10 seconds of each recording were used.
During the experiments the point-light displays were shown on an Apple iBook 
computer with a 14-inch LCD display. The point-lights were shown in green on a 
black background. The children sat approximately 40cm from the screen. Figure 6. 1 
shows an example of the stimuli shown to the children.
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Figure 6.1. Static frame of a point-light display showing the two actors where each actor is 
represented by 13 points of light. In this frame the actor on the left of the screen is expressing anger 
and the actor on the right is expressing joy.
6.2.3. Design and procedure.
Children were seated individually in front of the computer monitor and the 
experimenter was seated next to the child. A flat board, with a vertical line drawn 
centrally to follow the central line that appeared on the monitor, covered the 
computer keys and a small toy cat was placed on the centre of the board in front of 
the child. The children were asked to put the cat to the side of the screen that 
showed the point-light display of the figure that was expressing the target emotion 
(e.g.” who’s happy?”). After every response the toy was returned to the centre.
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Familial' emotion terms were used; specifically, cf'oss was used as well as angiy for 
anger target displays, and scared and frightened  were used for fear. All of the 
children were asked if they understood all of the familiar emotions terms used in the 
study (e.g. “what do you do when you are scared?”) and, without exception, the 
children responded appropriately. All of the children responded to every item and 
they were allowed to see the presentations more than once if they needed to. This 
occurred approximately 10% of the time for the younger groups and rarely for the 
oldest group. Only on two occasions did a child ask to see a display more than twice 
and on no occasion did a child ask to see a display four times or more. The 
experiment lasted for 10 minutes for each observer. Three examples of each target 
emotion were shown with foils from each of the other emotion categories used. 
There were 24 trials in all (four target emotions x three examples of each target 
emotion x two repetitions of each so that every example would appear once on the 
left side and once on the right side of the central line in the display). This procedure 
allowed both halves of each original dyad to be used once in the experiment.
A dimly lit and quiet aiea of the school was used to test each child individually. The 
children were told that they would see two people on the screen but that they were 
people made of dots. An example of one of the displays was shown and the children 
were asked to put the toy on the side of the screen where the tallest person was. This 
task was always completed successfully and so demonstrated that the children could 
understand similar instructions to that of the experimental task. The children were 
told that they would be asked a question as to the whereabouts of the happy person 
and so on. Once again, a clear indication that they understood these terms and 
insti'uctions was always given.
The adults were tested in a dimly lit laboratory at the University of Surrey. They 
were tested in a similar way to the children but were asked to verbalise ‘left’ or 
‘right’ to refer to the side of the screen where they judged the target emotion to be 
displayed. The experimenter used the terms happy, sad, fearful and angry to express 
the target emotions that the adult observers were to locate.
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6.3. Results
For each individual, an accuracy score for correct identification of the target 
emotions was calculated where a score of 1 was given for each correct choice, 
therefore a range from 0 - 2 4  was created, with a mean score of 12 expected by 
chance. The average accuracy scores for the four groups were 21,6, 19.2, 17.4 and 
15 for the adults, 9-yeai-olds, 7-year-olds and 5-year-olds respectively. All of these 
scores were shown to be significantly above chance levels when a one-sample t test 
was used; adults, t (13) = 17.20, p  < 0.001; 9- yeai' olds, t (17) = 9.23,^ < 0.001; 7- 
year-olds, t (17) = 6,56, p < 0.001; 5-year olds, f (17) = 4.00, p < 0.005. Therefore, 
at the most general level, the younger children were able to extract at least some 
information about the emotional content of the actors’ portrayals from biological 
motion. Some of the required discriminations were sufficiently challenging for adult 
performance to be high, yet below ceiling —  as confirmed when adult scores were 
compared to a score of 6 in a one-sample t test (r (13) = 4.24, p < 0.005).
To ask whether the developmental trend was similar for each of the four target 
emotions, the separate scores for each emotion category were calculated for each 
participant. This amounted to four scores for each observer with a maximum of six 
and a mean score of three to be expected by chance. Figure 6.2 shows how 
recognition improved with age for each of the four emotions sepaiately. The rate of 
development and level of performance was uneven and differed between the target 
emotions although in general it appeal's that monotonie improvement occuned as age 
increased. One-sample t tests were used to compare actual performance with that 
expected by chance. The only group-emotion combination not above chance (p > 
0.05) was for the 5-yeai-olds when the tai'get emotion was sadness.
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Anger Joy Sadness
Emotion
Fear
15- yr olds □ 7-year olds □  9-year olds □ adults
Figure 6.2. Accuracy of emotion identification as a function of age and emotion category. Error bars 
show standard errors. The results above each bar show results of one-sample t tests {df = 13 for the 
adults and 17 for the children) that compared actual performance with that expected by chance.
Trend analysis was performed on the data to investigate the shape of the function for 
perceptual development across age for each emotion. This showed a positive linear 
trend for each of the slopes that related accuracy to age for each of the emotions 
(anger, t (64) = 4.83, p  < 0.001; joy, t (64) = 3.49, p  < 0.001 ;sadness, t (64) = 4.85, p 
< 0.001;fear, t (64) = 3.75, p  < 0.001). This confirmed that recognition of all four 
emotions improved with age. A negative quadratic trend was also evident for the 
anger data (f (64) = 2.31,p  < 0.05). This indicated that perceptual ability for the 
recognition of anger developed rapidly after the age of 5 (when performance was just 
above chance) and was at adult levels by age 7 (t (30) = 0.16, p  > 0.05) .No other 
quadratic trends were detected for the other emotions showing a more even 
developmental trajectory (p > 0.05).
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The data also allowed an enquiry to be made as to whether performance in 
identifying a paiticulai' emotion varied depending on the foil emotion. In order to 
investigate this, 12 separate scores were produced for each participant where the 
maximum score was 2 and a score of 1 was to be expected by chance. The full set of 
scores for each conect emotion category broken down by emotion category of the 
accompanying foil can be seen in Table 6.1. and Figures 6.3 to 6.6 show the 
performances for each of the emotions for each of the age groups separately.
Table 6.1. Observers’ mean scores for each correct emotion category broken down by emotion 
category of the accompanying foil. Standard deviations are shown in paientheses.
Age Group Correct/Foil
Anger/Joy Anger/Sad Anger/Fear
5-year olds 0.95 (0.5) 1.4 (0.6) 1.5 (0.7)
7-year olds 1.4 (0.5) 1.6 (0.6) 1.8 (0.5)
9-year olds 1.5 (0.5) 1.8 (0.4) 2(0)
Adults 1.6 (0.5) 1.8 (0.4) 1.9 (0.3)
Joy/Anger Joy/ Sad Joy/Fear
5-year olds 1.6 (0.5) 1.4 (0.6) 1.1 (0.8)
7-year olds 1.3 (0.7) 1.4 (0.7) 1.6 (0.6)
9-year olds 1.3 (0.8) 1.8 (0.5) 1.6 (0.5)
Adults 1.6 (0.5) 2 (0) 1.8 (0.3)
Sad/Anger Sad/Joy Sad/Fear
5-year olds 1.16(0 .6) 1.2 (0.5) 0.95 (0.7)
7-year olds 1.5 (0.7) 1.5 (0.6) 1.2 (0.6)
9-year olds 1.7(0.6) 1.7 (0.4) 1.3 (0.8)
Adults 2(0) 2(0) 1.5 (0.6)
Fear/Anger Fear/Joy Fear/Sad
5-year olds 1.4 (0.5) 1.3 (0.7) 1 (0.8)
7-year olds 1.4(0.8) 1.6 (0.6) 0.8 (0.8)
9-year olds 1.7 (0.7) 1.7 (0.6) 0.8 (0.7)
Adults 1.8 (0.4) 1.7 (0.5) 1.6 (0.5)
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uAnger v Joy Foil Anger v Sad Foil Anger v Fear Foil
Anger Recognition as a Function of Foil Type
■ 5-yr-olds S7-yr-olds □9-yr-olds □  Adults
Figure 6.3. Mean accuracy of anger recognition as a function of age broken down by foil type. Error 
bars represent SEM. The figures above each bar show results of one-sample t tests that compared 
actual performance with that expected by chance.
Figure 6.3. shows performance at identifying anger for each age group. When the foil 
was sadness or fear 5-year-olds were above chance and there was improvement in 
performance with age. On the other hand, when the foil was joy 5-year-olds 
performed at chance levels (p > 0.05) but the older age groups were substantially 
better (p < 0.005). Paradoxically, Figure 6.4 shows that when joy was the target 
emotion and anger was the foil 5-year-olds performed well above chance (p < 0.001) 
but 7- and 9-year-olds performed at chance levels (p > 0.05).
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Figure 6.4. Mean accuracy of joy recognition as a function of age broken down by foil type. Error 
bars represent SEM. The figures above each bar show results of one-sample t tests that compared 
actual performance with that expected by chance.
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Sadness Recognition as a Function of Foil Type
I ■ 5-yr-olds B  7-yr-olds □  9-yr-olds □  adults |
Figure 6.5. Mean accuracy of sadness recognition as a function of age broken down by foil type. The 
figures above each bar show results of one-sample t tests that compared actual performance with that 
expected by chance.
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Figure 6.5 shows that children were poor at picking sadness from fear foils and 
performance for them all was at chance (p > 0.05). This was also the most difficult 
judgement for adults, although performance for them was above chance (p < 0.05). When 
the foils were anger or joy fairly even developmental trends are evident but the 5-year- 
olds did not perform above chance (p > 0.05). When fear was the target emotion (Figure 
6 .6), none of the children could distinguish fear if sadness was the foil (p > 0.05). Adults 
performed well above chance on this task (p < 0.001). Therefore, for the special case of 
fear and sadness combinations, irrespective of whether fear or sadness was being judged, 
the skill for perceiving them correctly was not evident until after the age of 9 but before 
adulthood.
Fear v A nger Foil Fear v Joy Foil Fear v Sad Foil
Fear R ecogn ition  as a F unction  o f  Foil T yp e  
[■ 5-yr-o lds □  7-yr-olds □  9-yr-olds □  adults j
Figure 6.6. Mean accuracy of fear recognition as a function of age broken down by foil type. The figures 
above each bar show results of one-sample t tests that compared actual performance with that expected by 
chance.
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6,4. Discussion
This study has shown that young children have the ability to identify affect from 
biological motion. This result both extends and bolsters the previous findings in this 
field which shows that young children can identify not only concrete entities such as 
walkers or dogs (Pavlova et al., 2001) but also abstract constructs such as emotions 
(Moore et al., 1997).
Although 5-year-olds recognised affect from biological motion, they were unable to 
recognise sadness. There was a trend for general linear improvement as age 
increased across all emotion categories but there was variation within each category 
and age group depending on the type of foil presented. This shows that although 
recognition improves with age, development of this skill is not a uniform trend.
That improvement in performance with age differed between the emotions is 
interesting as this uneven pattern of development may inform us about the 
mechanisms underlying the perception of emotion from biological motion. If 
recognition depended upon the operation of a single mechanism, devoted to the 
analysis of biological motion or a general motor skill, then an even developmental 
picture would have emerged than the one observed. Boone and Cunningham (1998) 
ar gued that perception of a par ticular emotion was related to being able to produce a 
specific motor action. However, there is no direct evidence of such a link and so it 
cannot be discounted that the acquisition of this skill is related to visual experience. 
Experience makes a difference to perception. For example, physically abused 
children who might well be exposed to anger as an environmental cue on a regular* 
basis accurately identify facial displays of anger on the basis of less sensory input 
than do controls (Poliak and Sinha, 2002). Importantly, the abused children were not 
better at perceiving other emotions than were controls. Further, children identify 
anger and joy when expressed through vocal and facial channels by their 
mothers more readily than when expressed by strangers (Shackman and Poliak, 
2005). For the specific case of identifying point-light displays Pavlova et al., (2001)
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argued the reason young children were better able to identify walking quadrupeds 
over walking humans was because they had little experience of humans from the 
particular view shown, but as young children are short (as are dogs) they had no 
trouble in recognising the walking dogs. Motor-skills theories and experience-based 
theories need not be mutually exclusive (Jacobs, Pinto and Shiffrar, 2004;Loula, 
Prasad, Hai'ber and Shiffrai*, 2005).
On the other hand, if recognition of emotion from biological motion is thought of as 
supported by a collection of cues picked up by different mechanisms then an uneven 
developmental trajectory would be likely to emerge. The idea of a collection of 
mechanisms for picking up a range of cues is supported by other studies reported in 
this thesis. When adults were presented with the original stimuli of the dyads that 
had been degraded in vaiious ways the effects tended to be specific to the emotion 
being judged and the manipulation of the point-light display that was made. For 
example, inversion selectively impeded the recognition of feai", whereas presenting 
single actors rather than natural actor pairs selectively impaired the recognition of 
love but enhanced sensitivity to sadness (see Chapter 3). Artificial pairs created by 
presenting a single actor and the minor image of this had further specific influences 
on judgements.
Substantial evidence supports the notion that separate systems exist to serve different 
emotions. For instance, in a recent review of the literature Lawrence, Muiphy and 
Calder (2004) argued that neuroscientific evidence shows fear and disgust to be 
represented in the brain in regionally specialised places, as double dissociations — 
where normal results for task A but abnormal results for task B are found in one 
patient and the opposite results aie found in the other patient (task B normal, task A 
abnormal)(Shallice, 1988) —  have been found between feai' and disgust in brain 
damaged humans. Thus, patients with amygdala damage show impaired recognition 
of fear expressions but not disgust (e.g. Sprengelmeyer, Young, Schroeder, 
Grossenbacher, Federlein, Büttner, and Przuntek, 1999) whereas patients with 
insula/operculum damage exhibit the opposite behaviours (e.g. Calder, Keane, 
Manes, Antoun and Young, 2000).
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In adults (see Chapter 3) anger was the portrayed emotion most easily recognised 
even when presented non-canonically. However, the data reported here show that 5- 
yeai-olds were only just above chance at recognising anger overall but performance 
varied depending on the type of foil that was presented. The ability to recognise 
anger improved rapidly after the age of 5, particularly when the foil was joy. For 
bodily expression of emotion (full-light) in dance movements Boone and 
Cunningham (1998) found that sensitivity to anger began to emerge at around the 
age of 5 and this is laigely in line with the results reported here. However, for voice 
prosody (Hortaçsu and Ekinci, 1992) and facial expression (Cummings, Vogel, 
Cummings and El-Sheikh, 1989; Sullivan, Kh'kpatiick and MacDonald, 1995) anger 
could be recognised by childr en as young as 5 and so it may be that the perception of 
anger from the movement of the body develops later than it does via these other 
channels of expression.
Of interest was the result that 5-year-olds could pick out joy when anger was the foil 
and yet older children were unable to. Paradoxically, 5-yeai-olds could not recognise 
anger when joy was the foil and yet older children could. Fhst, this result shows that 
younger children were not using logical reasoning to decide which of the two stimuli 
was the conect answer (i.e., when being asked to find anger, knowledge of what joy 
looks like combined with seeing a joy stimulus means that anger must be the other 
stimulus). Second, this pattern of results suggests that as a child becomes attuned to 
one stimulus, sensitivity to other previously mastered stimuli may suffer. Boone and 
Cunningham (1998) conducted a cue intensity task, i.e. the upward movements 
which aie thought to be a critical cue for joy (de Meijer, 1989) were manipulated so 
that there were either more or less upwaid movements than in the original stimulus, 
and found that 5-year-olds were more reliant than 8-year-olds in the use of the 
upward arm movement cue in decoding happiness. This could be indicative of 
children becoming less sensitive or giving less weighting (see Chapter 5) to this cue 
as they become attuned to other relevant stimulus cues (Boone and Cunningham, 
1998). Further, this type of phenomenon could explain the anomalous result of non­
monotonic development in the Boone and Cunningham (1998) study as 8-yeai-olds 
were better than adults at recognising sadness. Therefore, adults too may be 
susceptible to a loss of sensitivity in previously mastered cues in order to become
154
proficient in others although there was no direct evidence of such an effect in the 
results reported here.
My results show that ability to identify emotions laigely improves throughout mid­
childhood although there are some pockets of non-monotonic development. These 
results are largely in line with the findings of Boone and Cunningham (1998) 
although there are some differences in results, for example, those researchers found 
sadness to be the first emotion recognised; here it was the last. This study reports that 
joy was the most easily identified emotion by 5-year-olds thus paralleling the 
findings that positive emotions are the first to be recognised developmentally in 
music (Cunningham and Sterling, 1988) and in facial expressions (e.g. Philippot and 
Feldman, 1990; Walden and Field, 1982). That full-light presentations of dancers 
were used as stimuli by Boone and Cunningham poses a problem for direct 
comparisons as it is not known whether the contrasting results between studies aie 
due to fundamental differences between dance movements and actions made in 
interpersonal communication or differences between full-light and point-light 
conditions. Notwithstanding, the general finding is true for both studies that the skill 
to perceive affect from biological motion emerges at or by around 4-5 year s and then 
in most cases matures to almost adult levels by the age of 8 or 9.
Overall, these findings show that young children have the ability to use the isolated 
movement cues that aie conveyed in point-light displays to identify the emotions of 
others. Emotion identification from point-light displays improves with age largely 
monotonically but unevenly until late in mid-childhood when neai-adult performance 
is achieved.
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Chapter 7
Discussion
7.1. Overview
Four interdependent aims were set in Chapter 1 that relate to emotion and biological 
motion. These were: to see how the social context is important for the perception
of affect from biological motion; (ii) to further our knowledge about the mechanisms 
responsible for this ability; (iii) to see how the skill to read emotion from body 
movements develops in childhood and (iv) to further elucidate what is known about 
emotions. The principle findings relating to the first three questions were discussed 
according to their relevance in the empirical chapters. This chapter has two main 
puiposes; the first is to answer the final question about how the findings contribute to 
what is known about affect, the second is to discuss the methods used in this (and 
other) reseaich and to suggest ideas for future experiments. First the main findings 
aie summarised.
7.2. Summary of the main bindings
In Chapter 1, the existing studies that have investigated the perception of affect from 
biological motion were critically reviewed. It was argued that it would be useful to 
look at the subject from a social angle and to produce stimuli which captured more 
natural communication behaviours than those used previously. Methods were 
discussed in Chapter 2. The work in Chapter 3, using both quantitative and 
qualitative measures, assessed the utility of these new behavioural samples. The 
results showed that anger, joy, sadness, love and fear could be distinguished in 
normally orientated point-light displays. However, disgust was not recognised in 
either the qualitative or the quantitative task. Follow up experiments established that 
neither the varying duration of the vignettes nor the amount of turn taking within a 
display affected observers’ ability to recognise emotions. Effects of orientation were 
also explored; inversion was found to reduce the salience of the displayed emotions
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to varying extents although performance was still good for most emotions except 
feai'. Overall, these findings are consistent with the view that social information is 
specified in the spatiotemporal dynamics of point-light displays. The results show 
that the body provides an excellent channel (for most emotions) by which 
infomiation can be picked up from a distance and is not limited to communication by 
a small number of actors as oro-facial communication would be.
The experimental designs in Chapter 3 were similar to those conducted in other 
research laboratories. However, the work in Chapter 4 went beyond what has 
previously been investigated. Two important issues relating to the perception of a 
social event were explored. As a first step towards understanding if, and if so how, 
the social context augments the perception of affect, in Experiment 3 subjects were 
shown upright versions of the original dyads, a single actor (monads) and a dyad 
comprising a single actor and his/her mirror image (reflected dyads). In general, 
recognition was found to vary between the emotion categories depending on the 
context in which the emotion was shown. In particular, the removal of one actor 
seemed to impair the recognition of joy and love; these are emotions that are 
pai'ticulai'ly expressive socially. There were other impairments as a result of the non- 
veridical contexts (as in the reflected dyads). This suggests that observers take into 
account information from the entire scene when judging the emotional content of a 
situation.
These findings show that the properties of body movement alone cannot provide a 
full explanation for the recognition of affect and that the social context is a defining 
feature for the recognition of affect from biological motion. There are emergent 
properties within a scene that do not occur as a result of processing the kinematics in 
the display. This was well illustrated by the fact that portrayals of romantic love were 
unrecognisable (as love) without the presence of a second actor despite the fact that 
the stimulus properties for each actor were no different between monad and dyad 
conditions. Cleariy, the demonstration of the social influence on the perception of 
affect in this study augments the view that it is important to consider emotions at a 
social level.
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Experiment 4 also showed that there are qualities inherent within the social exchange 
that advise the third person observer of important communicative chaiacteristics. 
Here it was demonstrated that a speaker could be identified even if the only 
information available is a point-light display of two people engaged in conversation, 
where importantly, facial information was not available. Therefore, speech and body 
movement are connected. This confirms suggestions that speech and body 
movements are intimately related (see Chapter 1).
In Chapters 5 and 6 several studies were described which further investigated the 
mechanisms which aie involved in the perception of affect. During locomotion, for 
purposes of efficiency, the limbs move in a regular-, predictable way but emotions are 
not expressed by such regular (pendulum like) movements of the limbs. The 
experiments in Chapter 5 replicated procedures that had been conducted to 
investigate locomotory actions to assess whether there are differences between the 
way that affect and locomotion aie perceived. In the first study (Experiment 5) the 
information contained in the display was reversed to see if this made a difference for 
recognition (compared to normally played displays). The results showed that 
observers were able to recognise the displays despite the backward-played motion. 
The second study (Experiment 6) critically examined what information in the 
stimulus was required to perceive emotion. This was achieved by occluding some of 
the information in the displays. The results showed that as few as 3 or 4 points were 
sufficient for recognition; this demonstiates that there is considerable redundancy in 
a point-light display of affect.
Taken together, the results of these studies showed that emotion is processed 
differently to locomotion. This claim is made because in these results, displays 
played backwaids made no difference in recognition compared to displays played 
forwards whereas for locomotion, performance is impaired when the motion is 
reversed. Further, the contribution of different components of the body varied 
depending on which emotion was displayed and these components are not the same 
as those that ar e important for the perception of locomotion.
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In Chapter 6 a developmental study was documented where children completed a 
binaiy choice task to see if they could perceive emotion from point-light displays. It 
was demonstrated that children as young as 5 are able to perceive affect from 
biological motion. This ability largely improves throughout mid-childhood then in 
most cases matures to almost adult levels by the age of 8 or 9.
7.3. Implications for the study of emotion
The findings reported in this thesis contribute to answering the question of whether 
emotions should be conceived in terms of discrete categories or as varying along 
certain bipolai* dimensions such as pleasantness and activation (see Chapter 1). The 
results are difficult to reconcile with a dimensional account. Rather, they are 
consistent with an approach whereby emotions should be thought of in terms of 
qualitatively different categories possibly related to functional specialization in the 
brain.
This claim is made as dissociations were found between different emotions 
depending on the way the stimuli were manipulated —  the finding of dissociations 
suggests the existence of an underlying system of functional specialization 
(Lawrence et al. 2004). For instance, there were big differences in the way that fear 
was recognised when the stimuli were rotated and inverted compared to the other 
emotions tested. The results reported in Chapter 4 took this point (of dissociations) 
further in that the social context affected the recognition of some categories of 
emotion over others. Furthermore, in Chapter 5 it was shown that different elements 
of the images were critical for the recognition of different emotions. Moreover, in 
development, children do not acquire the ability to perceive affect for every emotion 
at the same rate, which is again supportive of categorical structures.
Therefore, it is suggested that the data reported in this thesis aie easier to reconcile 
with a categorical account rather than thinking of emotions in terms of dimensions.
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Other evidence suggests that emotion categorisation is evident from 5-months of age 
as infants, in a task where they are habituated to seeing different smiles worn by 
different people, prefer to look at a new emotion category expression (feai) worn by 
a new person over a never-seen-before smile (see Bornstein and Aiterberry, 2003). 
For adults, support in favour of categorisation comes from a study where adults have 
been shown to categorise emotional expressions that are conveyed via the vocal 
channel (Laukka, 2005; for similar effects on facial expressions of affect see Young, 
Rowland, Calder, Etcoff, Seth and PeiTett, 1997).
However, it would be precipitous to conclude that the structure of affect can only be 
thought of in terms of categorisation. The findings reported in this thesis aie also 
partly consistent with dimensional theories (at least for an account that specifies a 
pleasantness dimension) as in Experiment 3 both joy and love (positive emotions) 
were affected by the social context. However, despite the fact that both sadness and 
fear are considered as displeasurable it was only the percept of fear that was 
destroyed in the experiments that investigated inversion. A theory that posits 
pleasantness as a dimension would predict that these emotions would not be 
dissociated.
Some authors argue that there is room for both dimensional and categorical accounts 
to describe affect but with superior emphasis on one account over the other. For 
example, Russell and Barrett (1999) argue that dimensions are fundamental (but 
acknowledge that the seaich for categories will continue) whereas Lawrence et al. 
(2004, p-163) postulate that dimensions such as activation and valence may be 
important components of emotion but that these should not be considered as 
‘emotion primitives’ (whereas categories can be). These authors suggest that it is 
likely that the dimensional aspects ai*e processed at higher levels such as the frontal 
(Rolls, 1999) or prefrontal cortex (Davidson, 1992).
It has been discussed how the data fit into models that endeavour to explain the 
structure of affect. However, the data also provide evidence for modular and not just 
categorical processing (see Chapter 1) as inverted feai- stimuli were unrecognisable 
(see Chapter 3). This result is suggestive of a perceptual module for feai'. Also, the
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processing of concrete activities from biological motion has been shown to be IQ 
independent, which is indicative of modularity (Moore, Hobson and Anderson, 
1995). My data for fear inversions live up to Fodor’s (1983) requirements in that 
processing is mandatory and encapsulated from knowledge. However, Fodor argues 
that modules should be innate. The evidence in Chapter 6 —  that the skill to 
recognise affect from biological motion develops at around age 5 — does not support 
Fodor’s claim for innate modules (unless they are latent in early childhood). Of 
course, it might be possible that the dependent variable used here was not sensitive 
enough to show that young children can easily perceive affect from biological 
motion. Indeed, the youngest children tested were able to recognise joy easily. There 
have been few developmental studies to investigate the perception of affect from 
biological motion and so future research in this area is encouraged (see 7.4 for future 
experiments).
That there is evidence for modules refutes Gibson’s (1950; 1979) argument (see 
Chapter 1) that all the information required for vision is contained within the 
stimulus. However, in line with Gibsonian theory, the evidence of modular 
processing does suggest that information is processed in a bottom-up rather than a 
top-down way. In line with Gibson’s ideas, the natural envhonment is a good starting 
point for our enquiries. The results from Experiment 4 show the importance of 
considering the social environment in that the same expressive behaviours signal 
different messages depending on the social context. Thus, it is not enough to 
consider only the intrapersonal aspects of emotion; interpersonal aspects are equally 
important.
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7.4 Validity, limitations and future research 
Validity
This research was conducted to investigate the perception of affect by using more 
natural stimuli than have been used in the past. Overall, the general results verify 
those of other workers in the field in that affect can be recognised from body 
movement. Emotions are complex and cover such a broad class of phenomena that 
they may comprise more than one entity (Russell and Barrett, 1999). Indeed, the 
problem with emotion is that we do not really know how to define it; for example, 
‘anger’ covers a range of behavioiu- — from being slightly annoyed about picking up 
the wrong milk in the supermarket to the act of murder by a frenzied mob. Some 
might argue that until the operational variables are known there is no point in 
investigating a construct. However, it would be imprudent not to investigate 
something that pervades our everyday lives. Therefore, in the meantime — before 
the operational definitions are decided upon —  the best way forward is to conduct 
many studies looking at emotion from different angles in order to build up good face 
validity. The present reseaich should prove useful in this respect.
There is a growing bank of motion capture data available for the purpose of 
perceptual experiments. For example. Ma, Paterson and Pollick (in press) have 
produced, from the walking, lifting, throwing and knocking actions of emoting 
actors, a library of over 4000 movements. These authors have argued that libraries 
such as this will be helpful in describing the general movement properties of affect 
that aie used for recognition. Further, Ma et al. contend that these properties have so 
fax- not been detailed due at least partly to the fact that different research laboratories 
produce different movement samples which aie used for the purpose of a single (or a 
few) studies. I agree with this contention. However, we must be caieful in these 
attempts until the appropriate operational variables are defined. The present reseaich, 
for example, has highlighted that recognition of some emotions is dependant on the 
social situation —  this would not be known if all of the work conducted across
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laboratories used behavioural samples from one librar y such as the one produced by 
Ma et al. (in press).
Therefore, all research that investigates affect is somewhat problematic due to the 
lack of operational definitions for the subject matter.
Limitations
The samples used in this reseaich had good face validity in that the qualitative results 
(Chapter 3) showed that the emotions could be named correctly (apait from disgust) 
on at least half of the occasions. Good test-retest reliability was also demonstr ated in 
the work where recognition was based on the upright and inverted/rotated displays 
(Experiments 1,1a, lb, 2 and 3). However, one criticism of this work in general was 
that only one type of dependent measure (the rating scales) was used throughout the 
thesis (with the exception of the child study). The measurements made by using this 
method were not independently produced as judgments were made for every emotion 
on every trial (rather than having subjects only pick one). This may have some 
implications in terms of violating the assumptions needed for using parametric 
testing procedures. Furthermore, one could aigue that the measurement scale could 
be ordinal (data must be at least of interval level for paiametiic testing). However, 
ANOVA (which was primarily used throughout this thesis as the primar y inferential 
statistical method) is robust against violations such as these (see Howell, 1997). 
Furthermore, even if subjects had been asked to pick only one affect (out of the 5, or 
sometimes 6 or 4 choices available for every trial) they would still have been making 
implicit judgments about the other emotion categories in their heads. Moreover, it 
was useful for further understanding to have this error data to know the way in which 
emotions were confused with each other (for example, the way love was confused for 
sadness without the presence of the dyad —  Experiment 3). Finally, the ANOVA, 
results in this thesis were always reported with due caution in that, if sphericity (see 
Howell, 1997) was violated, the results from more conservative tests were used.
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In Chapter 3 control experiments for obvious confounds such as timing and leaining 
were conducted. However, the dyadic stimuli used in this thesis were quite complex 
and contained many parameters. More simple stimuli such as a single body part, like 
those used by Pollick et al. (2001), may be better for ensuring internal validity. There 
is always a trade off between taking reductionistic approaches which are more likely 
to conserwe internal validity but may compromise external validity. An attempt here 
has been to produce results that are high in both external and internal validity. The 
reseaich here has plotted a middle course.
It is important to note that a shortcoming of this research may be the fact that there 
was no neutral condition inbuilt into the experimental design. However, given the 
communicative context in which the stimuli were produced the production of a 
neutral stimulus might have been difficult. Furthermore, to include a neutral stimulus 
would have been more important if more quantitative methods had been used such as 
signal detection. This research supports the view that some emotions might be more 
functional than others at an interpersonal level. Love is one such emotion; joy is a 
candidate for being another. The research here suggests that that there is little 
difference in the way that other emotions (e.g. anger) are perceived between 
intrapersonal and social levels. However, a limitation of this research was that in 
Experiment 3 the monad condition showed an interlocuting actor with his or her 
partner occluded. Therefore, in this condition the interpersonal context may have 
been still observable albeit with one interlocutor hidden. It might be profitable, 
therefore, to consider a further study where the stimuli aie produced both with and 
without interpersonal interactions in order to assess more fully the contiibution of the 
social context per se. Another idea would be to have a static second actor to imply a 
social context.
Lastly, the natural interaction (rather than a pseudointeraction as in the reflected 
dyads condition) was shown to be important for the perception of some emotions 
such as feai*. Why this was so has not been answered in this reseaich. Cleaiiy, social 
interactions aie complex and there appear to be hidden patterns of movements within 
an exchange that contribute to the perception of affect. Pollick, Lestou, Ryu and Cho
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(2002) have suggested that neural networks are effective pattern classifiers for 
complex stimuli (see also Magnusson, 1996). A discussion of such ideas is beyond 
the scope of the present work. However, Pollick et al. (2002) have used automatic 
pattern classifiers and thereby demonstrated that there ai’e hidden patterns in point- 
light displays that ai'e not picked-up by human observers.
Future studies
The production of movement by an observer interferes with their perception of a 
point-light walker (Jacobs and Shiffrar, 2005; see Chapter 4). This shows that results 
are altered by providing more realistic environmental conditions than those used 
tiaditionally in a laboratory. It was suggested in Chapter 4 that variations in the third 
person’s (the subject’s) social behaviour should be incorporated in the experimental 
design rather than, or as well as, valuations within the visual display itself in order to 
comprehend whether an affordance based framework is appropriate for further 
understanding of these results. Whereas it is not difficult to ask a subject to walk (on 
a treadmill) whilst they make judgments about a point-light walker it is more 
difficult to design an experiment where subjects are required to make judgments 
about affect as well as experience affect. However, it is not impossible: a subject 
could be involved in a computer based virtual reality task where they become 
involved in a social event. However, this idea could be criticised. For example, 
Dennett (1991) has ai'gued that no virtual reality tasks (however realistic they 
become) will ever be able to fool people. Fmthermore, there becomes a point when 
trying so hard to mimic situations in the real world means that good internal (and 
therefore external) validity is lost due to introducing complex designs which permit 
too many potential confounds.
Hadjikhani and de Gelder (2003) have suggested that there are synergies between 
different processing modalities as the same important neural structures involved with 
the processing of affect are shared by different modalities of expression; this 
provides an opening to a new area of reseaich. Further studies could be conducted
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that explore the relationships between the various channels of expression such as the 
face and the voice, or the body and the face.
It can be ai'gued that strong conclusions cannot be made on the basis of the results of 
a single developmental study (Chapter 6). Very little work has been caiiied out in the 
developmental field to explore the perception of affect from biological motion so it 
would be profitable to carry out some further developmental studies. It has been 
assumed for too long that the face is the primar y channel for the perception of affect 
and even though it is likely that infants are exposed to faces more than bodies, given 
the foundational nature of body movement (see Chapter 1) it is possible that infants 
could discriminate affect from kinematics of the body. Thus, Bornstein and 
Arterberr-y (2003) have shown that 5-month-olds can categorise emotions from 
photographs of faces. Therefore, infants of a similar' age would be chosen for a study 
where they would become habituated to different examples of point-light displays 
showing one type of affect, fear for example. Then, for the test trials, the infants 
would be shown examples of fear and happiness in simultaneously presented point- 
light displays. Another idea is to conduct a preferential looking task to see if infants 
can match the sound of voice expressing affect to a point-light display (of the body) 
that depicts the same emotion. This would test for cross-modal processing of affect 
as well as the ability to perceive emotion from body movements (and sound).
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7.5 Conclusion
There are 3 main conclusions that result from the work investigated in this thesis. 
Firstly, the results show that the body is an excellent channel to convey the 
expression of affect. Secondly, the social environment is a defining feature of 
emotion as ability to recognise the stimuli can alter depending on the social context 
inespective of intrastimulus kinematics. Lastly, the work has implications for the 
topic of emotion; different processing constraints exist for different emotions and 
these are indicative of a categorical str ucture for affect. Furthermore, the results from 
Chapter 3 are suggestive of a special module for the processing of fear. The aim of 
this work was to take a social approach to the investigation of affect from biological 
motion. It is hoped that this research will motivate future researchers to take into 
account contextual information, and in particular social cues, in experimental 
designs.
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